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Abstract 
 
In 1985 Australian philosopher John Burnheim theorised an alternative to electoral politics that 
aimed to improve the coherence of policy. Partisan politics was becoming a barrier to pragmatic 
decision-making, amid the power-broking, vote-trading and the inability of elections to create a 
coherent picture of an electorate’s preferences. Demarchy, as he called it, used a decentralisation of 
authority based on government function rather than on geographical constituencies to better focus 
democratic deliberation. His model of democracy is, he claims, legitimised through a more accurate 
representation of the citizens’ interests. Eligibility to participate in a demarchic decision-making 
body is determined by a person’s legitimate material interest in a given issue, with participants to be 
chosen through a random selection mechanism.  
 
Burnheim’s proposal came immediately before a profound shift in the discourse on democratic 
theory; the 1990s and 2000s brought about a substantial debate on deliberative democracy and a 
revival of pragmatism. The changing epoch meant that demarchy was overlooked, regarded as 
utopian and impractical in an age that emphasised deliberative legitimacy rather than liberal or 
republican justifications for governance. 
 
My thesis re-situates demarchy to this modern discursive context. I reconstruct demarchy as a 
model of deliberative democracy, making inquiry and public justification central to its legitimacy. 
However, genuine inquiry and authentic deliberation are difficult to achieve unless participants 
have the skills and dispositions needed to engage in this manner. The development of citizens to 
engage in a deliberative manner is crucial, and, therefore, I argue that demarchy can also be used as 
a learning process for citizenship. Demarchic bodies can provide opportunities for participants to 
conjointly construct their understanding of a given issue, creating conditions for strong decision-
making and developing their capacities for deliberation.  
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Introduction 
 
Winston Churchill once infamously said that “democracy is the worst form of government except 
for all those others that have been tried from time to time”, implying that no form of governance is 
adequate. The often-overlooked context of his aphorism portrays a slightly more nuanced view of 
his words; Churchill had just lost the general election in Great Britain in 1945. World War II was 
over and the British people desired a Prime Minister who would commit to extensive 
reconstruction. Churchill was bitterly deriding the British people’s seeming ingratitude for his 
service in wartime. He believed he was deserving of more appreciation, and democracy was not 
capable of delivering to him his just deserts. Still, Churchill recognised that democracy performed 
its purposes better than the contemporary counterexamples: dictatorship in Germany, communism 
in Russia, fascism in Italy and imperialism in Japan. Democracy did not cause the Allied Forces to 
win the war, but for Churchill it was a preferable form of government to all the others. What, then, 
is it about democracy that makes it preferable to dictatorships, monarchies or oligarchies? 
 
Liberal perspectives see democracy as instrumental in protecting the liberties of citizens in a state. 
If the citizens themselves are sovereign, they would be protected from the tyranny of the few. John 
Locke (2012) saw democracy as the only way to create a legitimate government. For Locke, all 
people were created equally with rights to life, liberty and property. These rights could be protected 
by civil government, with this government requiring the consent of the majority in order to create 
laws. Democracy is crucial to legitimacy, for it is how citizens’ views and interests are 
communicated; consent of the majority cannot be gained through despotism or any other form of 
government.  
 
John Dewey (1940) understood democracy to be a mechanism for communication and a learning 
process. He regarded human life as a social experience and democracy was a method for people to 
understand their differences to one another. Dewey argued that democracy had both instrumental 
value in legitimising decisions as well as having intrinsic value in enriching lives. 
 
For every way of life that fails in its democracy limits the contacts, the exchanges, the 
communications, the interactions by which experience is steadied while it is also 
enlarged and enriched. The task of this release and enrichment is one that is to be 
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carried on day by day. Since it is one that can have no end till human experience comes 
to an end, the task of democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more human 
experience in which all share and to which all contribute. (p. 4) 
 
Under this view, democracy is a way of life. People live and learn democratically, coming to 
better understand the human experience through communicating and working with others 
every day. 
 
Scholarly opinions on the purpose of democracy have continued to evolve, and modern theorists 
also see democracy as a mode of inquiry. This could be seen as a combination of the two 
aforementioned conceptions of democracy; a method of legitimating decision-making through 
exploring people’s lives, interests and circumstances. This type of democracy could be broadly 
construed as deliberative democracy. It has a foundation in pragmatism; Charles Peirce (2009) 
argued that genuine inquiry has the potential to examine not only an issue but the habits and 
perspectives used to frame that issue. A pragmatic deliberative democracy, with participants 
evaluating the ways they approach an issue as well as the interests involved. Context matters for 
deliberative democrats; there is no singular or objectively correct method of addressing a problem. 
Many different forms of deliberative democracy have been developed in the last few decades, each 
with a slightly different purpose.  
 
One alternative model of democracy, demarchy, has been largely overlooked in the field of 
democratic theory and political philosophy and theory generally. The term demarchy was coined by 
Frederick A Hayek (1973) and denoted equality of law for all, with an ancient root in the idea of 
procedural rule (p. 40). In his book Is Democracy Possible? The alternative to electoral politics, 
published in 1985, Australian philosopher John Burnheim appropriated the term demarchy, 
proposing a new form of democracy that he argued would be more effective than existing 
democracies which are no more than “elective oligarchies with monarchical elements” (p.1). He not 
only rejects the present system of electoral and parliamentary democracy but also direct 
participation in the decision-making process by all citizens, including referendums. Burnheim 
intended for demarchy to be a deliberative democracy that more meaningfully reflects the 
preferences of citizens. His preference is for a form of democracy comprising decentralised 
functional authorities selected by lot. Burnheim motivation for developing this idea was to spark 
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philosophical and political debate on the structure of democratic government, the ways we select 
representatives and the rights of citizens in political participation.  
 
Demarchy is a form of democracy that has several important points of departure from more 
conventional democratic structures and institutions. It uses decentralised political authorities in the 
form of legislative or decision-making committees based on function to determine policy. Members, 
who must share a legitimate interest in the function of a specific committee, are selected by a 
process of sortition, rather than electing at regular intervals representatives who represent citizens 
according to geographical constituencies. Sortition is a randomised process of selection by lot, 
which Burnheim argues should be a statistical representation of the population, and which operates 
in a similar fashion to that of criminal juries. A greater emphasis is placed on the committees being 
more deliberative, having a more transparent and practical approach to political decision-making 
than in electoral democracies. He also emphasises rotation of office bearers to ensure maximum 
participation, and in doing so he aimed to create more equitable access to the decision-making 
process. Burnheim (1985) argued that if “political office is attained by lot there are no professional 
political careers. Nobody has to acquire debts to party organisations or patrons in order to gain 
office or hang on to it” (p. 85). The rotational offices would also serve as a learning process, as the 
regular change in participants would develop a “body of experienced, informed people who would 
have an interest in the doings of their successors…[and] it seems very likely that high standards for 
public discussion and responsiveness to the results of such discussion would emerge” (pp. 85-86).  
 
Burnheim’s 1985 demarchic proposal has several conceptual flaws that were noted by critics in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. One of the greatest impediments to realising a model of demarchy is its 
impracticality. Commentators such as Italian philosopher Danilo Zolo (1992) stated that demarchy 
is “unlikely to remain anything more than academic exercises incapable of making the transition 
from paper to reality” (p. 73). Cosmopolitan philosopher David Held (1986) had a similar 
assessment of demarchy’s limited practicability, contending that the task of decentralising 
government functions was hugely difficult to accomplish. They both charged Burnheim’s 
demarchic proposal with utopianism, too concerned with idealised political structures and not 
sufficiently engaged with real-world contexts.  
 
Other commentators, such as Jane Mansbridge (1988) and Philip Pettit (1988) contended that 
demarchy was overly focused on protecting individual liberty in a context where deliberation was 
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becoming of greater concern; philosophical discourse on political legitimacy in democracy revolved 
around public justification of decision-making. Mansbridge (2010) would later be situated within 
the preference-based approach to deliberative democracy, with Pettit (2001) arguing in favour of a 
proceduralist approach to democracy. While neither of these philosophers claimed that Burnheim’s 
demarchic project was a worthless endeavour; they contended that demarchy lacked focus in its 
aims and so would be less effective in protecting liberty and legitimising decisions than other 
deliberative democratic alternatives. Philosopher Gilbert Burgh (Burgh, 1996, 1998) added 
significantly to the demarchic debate by creating a model he called “cross-sectional demarchy”. 
However, there was little debate on demarchy past this point, as other models of democracy were 
seen as more practicable or worthy of experimentation. 
 
Burnheim released new editions of Is Democracy Possible? (a 2
nd
 edition with a new preface in 
2006 and a 3
rd
 edition in 2014). Once again, Burnheim’s proposal failed to inspire serious debate, 
though the reason for this failure was different this time; the discourse on deliberative democracy 
had continued to develop, with new and practical methods of achieving legitimacy and 
discursiveness. Burnheim recognised in the prefaces to these new editions that he had not kept up-
to-date on the contemporary discourse, but argued that his demarchic proposals still merited 
consideration. In 2016, Burnheim set out again to address the problems he identified in modern 
democracy in his new book, The Demarchy Manifesto: for better public policy. He recognised that 
the way he had originally conceived of government was largely speculative (p. vi), and set out a 
series of smaller but more viable democratic experiments. Burnheim also drew attention to several 
undesirable elements of demarchy as he envisaged them in Is Democracy Possible? such as his 
committees, reconceptualising them as councils in an attempt to avoid the negative connotation that 
term has developed. He also created a clearer explanation of their membership, stating that the more 
affected a person is, the greater their involvement can be. 
 
In the preface to the second edition of Is Democracy Possible? Burnheim (2006) laments that the 
dismissive nature of the objections did not assist him in refining his ideas any further. He had hopes 
that criticism would allow him to refine his views, but the objections were instead were largely 
unfavourable and not sympathetic to his demarchic proposal generally. There is an irony in 
Burnheim’s preface that the very quality he believed to be the failing of demarchy (its participatory 
democracy) was the aspect that became far more central in discourse in the 1990s and 2000s. He 
confessed that “[m]y preoccupation with participatory democracy seemed a hangover from the 
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sixties and seventies and my attempts to address Marxist concerns were further evidence of what I 
had to say” (p. iii). Subsequent discourse would come to focus on participation and deliberation, 
two aspects that he emphasised as crucial in his demarchic proposal. 
 
My intention with this thesis is to re-situate the original demarchic proposal into the contemporary 
discourse on deliberative democracy. Burnheim (2014) himself acknowledged in his third edition of 
Is Democracy Possible that there has been an incredible growth in the amount of literature of 
democracy, admitting that “I have not kept up with it in any thorough way and I could not hope to 
bring the references up to do date. What I have read has not changed my view overall. I suggest that 
the text does have a certain rhetorical coherence that I am loath to tinker with” (p. ii). The new 
editions downplayed some of the historically irrelevant justification (such as his antipathy for 
bureaucracy and his Marxist tendencies) but did not solve the substantive objections raised by his 
critics in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
I am grateful for these prefaces as I can now attend to the issues articulated by Burnheim and his 
critics alike. Burnheim may not agree with my methods, but my solutions may be able to propel 
demarchy into 21
st
 century discourse. His original perspective on liberalism is now characterised as 
adversarial, and participatory democracies now emphasise deliberativeness. Demarchic committees 
can also be educative; participants develop the capacities and dispositions needed to deliberate. The 
goal of my thesis is to reconstruct demarchy; I aim to demonstrate how demarchy can further 
deliberation. The crucial aspects of demarchy (functional decentralisation and random selection) 
remain relevant today. They just need to be re-evaluated within the modern democratic literature to 
be practicable and informative. 
 
Chapter summaries 
 
In chapter 1, I describe Burnheim’s purpose in changing the structure of democracy to a demarchy. 
Burnheim is highly critical of electoral democracies, arguing that they do not provide the equality of 
access or the deliberativeness that is required. He contends that representation is not effectively 
achieved when citizens vote for political parties; too many policies on too many issues are bundled 
together when using this partisan system, meaning that a person’s vote in an election for a party 
does not meaningfully convey anything about that citizen’s views. There is no way to know whether 
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a person agrees with all the policies of a political party, or agrees overwhelming with only one of 
that party’s views to the exclusion of all others, or is voting against the other major political parties. 
Burnheim is also frustrated with political careerism; individuals and groups who would ultimately 
prioritise their own careers at the expense of serving the common good. His demarchic project aims 
to provide more equitable access to public deliberation as well as improve the quality of 
representation. To accomplish these aims, he argues in favour of (1) functionally decentralised 
bodies, (2) a random selection mechanism for choosing participants, (3) a greater emphasis on 
deliberation and representative decision-making, and (4) higher levels of coordination between each 
decentralised body. Burnheim contends that using these processes would result in better conditions 
for policy making. 
 
In chapter 2, I explore the critical reactions to Burnheim’s original demarchic proposal published in 
1985. Overall, commentators did not know what to make of demarchy, characterising it variably as 
an exercise in liberalism, adversarialism, communitarianism and anarchism. There was little 
consensus as to the underlying philosophical basis for demarchy and this was a source of confusion 
for many, who considered this evidence of its utopianism. Demarchy is also considered utopian for 
other reasons, such as the impossible task of implementing it in the current political climate and 
ideology of liberal democratic institutions wherein it is likely to be met with harsh resistance from 
career politicians. Another objection is the idealistic view of how participant would conduct 
themselves under demarchic conditions; critics argued that participants are unlikely to engage in the 
civic-minded debate that Burnheim seemed to envision. I also explore a number of more superficial 
concerns raised by critics. While these are not as poignant for Burnheim’s overall theory, I explore 
them in order to create a coherent overview of all objections to his model. These concerns include 
the vague definition regarding the term of eligibility to participate, the difficulties with applying a 
statistical sampling mechanism, and the problem of demarchy’s horizontal governance structure.  
 
In Chapter 3 I discuss an alternative eligibility requirement to Burnheim’s statistical representation 
based on legitimate material interests. In Is Democracy Possible? he argues that a person’s 
eligibility to participate in a specialised functional body is based on their legitimate material 
interests. The purpose of this requirement is to determine who should be able to participate in 
functionally decentralised decision-making. In his view, a person should only be eligible to 
participate if their interest in an issue is both legitimate (non-criminal) and materially affects them 
in some manner. I find this eligibility requirement to be problematic however, as a person’s 
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participation rests on pre-conceived notions of what constitutes a material interest. I reconstruct this 
eligibility requirement to take a deliberative democratic approach to participation. I refer to this new 
requirement as deliberative pragmatic interests. I aim to make pragmatic inquiry as public 
discussion central to determining who is eligible to participate. Functional decentralisation requires 
that potential participants can inform the decision-making process on how they are affected, and I 
contend this can be achieved through public inquiry and deliberation. 
 
In Chapter 4, I analyse the claim that demarchy is a deliberative democracy. Burnheim contends 
that the use of deliberative procedures can greatly enhance the quality of decision-making, and that 
the structure of his model of demarchy can create strong conditions for deliberation. However, I 
contend that demarchy (as Burnheim envisages it) is not a deliberative democracy; the legitimacy of 
this type of government depends on the consent of the governed. In effect, Burnheim has created a 
type of representative democracy in the liberal tradition that removes many of the non-deliberative 
elements that exist in contemporary electoral democracies. The discourse on democratic legitimacy 
has developed and changed direction since the time of Burnheim’s writing of Is Democracy 
Possible? and I reconstruct demarchy explicitly as a deliberative democracy. My contention is that 
demarchy can take a variety of deliberative democratic approaches; legitimacy in a demarchy can 
be based in the public discursiveness of decision-making rather than consent of the governed. 
 
Chapter 5 explores one of the most significant obstacles to inquiry and deliberation: citizenship 
education. One of the criticisms raised of Burnheim’s proposal is that it assumes meaningful 
deliberation will occur but he provides no mechanisms for the development of citizens’ democratic 
character. The character and quality of citizens’ interactions are a crucial aspect for demarchic 
decision-making, especially if demarchy is to be a deliberative democracy. I discuss the role 
demarchy can play as a learning process for citizenship. More specifically, I contend that through 
demarchic procedures, citizens are subject to collective learning process in virtue of being part of 
communal decision-making and in so doing can develop their capacities for deliberation with 
practice over time. Demarchic bodies can be utilised as communities of inquiry (learning processes 
where participants collectively construct a problem). By viewing democracy as both a learning 
process and a decision-making mechanism, the quality of deliberation and participation can 
improve over time as well. 
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In Chapter 6, I examine the various models of demarchy that have been proposed over the last 30 
years. I begin with Burnheim’s original demarchic proposal and how it achieves legitimacy in 
candidate selection. I look at two subsequent models, firstly Burnheim’s ad hoc proposals in The 
Demarchy Manifesto and secondly Gilbert Burgh’s alternative of cross-sectional demarchy. These 
can be viewed through the lens of deliberative democratic theory. While these models may be able 
to achieve certain goals (such as an improvement in procedural equality each model has drawbacks 
depending on the context of the issue. The model of demarchy proposed by Burnheim originally is 
not context-sensitive; a local community with a limited amount of cultural diversity would need to 
utilise different democratic procedures to that of a large multi-cultural nation. Thus, I propose an 
adaptive model of demarchy. For demarchy to be effective as a deliberative democracy, participants 
need to be able to conjointly determine which procedures are appropriate to their context and adapt 
the demarchy concordantly. I contend that an adaptive model of demarchy has no single set of 
procedures, as participants are to conduct an inquiry into which procedures are appropriate and 
which are not. 
 
Chapter 7 is a speculative chapter, where I theorise how a demarchic model of deliberative 
democracy can be utilised in various Australian contexts. One of the primary criticisms of 
Burnheim’s demarchy is its utopianism; commentators have argued that his model could never be 
implemented due to the significant changes needed in existing political institutions. This chapter 
illustrates how demarchy can be adapted to suit complex issues while still being practicable. I 
propose three potential demarchic supplements to existing liberal democratic institutions. Firstly, 
demarchic inquiries, which operate much in the same way as royal commissions but provide greater 
opportunities for citizens to directly participate in inquiry. Secondly, demarchic plebiscites; 
deliberative forums designed to create an accurate sampling of a nation’s considered opinions. 
These would operate in a manner more akin to a community of inquiry than a referendum. Lastly, I 
propose that demarchy can be effective alternative to the legislative assembly were there to be a call 
for a reintroduction of an upper chamber in Queensland, which has been a unicameral legislature for 
nearly a century. My proposal is for a house of review and operates using many demarchic 
procedures, such as random selection of participants, rotational terms of service, and the formation 
of specialised functional bodies to conduct inquiry into specific issues.. This would introduce an 
additional layer of deliberation to a political institution while not interfering with existing 
democratic procedures. Each of these proposals utilise demarchic procedures to improve 
deliberation, and thus illustrating the potential of demarchy as a practical democratic mechanism.   
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Chapter 1 
The Demarchic Project: Making meaningful choices in 
electoral democracy 
 
Contrary to what most theorists see as the hallmark of democracy, John Burnheim (1985) contends 
that “elections are inimical to rule by the people for the people” (p. 62). In his view, people may 
have a set of definite preferences over a range of issues but voting is incapable of expressing those 
preferences. At most a vote may reveal simple consent for an issue but it does not register the 
importance of that preference to the voter; Rather, the purpose of voting in elections “is not so much 
to represent the variety of interests of those who have a vote, but to produce a decision that will be 
accepted by nearly everybody as final” (p. 71).This type of democratic process is used merely to 
gain popular consent and is unable to be meaningfully representative or deliberative. Another 
democratic institution he rejects is the referendum. He argues that “there are sound reasons for not 
regarding referendums on specific proposals as a satisfactory way of controlling public policy…” 
(p. 68). Referendums are both inequitable and non-deliberative, arguing that this process would be 
of advantage to a minority but would be blocked by an apathetic minority. 
 
Unlike liberal or republican conceptions of democracy, and to some degree participatory forms of 
democracy, Burnheim seeks to ensure that those who are affected by a given issue have their 
interests represented. In this chapter, I will explore Burnheim’s (1985) conception of demarchy set 
out in his book Is Democracy Possible?: The Alternative to Electoral Politics. He developed his 
proposal for demarchy to address a number of significant problems that exist within and because of 
electoral democracies. The context of these issues changed over time, prompting him to release a 
second edition in 2006 followed by a third edition in 2014, however these new editions merely 
added a new preface rather than revising the overall content. In these prefaces, Burnheim describes 
how the political context has shifted since his original 1985 book, though he argues that his 
demarchic proposal still has merit regardless of these changed circumstances. 
 
To do this, I will first explain each of the problems he identifies within existing electoral 
democracies. Burnheim argues that voters cannot meaningfully express their preferences when 
participating in electoral politics; party packages. He is also highly critical of direct democratic 
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mechanisms, such as referendums, to be meaningfully deliberative. Additionally, he argues that 
political careerism (building a living off democratically-elected public service) leads to non-
representative and non-deliberative policies. After this, I will explore Burnheim’s alternative to 
electoral policies; a form of democracy he calls demarchy to distinguish it from electoral politics. 
Demarchy decentralises decision-making through autonomous specialised bodies. Representatives 
in a demarchy are chosen using a random selection mechanism for greater equitable access to 
decision-making. Deliberation is more crucial to a demarchy; the specialised functional bodies are 
designed to create better conditions for inquiry as each body only deals with a specific issue. These 
bodies are coordinated by negotiation among themselves or by quasi-judicial arbitration. This is 
distinct from many modern states, which use centrally controlled multi-functional bodies based on 
geography. Lastly, I will explore Burnheim’s latest contributions to demarchic discourse found in 
his 2016 book The Demarchy Manifesto. This book is a new project, outlining several specific 
suggestions for the use of demarchy. However, it is not a sequel; Burnheim uses it as a means of 
improving deliberation and genuine inquiry in the modern context. 
 
The Problem of Electoral Politics 
 
In this section, I explore the four primary problems Burnheim identifies with electoral democracies. 
The first is democracy for elites and party packages. Burnheim argues that elections inhibit 
effective communication between citizens and representatives. He considers the agglomeration of 
people into like-minded groups as a method of simplifying elections while also making voting a 
somewhat meaningless exercise. Voting for party packages gives little indication as to the citizens’ 
preferences on any issue. The second problem he identifies is the professionalization of politics and 
the failure to be representative. For Burnheim, building a career in politics can be directly 
obstructive to meaningful deliberation; politicians may choose to pursue less contentious policies 
because this will preserve their careers rather than serving the public good. Thirdly, he describes the 
lacklustre quality of other democratic mechanisms, such as referendums. In his view, these forms of 
direct democracy are inequitable. He argues that the issues covered in referendums often strongly 
affect a minority while weakly affecting the majority; referendums are inequitable precisely because 
they give all people an equal voting right when they are not equally affected. Finally, he argues that 
political institutions are inappropriately centralised. Political parties gain broad ranging powers 
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when elected and this places too much authority in a group that may not have the qualifications to 
adequately administer all the issues involved. 
 
Elitism and party packages 
 
One of the greatest difficulties Burnheim has with electoral democracies is party packages. 
Individuals with like-minded ideas on governance or similar interests cluster together to form 
political parties, and these people gain competence in governing through their direct participation in 
the democratic process. He argues that these elites go on to compete within the political arena; they 
serve their own interests or ideologies without sufficient regard for genuine inquiry, pragmatic 
policy-making, or representing the whole state. Under these circumstances, deliberation becomes 
minimal. He goes on to state that "if the point of democracy is that good decisions, decisions that 
reflect the long-term interests of the people, should be made, it is questionable whether people can 
know enough to make rational decisions on the very large range of issues that have to be faced” (p. 
2). This problem, he says, has nothing whatsoever to do with an ignorant voting population, and 
that it applies also to professional politicians, social scientists and other elites. Rather, 
 
[i]t is an argument against all centralisation of decision-making power whether in an 
individual, a small group or a mass assembly. Clearly the force of the difficulty is a 
function both of the size and complexity of a society and of the degree to which its 
affairs are ordered by explicit administrative decisions, its degree of socialism. (p. 2) 
 
For Burnheim, these are cogent reasons to reject electoral politics, in which citizens choose 
representatives to make decisions on their behalf. In a large nation-state, or even in a small city-
state, there are simply too many people with too many preferences on too many issues to have all 
citizens to participate directly. Representatives are chosen to fulfil one of the two roles: to be a 
delegate representing the views of a group of people or to achieve goals as they see fit, in 
accordance with the mandate granted to them due to being elected by a majority. Representing the 
views of a constituency is by far the more important quality a representative must have. However, 
politicians tend to cluster into like-minded groups, and these groups will tend to develop alliances 
and hold similar views over most issues to give the perception of unity. Citizens give their votes 
generally not just to individual candidates but also to the political party that candidate belongs to. 
For Burnheim this is the heart of the problem of electoral democracy; polities are multi-functional 
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and voting for a party is to vote in favour of every one of their policy positions (or against all policy 
positions of their opposition). As he points out, 
 
[m]y voting for rather than against does not say how strongly I am in favour of a 
proposal … voting is usually a matter of simply ‘buying’ or ‘not buying’ large 
packages, much of which one does not want. Mere voting tells us very little because it 
registers so little. (p. 62) 
 
Burnheim describes party packages as a simple method of determining elections that give us next to 
no useful information about people’s actual preferences on any given issue. People with similar 
strong political views cluster into groups and these then form parties. Though there may be dozens 
of political parties (some of which are highly specialised), the most powerful tend to represent the 
dominant ideological approaches within a polity (in most cases, progressive and conservative). In a 
two-party system, most citizens tend to express their view for one of the two major parties, and 
electoral success is difficult for minor parties and independents. Electoral politics has major 
drawbacks, even before any governing is done, for example, it cannot assess what people want or 
why they want it. A vote for a party may not be about a citizen’s agreement over a functional issue 
like federal tax policy; it may be a banal and superficial vote against a candidate’s opponent for the 
way they style their hair or wear an unfashionable garment. There is no method of separating 
interest and preferences to build a coherent image of the electorate’s viewpoints. This problem only 
intensifies as the polity grows in size and complexity. As Burnheim observes, “[t]he larger the 
organisation and the broader the issues presented to the voters the less likely it is that the outcome 
of voting will be translated into the sort of concrete output that any particular voter wants” (p. 63). 
 
The limitations of direct democracy 
 
Some issues are of such national importance that direct participation into policy is sought from all 
citizens through a referendum. In some cases, such as constitutional changes, a referendum is 
required.  A specific question is put before all voters, and they must respond with a straight yes or 
no. Burnheim is highly critical of this democratic process for several reasons. He contends that 
regardless of any merits of a specific proposal, referendums are an ineffective way of determining 
public policy for much the same reasons that he provides concerning voting. In his words: 
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[with] specific issues it is very likely that many groups of people and interests will be 
affected much more strongly than others. Equity would seem to require that they be 
given votes in proportion to the degree in which they are affected. Otherwise a 
relatively apathetic majority may block a proposal that is of great advantage to a 
minority simply out of distaste for change or because it involves some relatively trivial 
adjustment on their part. But of course such uneven distributions of interest vary widely 
from issue to issue. Determining the relevant voting structure for each issue would be, 
to say the least, extremely difficult. Moreover, it is often the case that a relatively small 
deliberative body will take a much more enlightened view on a matter than the general 
public does, even when it is a matter in which most people have something approaching 
an equal interest. (pp. 68-69) 
 
Too many people vote in referendums on issues that affect them differently, and thus these 
democratic procedures are disproportionately disadvantageous to those who are in a minority but 
are profoundly affected. Burnheim believes that people prefer stability over most else; that it is 
better to have a law that is somewhat unjust than to take a chance on a new law with an uncertain 
outcome. In Australia, referendums fail more than 80% of the time; only 8 have passed out of 44 
since 1906 (Australian Electoral Australian Electoral Commission, 2012). It is far more likely that 
this result comes from the Australian people’s resistance to change or from a negative framing of 
the issues than from a profound disagreement with the majority of federal proposals.  
 
The professionalisation of politics and its failure to be representative 
 
One of the most grievous issues that Burnheim (2006) identifies is the professionalisation of 
politics. There has and always will be a certain group of people that will seek political office for 
career-related reasons. He observes that political representatives are increasingly professionals who 
seek to use power to advance their careers, which requires political trade-offs and party room deals 
to the detriment of democratic representation.  
 
The progress of careers in an organisation such as a party is determined mainly by the 
internal politics of the party. This would not matter, perhaps, if the processes of those 
politics resulted in coherent choices. But in the nature of the case they cannot generally 
do so. What concessions are made, and where, become a matter of contingencies that 
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bear no systematic relation to the substantive problems. Some who have a weak case 
will be appeased because they are powerful or strategically placed. Others with stronger 
needs will be ignored or dismissed with mere rhetoric because they are not well 
organised or articulate. The needs of particular politicians to mobilise support determine 
which voices are recognised and which unheard. (pp. 72-73) 
 
For many representatives, their choice may be to secure their own position or to make good policy. 
Burnheim identifies two possible outcomes with these professional political operatives: either 
political processes become incoherent or citizens become familiar enough with these representatives 
to choose the better power-broker. People are aware of the limitations of their electoral system, and 
use voting to provide incentives to politicians to act; those candidates who fail to keep election 
promises often won’t get a second chance. He admits with some resignation that “[t]o look upon 
elections as a means of choosing the best representatives is to expect too much of them. The 
performance of candidates is known. The rest merely show some promise. There is little basis for 
most people to make a sound judgement” (p. 73). Career politicians are not necessarily 
incompetent; many proving adequate, sufficient even! But this is all that can be expected from 
individuals who seek public office for their own sakes. Electors understand that they are not 
selecting the best and brightest; only those with a proven track record of competent governing. 
There is simply no better mechanism for electing individuals and parties.  
 
Another of the major difficulties Burnheim has with electoral democracies is its inappropriate 
centralisation (or decentralisation). Politicians and parties often gain significant control or influence 
over issues that do not concern them, and this becomes deeply troubling for those who are affected. 
Decentralisation of electoral politics cannot solve this problem either, as there would be very 
limited ways to educate the public on who their electoral choices are. People would know very little 
about their local political candidates and end up voting along partisan lines anyway. Burnheim 
recognises that “[p]utting each of these various agencies under its own popularly elected board 
would not solve the problem. In practice most electors could know very little about the candidates 
and the issues in the host of institutions by which they are affected. In most cases they would have 
to vote for party tickets, which is really a way of returning these bodies to centralised control” (p. 
77). It is undesirable either way. It is not sufficient to decentralise the governance of specific 
functional issues as the problem of electoral democracies remains. The increased possibility of 
deliberation on decentralised functional issues would be entirely counteracted by the enormous 
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decrease in knowledge about political candidates; there would be effectively no way to be informed 
about so many elections.  
 
For Burnheim, the only advantage to electoral democracy is its ability to displace an unpopular 
government without violence. Parties are elected due to the distastefulness of the alternatives, rather 
than being trustworthy and effective administrators of public policy. He finds this standard of 
governance much too low, and aims for something better. A democracy ought to be able to discern 
public goods, common interests or the preferences of the electorate. Burnheim solution is to remove 
the electoral processes from democracy to improve the quality of representation and deliberation.  
 
The Demarchy Project 
 
Burnheim aims to create an alternative democratic solution to these problems in electoral politics of 
misrepresentation and inappropriate centralisation. His idea was to create a democratic process 
without elections, without careerism, and to create better conditions for participation and 
deliberation. He calls this a demarchy: a democracy with four significant components. The first is 
functional decentralisation; creating separate specialised bodies to administer each function or issue. 
The second, the use of sortition; a randomised process that utilises a statistical sampling to select 
participants for the specialised functional bodies. Participants would serve on a committee for a 
designated period on a rotational basis before being replaced at set interval by a new randomly 
selected participant. The third component of demarchy is the increased emphasis on deliberation. 
Burnheim argues that demarchic bodies should aim for unanimity whenever possible. Committee 
decisions that achieve consensus would be highly legitimate. The fourth component is that a 
demarchy should be arranged so that each specialised functional body coordinates with other related 
bodies. This process is overseen by higher-level bodies; procedural democratic bodies tasked with 
adjudicating disputes between the specialised functional bodies, as well as creating a procedural 
framework for those bodies to operate within. I will now outline these four components of 
demarchy in more detail. 
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Functional Decentralisation 
 
Functional decentralisation is the idea that governments no longer use geographic methods of 
determining political boundaries. Due to the problem that an electoral democracy will always have 
difficulty in centralising or decentralising to the appropriate level, Burnheim’s solution is to change 
the way these boundaries are created in the first place. There has been a developing issue that 
functions (the specific governmental tasks) no longer operate as they once did due to the shift in the 
ways communities operate. Cities, towns, suburbs and other groupings of people are no longer the 
simple, coherent congregations of the past; people are affected by government functions that easily 
transcend those boundaries. Burnheim explains that there are two reasons for this type of 
centralisation; control of funding and ensuring the governed have some measure of control over 
themselves. A centralised government places many functions together for easier control, but this 
ease should not necessarily be its most important characteristic. According to Burnheim: 
 
There is no particularly strong relation between the functions themselves. Many of them 
have stronger practical links with similar functions in neighbouring municipalities or in 
higher levels of government than with other functions at the local level. It is not always 
the case that the geographical area of a municipality is the most suitable unit from the 
point of view of efficiency of operations … The city, the town, the suburb no longer 
exist as communities in the way they did when the structure of our patterns of local 
government was formed. People’s activities take place in a variety of localities and they 
belong to many overlapping communities, most of which have no precise location or 
boundaries or membership. (p. 80) 
 
His alternative is specialised functional agencies; autonomous committees that deal with various 
services such as parks, libraries, recreation facilities, building regulations, health services, and 
household refuse collection operate independently of each other. These agencies work in tandem 
with other independent agencies and together with the many diverse social activities that people 
engage in are part of the greater functional communities or constituencies rather than an inclusive 
geographically located community or constituency governed by single member electorates. The aim 
of this decentralisation is to improve the quality of deliberation by more accurately targeting issues. 
Time and practicality are an issue with any government; there is a limited amount of effort that can 
be directed towards any given problem before the next issue needs to be dealt with. Decentralisation 
17 
 
 
 
increases the amount of deliberation in each issue by reducing the range of issues the government 
needs to deal with.  
 
These agencies run like committees, on which a specific number of representatives, selected by lot, 
deliberate over specific issues on matters of public concern. The composition of the each 
committee, derived from the random selection process, would, according to Burnheim, represent the 
diversity of interests that any given public policy problem affects. Their task is to determine how a 
functional issue will affect people, what the preferences of all affected are, and discern what the 
possible outcomes can be. The representatives are not selected to advise legislators; rather, they are 
the legislators. These specialised autonomous bodies can represent the diversity of interests and 
preferences because of their decentralised control. Burnheim recognises that this shift in 
governmental structure is not enough on its own – the way in which candidates are selected needs to 
change as well in order to suit this new context. Voting would return to choosing candidates along 
party lines and reinforce centralised control anyway. Thus what he suggests is to do away with 
elections entirely in favour of a random selection process. 
 
Sortition and Statistical Sampling 
 
Burnheim proposes that representatives should not be selected by an election process of 
majoritarian voting but by a process of statistical sampling. This is a form of sortition: the use of a 
random selection mechanism from a larger pool of potential participants. This pool of candidates is 
made up exclusively of volunteers who have a legitimate material interest in the specific function of 
a committee. For any given function, a huge number of individuals are affected, and it is from the 
pool of volunteers that are part of this affected group that representatives are chosen. There are two 
significant components of this process: the volunteers’ eligibility to participate and their willingness 
to participate. Eligibility is referred to as their legitimate material interest. What does he mean by 
this? He roughly means to exclude people who merely have intrusive desires for others: 
 
I mean to exclude material interests that are not based on entitlements that are morally 
sound … Their interest must have a more material ground than their thinking on the 
matter. Equally, people may have a good reason to covet things I am entitled to, but that 
does not give them a legitimate interest in those things. (p. 4) 
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It is clear that Burnheim’s practice is exclusionary in nature. It aims to prevent the vote-trading and 
corruption rife in electoral politics by ensuring that only those with a clearly defined and morally 
sound interest can participate. He has a strong desire to ensure that those who are most strongly 
affected have the most say in the matter. The composition of the functional committees is the result 
of a statistical sampling procedure rather than unconditional random selection because of the greater 
trust that can be placed on representatives. Burnheim implies that someone representing a specific 
demographic would hold a great deal more trust because they belong to that demographic 
themselves. Therefore, the most reliable way of selecting a group of people who are representative 
of a specific population is to take a statistical sample of that population.  
 
The theory and practice of sampling is now highly developed. Such a representative 
group could be trusted to act as representatives if they had some stronger than average 
motive for devoting themselves to the interests they represent and acquiring adequate 
knowledge and skill for the task. If they were compensated for the time and effort 
involved the mere fact of their being chosen to be representatives might be sufficient 
motivation for many. For other it would, like jury service today, be an unwelcome 
imposition. It seems preferable, therefore, that representatives should be volunteers. 
Once a statistical characterisation of the various interests to be represented is established 
there should be no problem in selection from those who are willing to serve a group that 
is representative in the statistical sense. (p. 81) 
 
Volunteering for participation is a crucial component for demarchy; it is highly conducive to 
ensuring the strongly affected participate in the process. Volunteers will only emerge from those 
who care about the function sufficiently, and this demarchic characteristic should dramatically 
reduce the number of people who are affected in minor ways.  
 
Burnheim sets no specific time limit on how long a term of service is but does suggest that a 
method of ensuring the committee’s continual representativeness is to have a continuous rotation of 
membership. He sees no difficulty in committee representation if “there is a regular turnover of the 
members of a demarchy, and anybody who is concerned about the way a committee behaves has as 
good a chance as anybody else joining it” (p. 129). Burnheim (1990) captures some of the major 
advantages in more detail in the following statement, which appears in a follow-up article “Democracy 
by Statistical Representation” five years after the publication of his book: 
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Members on each committee would be replaced one by one at regular intervals in order to 
ensure continuity. Political organisations might, of course, urge their members to nominate 
for various committees in the hope of influencing their decisions. But they would not have 
the power over their members that parties now have, since there would be no place for 
endorsement, advancement or patronage. It would be very difficult too, for these 
committees to become corrupt, since the membership would be constantly changing in a 
random way, and those who had served on the committees would probably keep a keen eye 
on their successors. If the committee veered too much in a certain direction that would 
stimulate a rash of nominations from people of the opposite tendency for the next round of 
random selection. (p.26) 
 
The principle of rotation of offices by lot would, therefore, act as a safeguard against corruption and 
permanent political alliances. It would also lessen the likelihood of charismatic authority and powerful 
groups manipulating governments. The focus would be on the specific issues rather than on power-
trading between representatives, a problem in electoral politics that only proliferates over time. A large 
political party may have many policy issue areas, with not all members in agreement on all party 
stances. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) has many internal factions, some of which may not agree 
with certain policies. To successfully work in tandem as a cohesive political party, intra-party deals 
may be struck where a member trades an undesirable vote on one issue for party efforts on another. For 
example one faction may be more concerned with worker’s rights while another may be more 
concerned with social policy. If an issue arose regarding workplace relations (such as paid parental 
leave), the factions may come into conflict and the ALP might find itself unable to unite for a clear 
policy position. One faction or another might need to accept a position that they do not agree with for 
the sake of party unity (under the promise of having a favourable party vote on an issue that faction 
cares about). Under a demarchic model, vote trading is not possible. There is no need to consider the 
political implications on electability for a given environmental policy when there are no elections. 
Representatives are much freer to explore any issue when it is not conflated with irrelevant factors such 
as re-election. 
 
Burnheim recognises that the statistical sampling and the decision making process is fallible, and so 
uses a rotational membership system. At regular intervals, committee members are rotated off and a 
new member (chosen by sampling) in rotated on. It is possible that even an accurate sampling of 
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demographics or legitimate material interests would still have a non-representative membership 
whereby the committee would only discuss or give importance to certain views. Similarly, a 
committee may be overcome with prejudice and malicious intent, resulting in poor decision-
making. In either instance, the regular turnover of members prevents this from being a problem for 
extended periods of time. A massive loss of institutional memory is prevented by rotating only one 
member at a time; it may take many months or even years for a complete turnover in participants. 
 
An emphasis on deliberation and consensus 
 
Another important feature of demarchy is its greater emphasis on citizen participation and 
deliberation than the existing liberal representative system of electoral democracy. Electoral 
democracy is somewhat ineffective at ensuring people’s voices are heard as well as making good 
decisions. It is Burnheim’s (2006) hope that the decentralisation of functions and rotation of office 
bearers by lot based on statistical representation and legitimate material interest will give rise to 
more deliberative governance.  However, he makes no explicit mention of the size of each 
demarchic committee, although he implied that smaller assemblies will produce better deliberation. 
 
Committees strive to achieve as much unanimity as possible in their final proposal 
because unanimity enhances the force of their decision. Committees tend to 
accommodation, assemblies to confrontation. In the large assembly there is neither the 
time nor the capacity for detailed negotiation, and partly because of this each agent is 
usually reduced to representing a single interest … [b]y and large in such situations it is 
easier to be effective in stopping proposals than in proposing constructive alternatives 
… (p. 79) 
 
It is safe to assume that because he thinks committees are more accommodating than larger 
assemblies that he had smaller committees in mind. Nevertheless, there is an unsolvable conflict 
between accurate representation and useful deliberation. Burnheim points out how the more one is 
achieved, the less the other occurs. A large assembly cannot discuss a topic in significant depth, just 
as a small committee cannot be representative of all interests. The balance that demarchy seeks is to 
have a type of optimal balance to its representativeness; the greater number of participants means a 
better representation of a political division’s demographics, but at the same time a larger forum 
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loses a certain amount of deliberativeness. It is incredibly difficult for all to contribute to a 
discussion with so many people involved. 
 
Burnheim (2014) sees his approach as a deliberative democracy, or at the very least has seen it this 
way since his third edition (p. ii), meaning that he wishes for participants to make the best decisions 
they can with the best information available. He advocates publicly justified decisions, but 
confidentiality in the specific deliberations. It is a matter of pragmatic necessity that discussions can 
go wherever they may lead, as participants “should be free to consider alternatives without being 
called to heel by those whose interests they represent. The process of exploration of possibilities 
cannot proceed if pressure groups are in a position to lay down in advance what is negotiable and 
what is not” (p. 79). The reasoning behind any given public policy is known in a deliberative 
democracy; those who are affected ought to know why a certain outcome is chosen so that they may 
develop their own informed opinions on the matter.  
 
Interdependent Coordination and Higher-Level Bodies 
 
The last significant component of demarchy is its interdependent coordination and the use of 
higher-order bodies. An issue arises from the use of decentralised, autonomous functional 
committees, namely, there will be jurisdictional overlaps between the specialised authorities that are 
charged with regulating specified functions. As no one committee has jurisdiction over another this 
could create tensions or perceived conflict of interest. In electoral politics, these conflicts can be 
resolved by the legislative processes (bureaucracy or judiciary) but the demarchic structures require 
alternative solutions. Burnheim looks to the authority of higher-level bodies, to hear “appeals about 
their structure, restructuring them to meet changed circumstances, adjudicating their disagreements 
and dividing up resources among them” (p. 87). The task of higher-order bodies is restricted to the 
adjudication of conflicting claims using generally accepted criteria. Burnheim insists that higher-
order bodies would be coordinating bodies only and “would not be empowered to initiate policy, 
much less dictate to various functional bodies, but to provide a legal framework within which 
productive bodies operate” (p. 87). In other words, there are tasks that functional committees are not 
qualified to deal with on their own, involving conflicts of interest, interpretation of rules, 
arbitration, and, thus, an interdependent committee is needed to deal with these. It is important, 
therefore, that eligibility for participation is not based on legitimate material interest but on 
individual members being nominated by their colleagues on first-order bodies as “having shown the 
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special skill, knowledge and dedication that would fit them for a judicial role. They would 
constitute a sample of those judged most suited to the task by those in the best position to know” (p. 
87). 
 
Higher-level bodies operate with far more discretionary judgment than functional committees as the 
tasks they perform require them to see the nuances of complex situations; tasks which require 
judicious and thoughtful individuals to make context-sensitive decisions. Higher-order bodies are 
centralised coordinating authorities, but their responsibility is restricted to matters of procedure to 
assist first-order bodies and not with the regulation of any specified domain, such as farmland, 
forests or water. It should be noted that while higher-order committees are charged with the task of 
coordination, it is the task of functional committees to resolve their own disputes though this would 
seem to contradict with the previously articulated role of higher-level bodies. This is further 
muddied as Burnheim sees these upper bodies as having no coercive powers or authority to override 
the decisions of functional committees. Indeed, Burnheim insists that their authority is derived only 
from the consent of the governed and that there is no need for explicit powers when citizens will 
agree to abide by their decisions. I do not entirely agree with his view as he seems to imply here 
that the decisions of these higher bodies can be ignored if the affected specialised functional 
authorities choose to defy them. This could conceivably create ongoing problems whereby a 
committee can simply do what it pleases with the only recourse for poor policy-making being the 
rotation of members. 
 
Burnheim could be interpreted here as saying that specialised functional authorities should attempt 
to resolve their own conflicts if it all possible. If this conflict is not resolved in a manner that is 
satisfactory to affected parties, then they can appeal to the higher-level body to adjudicate. 
However, there would seem to be little purpose in a higher-level body if an appeal to their 
judgement can be ignored by a dissenting specialised functional body. I explore the structural 
relationships in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
In many ways, Burnheim’s project operates along parallel lines of reasoning to Vincent Ostrom’s  
(1961) work on polycentrism. This is the view that citizens should self-organise their governance 
around resource or financial centres, rather than around population centres. Ostrom takes a liberal-
consumer perspective of politics, arguing that citizens should be able to select policies that most suit 
them, and that elections are not effective at this task. Polycentrism uses many overlapping 
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governmental systems where there should not be a monopoly of authority. He argues that there is no 
need for a centralised government to deal with the wide variety of social issues. The primary 
difference between demarchy and polycentrism is that demarchy seeks to holistically alter the way 
representatives are selected, and do away with conventional states entirely. Polycentrism seeks to 
more effectively govern consumers and resources through decentralisation. 
 
Another related and contemporary project is David Van Reybrouck’s (2016) bi-representative 
proposal in Against Elections: the Case for Democracy. For Van Reybrouck, there is value in both 
electoral systems and in the use of random selection in politics. He argues that professional 
politicians have levels of expertise and competence far beyond that of ordinary citizens. There is a 
common perception of legitimacy in elected officials; these representatives legitimise the process 
due to being selected by majority consent. Conversely, Van Reybrouck views substantial 
advantages in sortition, arguing that when a representative does not have to be re-elected they are 
much freer to make policy decisions. There is less distrust between the ruled and the rulers when the 
rulers are randomly selected (see Van Reybrouck, section 4.5). Additionally, sortition allows for 
ordinary citizens to develop their own capacities and understanding, raising the overall level of 
competence in the population. He thus proposes a combination of both processes: the bi-
representative system. In practice, this may be using both selection methods in a bicameral 
parliament (e.g. an elected lower house and a randomly selected upper house). He argues that this 
type of mixed selection mechanism incorporates the best of several traditions while minimising 
their deficiencies. This includes the populist tradition of elections, while avoiding the perception 
that voters are a monolithic people. Voting in elections alone may give the impression that voters 
are of one kind alone; there is no way to adequately represent the diversity of socioeconomic, 
cultural and ethnic groups through elections. The bi-representative system grants the advantages of 
direct democracy through drawing lots, but without overlooking the value of political elites and 
experts. Van Reybrouck finds sortition to be a valuable addition to democratic systems, but argues 
that it should not be a holistic replacement to elections. 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to both the bi-representative system and for demarchy. In 
some ways, Reybrouck’s method is more practical as it leaves existing political institutions in place 
and adds on sortition to improve the quality of representation. In this way, there is no loss of public 
confidence in the legitimacy of the government as elected officials remain an important component 
of the democratic process. Demarchy on the other hand is virtually stateless, requiring a 
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fundamental shift away from existing parliamentary or republican models of governance. This 
would be highly problematic to implement, and there would undoubtedly be fierce public resistance 
to such a shift in the way the democracy operates. However, demarchy does remove the problem of 
elections being non-representative and weakly legitimate governments; Reybrouck’s compromise of 
using dual systems still does not address the problem that elections cannot convey any meaningful 
preferences.  
 
The Demarchy Manifesto 
 
More than three decades after his original project, Burnheim released a substantial update to his 
original proposal in his 2016 book The Demarchy Manifesto. In this section, I will discuss the 
purpose of this book and then explore the ways Burnheim has updated his demarchic proposal. The 
most significant change for demarchy is the explicit reconceptualization of demarchic bodies as 
experimental councils, and the greater emphasis placed on public inquiry. The demarchic councils 
are specialised deliberative bodies that are more akin to advisory boards rather than replacements 
for existing democratic institutions. These councils are charged with a more deliberative role; 
Burnheim aims to increase the chances of pragmatic inquiry occurring in local, national and even 
global contexts.  
 
Burnheim (2016) now views his specific demarchic proposals in Is Democracy Possible? as too 
idealised, and therefore “the present text is concerned with immediate practical problems” (vi). The 
new publication emphasises more the practical and experimental aspects of demarchy by including 
proposals in the form of suggested solutions for decentralisation and deliberation:  
  
The underlying strategy is to establish (demarchic) procedures that come to be generally 
recognised as authoritative in their field of policy both by various communities involved 
in that field and by other authorities … My strategy at the global level is in principle the 
same as at the domestic level, to confront existing authorities with the demand that they 
follow appropriately decided policies in certain specific matters where coordinated 
action is needed. (p. 75) 
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Burnheim is not attempting to directly replace existing structures but to introduce new authorities 
and processes that are capable of coping with modern circumstances. This moves beyond the scope 
of the original project somewhat, as some issues have grown in complexity and pervasiveness so 
that greater democratic procedures are needed to mitigate against greater corruption than in the 
original conception of demarchy had foreseen. In many ways, Burnheim (1985) seeks demarchic 
structures as a method of revising or restructuring democracy, a political system that he described in 
his original text as not existing in practice because “[a]t best we have what the ancients would have 
called elective oligarchies with strong monarchical elements” (p. 1). 
 
There will always be disagreements in determining who has a legitimate material interest and 
ascertaining the purview of a given functional authority. He argues that demarchic councils
1
 can be 
set up, experimentally, to deal with the specific issues within each autonomous council’s 
jurisdiction. These councils do not need specific authority as those people who are affected will 
comply with decisions, provided they feel they are being adequately represented. Burnheim (2016) 
finds it acceptable that not all people are civic-minded nor would they share an interest in all public 
affairs; all that is required is that enough people who have a legitimate material interest in a specific 
issue contribute to the public sphere. 
 
It is not just a question of the results we achieve, but of the sort of people we want to be. 
As I said in speaking of moralism, it is not that we all ought to be public spirited. There 
are many other ways of leading an admirable life, but we do need enough people to be 
active in public life, just as we need artists and entrepreneurs. (p. 82) 
 
For Burnheim, public participation is one of voluntary action; no one should be forced to be 
involved, nor is it desirable for everyone to do so. Those who involve themselves can contribute to 
governing, while others can contribute in their own ways. He also suggests the development of local 
public goods. He proposes that there is value in developing local democracies through these 
communities; many issues that affect people directly are those that are close to home. In 
Burnheim’s view, local governance is more prone to corruption as citizens feel the stakes are too 
low to concern them and they fail to engage in democracy at this level. What he says is needed is an 
                                                          
1 One of the changes Burnheim offers is to refer to demarchic councils, rather than committees. This seems to be a relatively cosmetic alteration; he 
still views these authorities as having the same purpose. Most readers would “find committee work unattractive, for a host of different reasons” (2016, 
p. 43). I refer to both demarchic committees and councils (or other terms such as ‘agencies’ used by Burnheim and other authors to describe first-
order and higher-order bodies) interchangeably, as the difference is stylistic and not conceptual. 
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increased social aspect of community; participating in sporting and cultural activities can be a 
method of improving relationships for the democracy without the need for specific structures or 
committees. 
 
Burnheim argues that the more people are aware of the impact of public goods, the better and 
clearer their preferences will be. Local demarchic councils would, therefore, be ideal for these 
public deliberations. He contends that this discernment of public opinion on public goods is needed 
on national and international scales as well. Party politics, he says, is incapable of bringing about 
vigorous deliberations, and has the capacity to only deliver broad policy packages, resulting from 
political trade-offs with factions representing specific sectional interests and powerful elites.  
 
If we are to break free from the grip of party politics the initiative for and structure of 
policy committees has to come from outside that arena. The particular shape of the 
council in a particular matter needs to be determined in view of the range and character 
of the issues it addresses. Once again, what is paramount is getting a vigorous 
discussion and a jury that is well-equipped to derive a practical policy from it. (p. 89) 
 
Burnheim places a great deal more emphasis on creating the right conditions for public discussion. 
Demarchic councils, a combination of first-order bodies which are functionally decentralised and 
determine their own scope (they have functional autonomy) and higher-order bodies (coordinating 
councils), work in tandem to create pragmatic policy. He provides several possible models for 
experimentation such as a specialised deliberative body to ascertain the veracity of climate change 
science. He implies that the search for solutions to global issues is impeded when there is no 
consensus on the nature of the problem itself. An independent demarchic council could be used to 
inquire into the issue and then problematise it in accordance with their findings. This type of body 
would receive input from relevant interest groups and stakeholders but is not beholden to them, i.e., 
not accountable to them. Crucially, each problem that arises is given its own demarchic council; the 
climate change science committee conducts inquiry into the scientific consensus. However, “the 
scientific panel might establish another panel to assign responsibilities to particular agents, multi-
nationals and especially states. That panel would need to involve much broader expertise than the 
scientific panel itself” (p. 101). Burnheim argues that the demarchic structures (decentralised issue-
based bodies) are to have an advisory and deliberative role. He offers several more demarchic 
models for experimentation such as local community building, auditing committees, and global 
27 
 
 
 
demarchic juries. However, they follow the same modus operandi and do not require individual 
analysis. 
 
The Demarchy Manifesto cannot be overlooked if Burnheim’s work is to be taken seriously. On the 
other hand, it would be a mistake to read it as a self-contained articulation of Burnheim’s present 
position to finding solutions for immediate practical problems in matters of public interest. Rather, 
it should be seen as a companion to his original proposal outlined in Is Democracy Possible? 
Indeed, The Demarchy Manifesto is best read as a supplementary text designed to explore the more 
practical applications of his theory proposed in his original text. Nevertheless, his latest contribution 
articulates more clearly what he believes demarchy’s purpose is, namely, to create more pragmatic 
policy primarily through “a process of transferring the initiative in formulation policy options from 
political parties to councils representative of the people most likely to be affected by those policies” 
(p. i). Governance is an imperfect process that must do the best it can, rather than holding fast to 
some ideological position, regardless of circumstances. He argues that our knowledge is fallible and 
that we must accept that we must continually develop our understanding of issues. In his view:  
 
The basic thrust of demarchy is to decentralise those efforts so that what we try to do in 
any particular matter is as closely aligned as possible to specific problems in the light of 
the best understanding we can achieve them. It is a call to stop looking at collective 
choices as implementing the will of people and look at them as problems we need to 
understand and solve one by one. (p. 110) 
 
According to this passage, Burnheim means to end the tenacious demagoguery of politics and to 
genuinely focus on solving societal problems. Some issues are never resolvable, or, at least, we do 
not yet have the means to solve them. Sometimes solutions will backfire because key pieces of 
information are not yet available. A demarchic council will at the very least give those affected by 
an issue access to the discussion, even if they cannot yet fix it. Simply put, Burnheim argues that 
demarchy has a better chance of succeeding at being representative and deliberative than electoral 
democracies: 
 
[Demarchy] is not just a matter of pragmatic experimentation. It is deeply morally 
serious. It offers people roles in which they can express what is best about their capacity 
for creative cooperation. In that way it is a realistic and sober way of giving power to 
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the people in the light of both our unprecedented problems and our novel capacities for 
understanding them. (p. 137) 
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Conclusion 
 
Demarchy provides an thought-provoking account of democracy that has the potential to improve 
the quality of representation and decision-making in politics. However, Burnheim received 
considerable criticism over the last three decades since the publication of his original book. It is my 
aim to explore these criticisms in a broader context. Though I defend demarchy as an effective 
solution to a pragmatic approach to governance, I argue that it needs to be fully conceptualised as a 
deliberative democracy. Burnheim neglects several key aspects of this type of democratic model, 
particularly with regards to citizenship education. Too much emphasis is placed on pragmatic 
outcomes, while I aim to make the deliberation process central to the demarchic theory.  
 
In this chapter I have explored the structure of John Burnheim’s demarchy, in terms of both his 
1985 and 2016 proposals. Demarchy could be an alternative to electoral democracies, using 
decentralisation and random selection as a means of overcoming the inadequacies of 
professionalised politics. It is not a perfect theory as it seems to rely on a utopian view of politics. 
The proposed demarchic structure in Is Democracy Possible is largely incompatible with modern 
political institutions methods. The specific type of authority held by demarchic committees is also 
unclear, and while Burnheim has attempted to resolve these in The Demarchy Manifesto, these 
controversies have continued to plague the project for decades. In the next chapter, I explore these 
controversies and discuss the gaps and inconsistencies in detail.  
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Chapter 2 
A literature review of the demarchic proposal 
 
In chapter 1, I gave an account of Burnheim’s demarchic proposals. I focused on the original 1985 
book as this is where the most cogent and well-explored version of demarchy is articulated; he 
aimed to create a more participatory form of democracy than contemporary electoral models. 
Burnheim hypothesised that using functional decentralisation and random selection would create a 
highly legitimate decision-making process through its radical method of apportioning 
representation. At the very least, Burnheim hoped to further the discourse on participatory and non-
electoral democracies, but his proposal did not have the effect he intended. Many commentators 
regarded demarchy as a utopian vision of democracy: idealised citizens contributing to meaningful 
deliberation, participating through volunteerism. Theorists such as Jane Mansbridge (1984), James 
Fishkin (1991) and Seyla Benhabib (1994) moved the discourse on democracy away from the 
previous liberal vs. republican debate; their perspectives emphasised democratic legitimacy through 
deliberation. The new primary points of contention in the discourse revolved around the methods 
and character of deliberative democracy. These commentators were doubtful of demarchy’s ability 
to achieve its aims given the new models being developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
In this chapter, I will conduct a review of the commentaries of demarchy. I argue that in order to 
update demarchy to a 21
st
 century context, it is necessary to look at its strengths and weaknesses in 
the original context. To do this, I have categorised the objections into four major sections: 
placement in the theoretical context, practical implementation, citizenship and inquiry, and specific 
issues with demarchy. In the first section, theoretical context, I discuss the various interpretations of 
demarchy’s philosophical basis. There is no consensus as to whether demarchy is a liberal, 
participatory or communitarian democracy. Next, I explore the many obstacles to demarchy’s 
practical implementation. Critics expressed their incredulity at the prospect of using demarchy 
when there would be a hostile resistance on the part of existing political elites; demarchy was seen 
as incapable of being put into practice. In the third section, I explore the objection to Burnheim’s 
utopian conception of citizenship and inquiry. Critics argue that demarchy does not adequately 
address problems of unequal power and education in citizens. However, several proponents of 
demarchy such as James Walker (1992) and Gilbert Burgh (1996) see its value as an avenue for 
deliberation and the development of citizens’ capacities. Finally, I will explore some of the specific 
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criticisms of demarchic structures. In this last section, I discuss the challenges involved in using 
Burnheim’s conception of legitimate material interests, the random sampling process, and the use of 
specialised functional bodies and higher-level bodies. These more specific challenges, while less 
fundamentally problematic for demarchic theory, are worth exploring as a matter of practical 
application. If demarchy is to be ever used as a form of democracy, the limitations of these practices 
need to be evaluated. 
 
Demarchy in the theoretical context 
 
In this section, I discuss the problem of Burnheim’s engagement with the philosophical discourse 
on democracy. To do this, I will briefly examine the history of that discourse, and argue that 
Burnheim’s views are couched in the debates of the 1960s and 1970s. After this, I will explore the 
reactions to Burnheim’s 1985 proposal; there was little agreement on the underlying purpose of 
demarchy. Demarchy can be categorised as an adversarial model however, and views it as a step 
away from the developing discourse on deliberative democracy.  
 
A significant problem with Burnheim’s demarchic proposal is his non-engagement with the 
contemporary debate. What does this mean? Up until the 1960s and 1970s, discourse on democracy 
focused on debates about liberalism and republicanism; a disagreement epitomised by John Locke’s 
(2012) notions of life, liberty and property and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (2002) theory of freedom 
through self-determination. Liberalism contends that people should be free of all undue influence, 
with democratically-obtained consent being crucial to the legitimacy of government decision-
making. This is the negative conception of freedom, and was a significant component of discourse 
during the mid to late twentieth century. The positive conception of freedom, illustrated by 
Rousseau, describes the way people collectively control their own affairs through participation. 
Groups of citizens discuss their interests and create the general will: political decision-making is 
legitimised through the collective formation of this will. The influence of this discourse on 
Burnheim’s theories can be seen in Is Democracy Possible?; he specifically cites liberal democrats 
such as Hayek (1973), John Rawls (1971) and CB Macpherson (1977) in his discussions about 
liberty. He is also influenced by alternative democratic processes such as those offered by Robert 
Dahl (1971), or the more anarchist governments suggested by Robert Nozick (1974) and Michael 
Taylor (1982). These works influenced his ideas about participation and the legitimacy of decision-
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making; Burnheim’s demarchic proposal purports to be a combination of equitable access to 
participation and legitimacy through deliberative consensus. 
 
There are a number of disparate views as to the crucial aspects of demarchy and its primary 
purpose. One of the most common perspectives on demarchy is that it is a global democracy; 
political theorists such as Jost Delbruck (2003), Massimo La Torre (2005) and Thomas Meyer 
(2002) see demarchy as a means of eroding the current view of political sovereignty that 
emphasises nation states. They view demarchy as only practicable on the global scale. Another 
noteworthy perspective is that demarchy is an exercise in communitarianism. In “Debating 
Democracy” Tony Lynch (1989) sees demarchy as an alternate form of communalism, arguing that 
Burnheim was creating a “democratic socialist reconceptualisation of the Libertarian polity Nozick 
sketches …” (p. 111). Esref Asku (2007) holds a similar view, characterising demarchy as radical 
communitarism, whereas John Dryzek (1995) more strongly sees demarchy as being firmly situated 
within the liberal democratic tradition. For Dryzek, demarchy only achieves legitimacy in its 
decision-making through aggregating the preferences of participants. Critics are unclear about the 
specific philosophical foundations or overarching purpose of demarchy. Burnheim used his notion 
of legitimate material interests as a means of equitably apportioning representation. Democratic 
legitimacy is to be achieved for demarchy through consent of the governed, and for Burnheim this 
consent must be obtained from those who are affected (the legitimately materially interested). The 
political discourse in the 1980s began to characterise the way citizens participated, and not simply 
the purpose of that participation; adversary democratic processes emphasise a contestation of 
interests in contrast to deliberative democracies which emphasise public deliberation. Political 
philosopher Phillip Pettit (1988) contends that demarchy does not offer a superior model to 
republicanism. He contends that public-spirited citizens under a republican democracy would 
introduce a number of improvements to the decision-making process, such as intellectual 
accountability, public justifiability, and consideration of the common good. For Pettit, “if the 
argument ascribed to Burnheim seems persuasive, that may be because the framework of 
consideration is just the adversarial conception of political life” (p. 107). In his view, demarchy is a 
structural re-arrangement of adversarial democracy, but this in itself may not have a substantial 
impact on creating legitimate decisions through deliberation. To have deliberative legitimacy, there 
must also be a greater focus on changing the way citizens interact. 
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Mansbridge (1988) is also doubtful of demarchy’s ability to legitimise public decision-making. In 
her view, demarchy might be able to provide equal access to the decision-making process, but 
substantial inequalities would still remain unaddressed: 
 
Burnheim's treatment of both negotiation and lot, however, gives insufficient attention 
to the theoretical and practical problems of unequal power. As experienced mediators 
realise, negotiations usually convert power into settlements that reflect the relative 
strength of the negotiating parties. While negotiators themselves explicitly confront and 
worry about this problem, Burnheim neglects it, perhaps because he may envision his 
scheme taking place in a “genuinely classless society.” This point is obscure in his 
presentation … even leaving the resulting inequalities of individual wealth to the side, I 
cannot see how negotiations between producers and consumers, regions rich in 
resources and poor regions, professionals (with verbal and organising skills) and manual 
laborers … will produce results that meet the democratic criterion that in moments of 
conflict every affected citizen ought to count equally (or, as Burnheim would have it, in 
proportion to the degree to which they are affected) in the outcome. Negotiation, while 
an important democratic tool, needs to be combined with mechanisms that redress 
unequal power. (pp. 656-657) 
 
Mansbridge (1983) argues against adversary democracy in favour of deliberative democracy (what 
she terms unitary democracy). She argues that a democracy is legitimised through a substantive 
equality, and this is only possible if citizens to work together for the common good through a type 
of civic friendship. She argues that equality is achieved through respect, face-to-face discussion, 
identifying common interests, and unanimity in decision-making. Mansbridge strives towards 
substantive equality in decision-making, whereas Burnheim is creating a procedural equal of access. 
 
I tend to agree with Pettit’s and Mansbridge’s criticisms, at least in the sense that demarchy may not 
be able to further equality substantively. Burnheim has created a proposal for a fascinating 
democratic experiment but has not changed the character of interaction within those processes. I 
contend that Burnheim’s demarchy would, indeed, make it difficult to create systemic inequality 
due to its decentralisation and random selection mechanisms. However, there is nothing to prevent 
inequalities from arising in each committee. Each specialised functional body can still operate as its 
own self-contained adversary system; Burnheim may be correct in his assertion that there would be 
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no more careerists, but he also has offered no mechanism to improve the quality of deliberation. 
This inequality is as much a problem within demarchy as for its implementation; I explore the 
problem of existing political elites in the next section. 
 
The problem of implementation: political realities 
 
One of the more mundane but still important concerns with demarchy is its lack of practicability in 
a modern political context. In this section, I will discuss one of the more common objections; that 
demarchy would never have the political support needed to be implemented in reality. Demarchic 
proponent  Brian Martin (2001b) views demarchy as a model of democracy best suited to social 
experimentation, arguing that demarchy could be adapted to suit the political and social context. 
However, Martin (2001a) also recognises the difficulty of implementing a demarchic model within 
existing politics.Other commentators such as James Simmie (1986) and Janet Ajzenstat (1986) see 
this implementation issue has a far more intractable problem. Simmie (1986) has argued that 
implementing a demarchy is unrealistic given the ways politicians are currently behaving. He 
contends that many politicians are dedicated careerists and that “it is highly unlikely that [elected 
officials] will agree to give them up voluntarily in the future. This would require a degree of 
philanthropy which politicians are not noted for” (p. 288). Simmie is doubtful that politicians would 
ever be willing to relinquish their control for the same reason Burnheim would see them removed 
from power: their priortising personal gain over the common good. Ajzenstat (1986) also makes this 
same assertion, arguing that moving away from contemporary elitist partisan politics is impractical. 
She is uncertain that using a random selection mechanism would solve the problem of ambition:  
 
The lottery is meant to prevent rule by entrenched elites. But as a result there will be no 
political careers. Where will the ambitious congregate? Burnheim gives a good and 
sympathetic account of Whig liberalism. Certainly he is as convinced as any Whig that 
power corrupts. But perhaps he underestimates the measures required to curtail 
ambition. According to Whig theory the political institutions designed to trap and 
harness ambitious elites must be baited with the promise of a gratifying amount of 
power. (p. 639) 
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Both Simmie and Ajzenstat strongly contend that the existence of political professionals and 
partisanism presents an almost insurmountable challenge to implementing demarchy. For both, 
political operatives are there for their own purposes and there seems to be no way of dealing with 
this obstacle whatsoever. In his book chapter “Demarchy: a Dubious Conception of Democracy”, 
Christian Hiebaum (2013) argues that elections should not be removed due to the necessary role 
they have in structuring public debate. He views elections as the most effective way for issues to be 
publicly explored as there are no other viable alternatives for public discourse. Hiebaum contends 
that for democratic discourse “there may be some supplements, but there are no real alternatives to 
the struggle of political parties for votes, for communicative power” (p. 93). Walter Kendall (1986) 
interprets the move away from electoral politics differently, as he does not think that political 
parties would need to be made redundant. He argues that they could still be an important component 
of deliberation, seeking “to influence public opinion rather than run competing candidates” (p. 658). 
Kendall interprets the demarchic structure as one that refocuses and retargets politics. Politicians 
would need to change their goal to be persuasion and education, rather than popularity and 
pandering. He implies that political parties in a demarchic system would be lobbyists, jockeying for 
influence and attempting to shape political debate.  
 
In The Demarchy Manifesto, Burnheim explicitly argued that demarchy is not a directly applicable 
model of democracy to be used in any context. He explicitly proposes demarchy as a series of 
processes that could be adapted for each context; this is the reason why he offers several distinct 
varieties of demarchy. I contend the issue of practical implementation as a significant issue in the 
short term but ultimately solvable in time. Simmie and Ajzenstat have valid concerns about the 
strategic implementation of demarchy, and careful thought and planning would need to be 
conducted in order to utilise a full demarchic structure. However, Burnheim’s proposal is one of 
experimentation and would not necessarily have to be instituted on a wide scale initially. Small-
scale experiments, such as in local councils, would be sufficient to prove the viability of demarchy 
and to gain the support of the population. It would be a slow and gradual process to discover where 
demarchy would be effective and how it can be best utilised. Demarchy is only impractical when 
seen as an immediate democratic alternative; any significant change to democratic institutions and 
processes would take time for citizens to acclimatise to them. The capacities of citizens to 
acclimatise and deliberate are also a problem for demarchy however. Burnheim (1985) makes 
several assumptions about the democratic capacities and dispositions of participants, such as mutual 
trust, willingness to cooperate, respect, and reciprocity (pp. 88-89). He states that changing the 
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“ways in which entitlements to resources and rewards are generated and appropriated are crucial…” 
(p. 89) but this only mentions what is needed, rather than stating how this is to be achieved. 
 
Idealised citizenship and inquiry 
 
One of the significant challenges to demarchy is in Burnheim’s perspective of citizens’ democratic 
engagement. To demonstrate this, I will first explore commentators’ objections to the idea that 
citizens are willing and able to participate in the manner demarchy requires. I will then explore 
Burgh’s response to this, as he argues that demarchy itself can be used as a learning process. 
Demarchy does far more than rearrange democratic processes to make them more effective and 
efficient; it requires a significant change to the way people participate as well as a dramatic increase 
to the number of people willing to participate. This problem is not explored in detail in the 
literature, as Mansbridge (1988), Pettit (1988) and Ajzenstat (1986) all allude to the difficulties 
involved in improving the quality and character of participation. Mansbridge (1988) argues that 
insufficient attention has been paid to inequalities that exist in democratic systems, stating that 
“negotiations usually convert power into settlements that reflect the relative strength of the 
negotiating powers. When negotiators themselves explicitly confront and worry about this problem, 
Burnheim neglects it, perhaps because he may envision his scheme taking place in a ‘genuinely 
classless society’” (p. 656). Pettit (1988) views demarchic participation as too strongly entrenched 
within an adversary conception of politics. Demarchy “will have some force only for those who 
accept the dominant, adversarial conception of political life. It will carry no weight with those who 
endorse the alternative, republican conception …” (p. 106). For Pettit, the demarchic process distils 
adversarial politics into a more potent form but does not improve the quality of deliberation and 
inquiry. He seeks a democratic process that looked beyond self-interest to the common good, 
contending that demarchy would only bring about improvements to the common good incidentally. 
 
One of the advantages of electoral democracies is that they do not require that the citizenry 
participates to any great extent. Not all citizens are required to understand issues, listen to others or 
even vote in their own self-interest. Lynch (1989) argues that a difficulty with Burnheim’s 
conception is the utopian view of citizenship. For Lynch, “persons do not generally enter the realm 
of public policy discussions entirely given over to the desire to discover and support the best argued 
decision” (p. 117). He is concerned about both the quality and character of political participation, as 
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he implies that bringing together participants through demarchic processes would not create 
superior deliberation. A cynical (but likely realistic) view of participation would be that the average 
voter shows up to their polling place once every few years and votes for the most charismatic 
individual. Those in power are the ones who negotiate, compete and cooperate to create laws and 
determine the usage of public resources. Deliberation and inquiry requires participants to have 
communicative competencies, and elites are those who develop these skills to a high level. In 
countries with millions of citizens, the ability to create competent political elites is not a difficult 
task. 
 
Demarchy, however, creates a new problem. In a decentralised committee that uses a random 
selection process to choose its membership, there is no guarantee that the layperson will be up to the 
task of governance and decision-making. Burnheim (1985) argues that the process itself would be 
instructive, and that members would rapidly gain the competence needed to do the job (pp. 127-
128). This notion of developing competence through participation has significant merit (I explore 
this in detail in chapter 5) but was met by some resistance by commentators such as Walker and 
Burgh, philosophers of education who both see the learning potential in demarchy but argue for 
some changes to its conception.  Walker (1987) argued that a demarchic society would have 
significant benefits, but would require that citizens hold many habits of mind and democratic 
qualities in order for demarchy to function: 
 
Burnheim implicitly acknowledges as much in pointing out that one of the empirical 
conditions for demarchy is a well-educated population that is reasonably democratic and 
tolerant in its social attitudes. Other empirical conditions include ample productive 
technology, a willingness to participate in matters that interest one and to leave alone 
those that do not, and a desire to avoid rigidity and concentrations of power. As 
Burnheim observes, these conditions are reasonably secure in the advanced countries. 
(p. 328)  
 
Walker argues that demarchy requires that citizens have a number of dispositions in order to work 
well, and this may not be feasible in a number of contexts. If deliberation is conditioned upon these 
qualities already existing in participants, then demarchy would be ineffective in any society which 
did not strongly develop these democratic dispositions. Walker’s contention is that “demarchism 
remains a theory of the kind of political boat we require, not the boat we are in” (p. 329). A 
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different type of education, politics and social interaction is needed for demarchic success as people 
must develop certain types of democratic skills and dispositions in order to bring about Burnheim’s 
ideal. Overlooking demarchy as a democratic learning process misses the opportunity to improve 
the quality of deliberations, citizen engagement and outcomes for the democracy. 
 
Burgh (1996) contends that demarchy can be a democratic learning process in itself. A fully realised 
demarchic structure is to be used as a democratic way of life. Burgh views demarchy through its 
functionally decentralised processes as a method of developing citizens’ capacities. He says: 
“Needless to say, an important component in the restructuring and maintenance of a demarchic society 
is the fostering of the democratic character of the citizenry. It is vital, therefore, that children within 
democratic communities learn to behave democratically” (p. 242). In his attempt to create a superior 
structure for democracy, Burnheim (1985) has neglected an essential component: the education of 
the people within it. As Walker and Burgh have pointed out, demarchy does not necessarily 
improve the deliberative capacities of participants; the processes may enhance the quality of 
decision-making, but not the character of deliberation.  
 
Democracy is not merely a decision-making mechanism; it allows people to communicate ideas, 
collectively problematise issues, and deliberate on possible outcomes. The character of the 
interaction is of greater importance than the outcome; when the citizenry is poorly-informed, their 
ability to participate meaningfully is negligible. Democracy should exist as a learning process for 
citizens to develop an understanding of issues, the interests of others, and reflect on themselves and 
their own involvement. However, this in itself is a near impossible task without some amount of 
education. Carson and Martin (2003) favour the use of demarchy as a more participatory and 
deliberative democracy. They have a more optimistic appraisal of demarchy’s ability to develop 
citizens’ capacities; their assessment of functionally decentralised deliberative bodies, based on 
cited studies and small experiments, came more than a decade later than most critics of Burnheim. 
They state that experiences “with policy juries and planning cells suggest that demarchy would 
generate a high level of citizen participation” (p. 5). While Carson and Martin are also cautious in 
the use and implementation of demarchy, they do argue that setting up these functionally 
decentralised committees could provide greater opportunities to develop a more engaged and 
informed citizenry. 
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Many critics make similar comments; that demarchy is heuristic (see Mansbridge, 1988; McGaw, 
1988; Walker, 1987), providing opportunities for citizens to become more competent at decision-
making over time. Ensuring that participants meaningfully contribute is a challenging aspect to 
demarchy as any citizen with a legitimate material interest and sufficient education will participate, 
but many who ought to, such as those who must dedicate their time to earning a living, are not able 
to. As I discussed in the introductory chapter, the discourse on deliberative and participatory 
democracy has shifted direction since the time of the 1985 edition of Is Democracy Possible? If 
demarchic structures do prove to increase the amount of participants in the political process, greater 
attention needs to also be given to the quality and character of their participation. I agree with 
Mansbridge’s (1988) characterisation of demarchy as an adversarial system and that there needs to 
be a move towards a model that emphasises deliberativeness. A crucial aspect of deliberative 
democracy is in the development of citizens’ capacities to engage in genuine inquiry. Demarchy has 
potential to operate as a deliberative democracy, but several specific processes within Burnheim’s 
model may stifle deliberation rather than enhance it. 
 
Specific problems with the model 
 
So far, I looked at the broader, macro-level conceptual difficulties of demarchy to situate it within 
the field of democratic discourse. Burnheim conceives of demarchy as a kind of deliberative 
democracy, using his model to achieve equality, legitimacy, and deliberativeness in decision-
making. In this section I explore some of the commentaries and criticisms of Burnheim’s 
statistically representative demarchy. These aspects merit discussion but are more superficial due to 
their being problems of implementation; they need to be examined for their purpose and 
effectiveness but are not as troublesome for demarchic theory as the problems so far mentioned. I 
will examine his aims with regards to three significant aspects of demarchy: legitimate material 
interests, sortition, and the roles of specialised functional bodies and higher-level bodies. Firstly, I 
will look at how Burnheim conceives of legitimate material interests as an eligibility criterion and 
this is problematic. While the literature has not in any depth explored the problems associated with 
the concept of legitimate material interest, I have reservations about its use as an eligibility criterion 
due to the vagueness and exclusionary nature of the term. I follow this with a discussion on the 
various perspectives and criticisms of Burnheim’s statistical sampling method. Both Mansbridge 
(1988) and Burgh (1998) view this selection process as flawed due to the limitations it places on 
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participation and I will explore these criticisms. Lastly, I will discuss the difficulties in using the 
demarchic structures (specialised functional bodies and higher-level bodies) proposed by Burnheim. 
It would be difficult to create specialised functional bodies for any number of issue areas, and the 
use of higher-level bodies to solve the problem in creating the authorities to administer these 
ambiguous issues is inadequate.  
 
Legitimate Material Interests 
 
Burnheim (1985) description of legitimate material interests is a somewhat crude formulation that is 
lacking in detail; a material interest being one that “excludes intrusive desires about how others 
should fare” (p. 4) and legitimate in excluding material interests that are morally unsound. A 
legitimate material interest is an interest that is material in some way, based on moral entitlements. 
Lynch (1989) expressed dissatisfaction about this definition, arguing that distinguishing between 
having strong feelings on a matter and having a material interest is crucial for liberalism. Lynch 
states that “the notion of material interests needs to be spelt out, not only because it is clear that 
material does not mean, say, financially material” (p. 113).  It is possible to infer several goals from 
his statement though, as he implies that he wishes to exclude harmful, criminal and malicious 
interests from the process.  
 
I have three objections to this: firstly, malicious and criminal interests are unlikely to be brought to 
public deliberation. Secondly, an unlawful interest may still become a lawful interest given public 
deliberation. Abortion, homosexual marriage, and cannabis usage are all examples of once-illegal 
practices that are gaining legality around the world due to their inclusion in the democratic process. 
Apportioning representation to only those with a legitimate material interest may exclude many 
groups from participation due to a pre-determination that their interest is illegal or immoral. 
Thirdly, I also disagree with Burnheim’s characterisation of “material” interests as its usage is 
unclear at best. Does a material interest only count as material due to it having some effect on a 
person’s property or opportunities? Does it refer to the person suffering any effect from the issue at 
all? How does a person measure an opportunity cost? What of long term impacts of issues, such as 
climate change? Additionally, some issues are wide-ranging and ethical in nature. The issue of 
when a life begins is an issue that should surely be counted as a material interest for all but the issue 
of the legality of abortion hangs directly on this determination. What is the boundary between the 
issue of life and the issue of abortion? Burnheim’s view of legitimate material interests attempts to 
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address these concerns, but a more nuanced eligibility requirement for participation is needed. I will 
discuss this in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
In The Demarchy Manifesto, Burnheim (2016) cautions against a certain type of moralism, 
specifically arguing that blaming people or groups for their type of participation is unproductive. He 
sees demarchy as a method of allowing all to participate in the way they are capable of and is 
optimistic about the outcome. He states: 
 
A social order in which the greatest possible variety of activities that people find 
worthwhile flourishes is a public good that everyone can enjoy and value. Although the 
aggregate result will not be designed to express some particular moral philosophy or 
objective, both the particular polities and the overall result can be expected to embody 
the whole range of moral concerns. (p. 59) 
 
Burnheim’s new demarchic project has moved away somewhat from the position that legitimate 
material interests must be based on concerns that are morally sound, as he intends to include a 
greater range of viewpoints. In Is Democracy Possible? this was problematic as the definition of 
morally sound could be brought into question but the more troubling component is the need for a 
pre-existing set of moral standards. Demarchy’s purpose is to bring in all those who are affected by 
an issue and allow them to determine the right action for themselves. This process is undermined if 
one particular set of morals is privileged over others. For example, a committee or council that is 
initially created by those from a Judeo-Christian background will unavoidably have particular habits 
of mind, even if they do not strongly identify that way. There may be subtle perspectives or 
prejudices based on culture, gender, sexuality and the like, though this is an unavoidable problem. 
Awareness needs to be raised of these perspectives for a more deliberative democratic process to 
occur. 
 
Burnheim’s new legitimate material interests is based on some kind of pluralistic values system. He 
is attempting to allow for multiple perspectives to be considered legitimate while disallowing none; 
his pragmatism suggests that the difference between people exists, and that all should have an 
opportunity to contribute. I agree with the notion that multiple perspectives should be included in a 
demarchy, but I find it self-negating as an eligibility requirement; if many points of view and values 
systems are able to justify their eligibility, then it will be difficult to determine who should be 
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involved at all. If someone makes this determination, it will be based on their values, which then 
defeats the appeal to pluralistic values Burnheim implies in the Demarchy Manifesto. 
 
Sortition and statistical sampling 
 
Statistical representation is a novel approach to selecting representatives, although this is met with 
some resistance in the literature. Burnheim argues that the demographics of a society can be 
relatively easily calculated or measured through technological means, but I would argue that this 
does not address the problem of which demographics to include. There are simply too many factors 
that could be taken into account without first considering what is being sampled.  
   
Mansbridge (1988) approves of the goal of legitimate material interests but implies that demarchy’s 
other processes will be problematic for maintaining adequate representation. She argues that, 
 
Burnheim’s statistical sampling process would not prevent key differences arising 
through self-selection and self-reinforcement. Nor would relying, as Burnheim does, on 
rapid turnover, publicity, and public opinion solve the problem of the resulting biased 
representation without some form of formal accountability, which he rejects. Turnover 
is limited by the need for experience, and even the most politicised public would not 
have the time to monitor adequately the many different agencies Burnheim proposes. (p. 
658) 
 
The continuous rotation of members may be a good idea, but at the same time it will interfere with 
the inclusion of sufficiently competent and eligible participants. She argues that even with a huge 
amount of politically engaged citizens, this rotation will run through too many of the legitimately 
materially interested. Eligibility in such a narrowly defined group may be practicably incompatible 
with both statistical sampling and continuous rotation at the same time. In his book Non-violence vs 
capitalism, Martin (2001a) argues that one of the weaknesses of demarchy is that specialised 
interest groups may not get a voice in decision-making. It may be a challenge to claim that the 
decisions of certain specialised functional committees are legitimate, as interest groups “would not 
be guaranteed a special role when decision-makers are chosen randomly” (p. 99). The sortition 
process may provide equal access to participation, but this equality may potentially come at the cost 
of well-represented deliberation. 
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I agree with Burnheim’s reason for using statistical representation as it ensures that all within a 
policy have a chance to participate. The sampling process he outlines is suitable in certain contexts 
(such as large issues areas that affect all people, such as economic policy and healthcare) but there 
are some contexts in which one legitimately materially interested group form a supermajority Those 
with a statistically small but legitimate material interest will likely be left out of the process unless 
special care is taken to ensure their inclusion. For example, all citizens have an interest in the use of 
land in Australia, but the concerns of Indigenous Australians are unique. This particular 
demographic makes up approximately 3% of the population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013), 
meaning that any statistical sampling would likely overlook this group; they have only one in fifty 
chance of being able to self-represent. Without a quota of minority participants, domination by the 
majority is unavoidable. I do not entirely disagree with the use of sampling as it is conceived by 
Burnheim, in terms of using legitimate material interests alone. At the very least, greater specificity 
is required in determining who is sampled and why. It is not necessary to create a model of 
statistical sampling for all cases, but it is important to at least discuss the reasons why people are 
selected. 
 
I argue that a more inclusive eligibility requirement is needed. Thus, in Chapter 3, I discuss an 
alternative kind of eligibility: a deliberative pragmatic interest. Legitimate material interests exclude 
many people from discussions in which they ought to be a part. Some political issues require the 
discussion of fundamental problems (such as the sanctity of life and human dignity) but the material 
interests are difficult to quantify, and Burnheim’s demarchy would exclude these. I aim to create an 
explicitly deliberative democratic model of demarchy (as opposed to statistically representative 
demarchy); with an inclusiveness to citizens’ eligibility to participate. A random selection, not only 
of those with legitimate interests but also of deliberative interests should be made; those who are 
affected can bring something unique to the table will greatly improve the process. It is more 
important to have all of the disparate voices heard than to hear the number of voices for each 
interest.  
 
Specialised functional bodies and higher-level bodies 
 
Another significant issue for demarchy revolves around the ways each demarchic body is 
constructed and organised in relation to one another. The type and source of authority that 
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functional committees have is still unclear. Ajzenstat (1986) argues that functional committees lack 
self-sufficiency. In her view, each committee is designed to work independently, having a self-
contained decision-making structure and being free of external controls or influences. She maintains 
that “the decision-making agencies are to be autonomous and specialised; their work will be 
coordinated by negotiation, or failing that, but quasi-judicial arbitration. No one agency will be self-
sufficient; none will be in a position to dictate to people or to other agencies” (p. 638). Hiebaum 
(2013) makes a similar critique, arguing that this type of horizontal governing structure would only 
be effective with either (1) a far more limited number of participants than Burnheim proposes, or 
(2) a pre-existing collective sense of identity. He says that “[s]uch an arrangement would bear a lot 
of resemblances to a world-community. In addition, if this community had a constitution and a 
bureaucratic apparatus, it would not differ very much from a world state, because division of 
political administrative functions is a common feature of modern governments” (p. 94). For 
Hiebaum, demarchy’s organisational structure lacks sufficient difference from existing political 
institutions to make the shift worthwhile. Martin (1992) also has difficulty theorising how the 
horizontal demarchic structure would operate without a centralised coordinating body: 
 
The numerous local decision-making groups would need to coordinate their activities 
not to mention coordination with groups in other localities. This could be done on a 
network basis, without any central supervisory executive. But what exactly would the 
network look like, and how would it work? (p. 13) 
 
For Martin, the problems with higher-level bodies are overcome by putting more emphasis on their 
interconnected authority. In “Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition”, Terry Bouricius (2013) 
views Burnheim’s higher-level bodies in a similar fashion, characterising them as “meta-legislative 
bodies” that are designed to “provide a legal framework for the policy-making bodies to settle 
disputes” (p. 6). The role of higher-level bodies may not need too much further development, as 
their only purpose is to arbitrate troublesome disputes between committees.  
 
Burnheim (2016) no longer explicitly advocates that there should be a higher-level deliberative 
body that oversees functional councils, as he sees the functional councils as the deliberative bodies 
to work in tandem with existing political structures. He sees demarchic bodies as a go-between for 
the people affected and the government:  
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Competent and dedicated people will need to devote persistent attention to identifying 
instances where the introduction of a demarchic council is likely to succeed in solving 
existing problems. They will need to make well-designed proposals for the scope of the 
council, and the formulae of sortition (random selection). They will need to stimulate 
communications between the council and the people it aims to serve. (p. 136) 
 
Still, either case raises important questions about the limits of authority that have not been 
answered. It is possible that they do not have any coercive powers at all; the strength of the 
consensus building allows for widespread acceptance of policies created by functional committees. 
However, originally Burnheim articulated demarchy as a more efficient re-arrangement of political 
structures, rather than a completely different type of authority. This implies that each committee 
requires a clearer explanation of the limits of their authority; what controls they can force upon their 
subjects, how they relate to other committees, and whether or not they are subject to the laws of 
higher-level committees. Without this clarity, a great deal of efficiency is going to be lost despite 
the improvement in representativeness. Pettit (1988) is even more dubious of the authority of these 
committees, arguing that several overarching practical issues pose significant challenges.  
 
[Burnheim] is more concerned to secure agreement on the desirability of the abstract 
demarchic proposal than he is to persuade us about the detail of its development. I have 
doubts about his strategy in this regard, for it is difficult to consider the abstract 
proposal without being overwhelmed by objections which only a detailed blueprint 
could begin to answer. (p. 105) 
 
Taxation is an issue that currently is unimaginable through anything other than a centralised 
authority as many public works projects require far more economic resources than the decentralised 
authority can bring to bear against it. Burnheim (2016) suggests a possible solution to monetary 
issues through the creation of public foundations. He suggests that a demarchy could use 
independent, non-partisan auditing services  
 
run by a suitable mix of ordinary people, accountants and economists. These services 
would be attractive to firms who were advantaged by having the truth about their 
performance be publicly available. These auditors would be employed not be firms but 
by a public foundation, which would assign teams of auditors to particular firms on a 
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randomised roster…they could supply a focus for public discussion that we lack at 
present in regard to many problems. (p. 108) 
 
Demarchy offers a decision-making method but no overarching method of dealing with overarching 
issues. Taxes affect all governments, and a clearer explanation of how taxation functions is 
required. Pettit (1988) goes on to argue that functional committees will also have territorial 
disputes; there will be many cases where legitimate material interests of two committees may be 
similar enough to cause significant political tension (p. 105).  
 
Higher-level committees are Burnheim’s catch-all. Whenever a territorial dispute occurs, whenever 
authority becomes unclear, whenever a tension needs to be worked out, a more centralised authority 
comes to the rescue. In Is Democracy Possible?, a higher-level committee has a similar selection 
mechanism to that of the functional committees, but with additional qualifications required from 
them. These participants would need to have previous experience on a lower-order committee, as 
well as being acknowledged by their peers as competent. How these function, what their authority is 
and how many there are, are never fully explained. As previously stated, Burnheim leaves this 
purposefully vague so that it may be fluid enough as a concept to experiment with. In The 
Demarchy Manifesto he explicitly states that demarchy is not meant to be a universal blueprint but a 
means of testing or trial and error. Burnheim’s (2016) intention for demarchy is “to be assessed 
pragmatically as proposals, not as theories that are supposed to cover all possibilities. They are calls 
for experimentation, not ideological commitment” (p. 9). 
 
Arguably, a complete demarchy is never to be realised. Burnheim recognises this in The Demarchy 
Manifesto stating that a wholesale change is incredibly unlikely due to the extensive testing and 
reorganising that would need to occur over time (p. 136) In Chapter 7, I articulate what kind of 
changes can be made to existing structures to create a demarchic higher order committee. 
Conceptual shifts and alterations to membership requirements in upper houses like a senate would 
fulfil some of these goals. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the range of practical and conceptual difficulties that have been 
discussed with Burnheim’s model of statistically-representative demarchy. Many critics agree that 
there is some merit in the idea of demarchy, but still find the proposal undesirable in the face of 
more practical democratic alternatives. Demarchy cannot be easily implemented due to the 
entrenchment of existing political institutions, and Burnheim overlooks crucial deliberative 
dispositions needed for his model to operate in the way he envisages. Several key notions are not 
fully developed, such as the eligibility requirement of legitimate material interests, and the 
organisational structure of higher-level bodies, and specialised functional bodies. 
 
In the next chapter, I begin the process of conceptually reconstructing demarchy to be practicable in 
a modern context. Burnheim argues that the people’s interests, rather than the people themselves, 
should be represented in a demarchy. Instead, I will argue that legitimacy rests on the demarchy’s 
capacity to consider interests in an inquiry-based process. To do this, I contend that the process of 
determining the boundaries of a given issue can be an inquiry in itself, allowing all who would 
claim to have an interest in an issue to participate. Those who would volunteer must subject 
themselves to this inquiry process, and publicly discuss how they are affected by that issue. 
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Chapter 3 
Deliberative pragmatic interests: a re-evaluation of eligibility 
to participate in a demarchy for the modern context 
 
In Is Democracy Possible?, Burnheim wrote for the discursive context of the 1960s and 1970s; 
what he described in his Preface in the 2006 revised version as characterised by “the end of the 
epoch of radicalism” (p. iii). He intended to create a radical solution to the problems of electoral 
politics. His contention: that removing political elitism and allowing all those affected by the issues 
to participate would result in a more equitable and deliberative democratic outcome. Burnheim 
attempted to balance the liberal democratic concerns of equality and rights with the republican 
concerns of participation and self-governance. His novel approach was to grant all people who have 
a legitimate material interest in the issue being administered equal access to participation. He 
argued that “nobody should have any input into decision making where they have no legitimate 
material interest” (p. 4). Burnheim’s contention was that if this principle was overlooked, decision-
making would violate the autonomy of those affected by the issue and would ultimately be a form 
of unjustifiable tyranny. While Burnheim has made some clarifications about the purpose of 
defining eligibility to participate in The Demarchy Manifesto, it is still situated within the original 
discourse from his original work in the 1980s. 
 
Contemporary democratic theory gives deliberation a greater central role within the discourse on 
deliberative democracy and legitimate decision-making. Political legitimacy rests on several factors, 
such as public justification, the mode of inquiry in decision-making, equality of access to the 
decision-making process, and the selection process for political officials. My purpose in this chapter 
is to update the general notion of legitimate material interests for the contemporary context. I 
contend that the selection process itself can be a deliberative mechanism capable of balancing the 
shifting needs for equality of access, public justifiability in decision-making, and genuine inquiry. 
To do this, I use a new eligibility requirement for demarchic participation: deliberative pragmatic 
interests. This new requirement has two key components, (1) that there is a public deliberation on 
the interests of a given issue, and (2) that this deliberation uses a pragmatic inquiry process. In this 
chapter, I will first discuss what the political jurisdiction is in a demarchy. Geographic boundaries 
have historically been simple and effective methods of determining the limits of political 
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jurisdiction, whereas Burnheim’s demarchic boundaries are functionally decentralised. Next, I will 
discuss what makes people eligible to participate in a demarchy. Burnheim argues that only those 
with a legitimate material interest should have some opportunity to participate in decision-making. 
Following on, I discuss the difficulties involved in the use of legitimate material interests; both 
“legitimate” and “material” are qualifiers of dubious value in terms of assessing a person’s interest. 
I will conclude that what is needed is a method of assessing a person’s eligibility to participate: a 
deliberative pragmatic interest. This is more of a process than an explicit eligibility criterion, as 
participants publicly discuss their interest in a pragmatic manner.  
 
Political jurisdiction in a demarchy 
 
In this section, I will explore how political boundaries are formed to evaluate the comparative value 
of demarchic decentralisation. The boundaries of electoral democracies throughout the world have 
historically appealed to geographical criteria divided into multi-functional political constituencies 
whereas Burnheim’s demarchic proposal sets the limits on its authority by the function itself using 
specialised autonomous and overlapping agencies which attend to single issues. Burnheim proposes 
that the limits of each specialised functional body are defined by the legitimate material interests 
involved. Burnheim (1985, pp. 3-4) implies that jurisdiction in a demarchy extends to all those with 
a legitimate interest in an issue, but this type of political boundary raises questions about the limits 
of this authority. What exactly are the limits of demarchic decision-making powers? Who 
determines who has a legitimate interest and who does not, and can this be contested? In contrast to 
the specialised functional bodies, multi-functional agencies administer many issues within a given 
territorial boundary (such as a nation-state or a city council), and this approach provides simplicity 
to determining the limits of their authority. Geographical boundaries allow for a simpler 
demarcation of sovereignty but create difficulties in determining how economic and social forces 
interact across these boundaries.  
 
An historical demarcation of borders often shows lines of conflict, violence, and war rather than 
reflecting democratic boundaries (see Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999, p. 596; Paasi, 1998, p. 69), 
which is of little value to contemporary democratic representation. Groups are not congruent with 
issues in the ways they once were due to globalisation. An example of this change can be seen in 
the Brazil-United States cotton dispute (see Schnepf, 2010, pp. 5-12). The United States practice of 
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subsidising cotton farmers domestically was having a profound effect on Brazilian farmers’ ability 
to compete in their own domestic market. The increased ability of markets and governments to have 
wider impacts means that current political boundaries are no longer viable as a way of dealing with 
all issues that affect citizens of that territory.  
 
Existing national boundaries are no longer and effective means of managing internal issues when 
nations utilise highly interconnected global supply chains. For instance, cotton might be farmed in 
China, processed into textiles in India, and sent to Bangladesh to be made into shirts. The design for 
those shirts may have come from the United States, and they are all sold in markets around the 
world. This is a reality in a globalised context, and this type of supply chain was not something that 
was possible until telecommunications and logistics reached a certain level of global efficiency. A 
reconceptualization of boundaries is needed to reflect the changes to the world context, especially 
when this context is likely to continue to evolve. For a demarchy, boundaries signify the 
jurisdictional limits between specialised functional agencies. Boundaries are created by looking to 
all those who are affected by a given function of that agency and excluding all others from 
participation in the decision making and administration covering the issues. Those affected by an 
issue are eligible to participate in that specialised functional agency. 
 
Demarchic boundaries are more difficult to determine as they cannot be drawn in the same way that 
geographically defined territories can be. Functional decentralisation requires that the boundary of 
the authority must be determined by those who are affected, and Burnheim refers to these people as 
those with a legitimate material interest. He determines eligibility through the use of legitimate 
material interests; if groups or individuals are materially affected in some way by an issue, they 
have a right to participate in the specialised decision making body that deals with that issue. He is 
somewhat vague as to a specific definition of what he means by the term, but primarily he uses it to 
exclude those who would presume to know what is good for everyone affected by the function, 
rather than simply themselves. In Is Democracy Possible?, Burnheim (2006) argues that people are 
not entitled to participate “simply by having strong feelings about the matter. Their interest must 
have a more material ground than their thinking about the matter” (p. 4). In The Demarchy 
Manifesto, Burnheim (2016) clarifies this view further, where he argues that a representative 
sampling should only include “the legitimate interests most strongly affected by the problem to be 
solved, but not of every group that has an interest in it” (2016, pp. 39-40). 
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As I stated in Chapter 1, democracy is replete with people whose aims and goals do not align with 
those they purport to represent. Burnheim aims to remove this type of participant from the process 
by using ‘affected’ and ‘unaffected’ statuses as eligibility requirements. What is less clear, however, 
is what the notion of a more material ground entails, and it requires explanation in order to be 
usable in practice. There are a number of groups that may not be strongly affected, or the interests 
of the people in these groups are not material in some way, but to exclude these people from 
participation would result in a less deliberative process. For example, the issue of the sanctity of life 
exemplifies this problem. Many religious groups have strong opinions on the value of morality of 
life, and, consequently, a process that ignores their perspective may be less deliberative. However, 
these types of interest groups may still not be affected should others be free to legally access 
abortion or euthanasia; issue that directly lead on from deliberations on the sanctity of life. 
Demarchic committees are meant to be pragmatic, using the best information they have available to 
make the best possible decisions. Burnheim states that those groups most strongly affected by an 
issue are those that should be most represented on demarchic committees, implying that those who 
are not profoundly affected could be overlooked by the process. I do not entirely agree with his 
view here, as I contend that all who are affected by an issue should be eligible to participate in the 
agency administering that issue and I explain my criteria for this in the next section.  
 
Assessing eligibility to participate in specialised functional bodies 
 
In this section, I explore how legitimate material interests are both the means of assessing eligibility 
to participate in a specialised functional body as well as the method of demarcating the boundaries 
of the bodies’ authority. To explore this issue, I will first discuss the difficulties involved in 
decentralisation of government functions. Centralised multi-functional agencies provide a simpler 
method for organising issues and determining public policy, whereas demarchy creates a great deal 
of institutional disorganisation and redundancy. Burnheim’s solution is to have participants 
themselves determine the limits of the specialised functional body’s authority, and he contends that 
these bodies are initially set up by higher-level bodies. I disagree with this latter proposal; I argue 
that higher-level bodies cannot set up the specialised functional bodies as this process would create 
the same type of tyranny that Burnheim intends to prevent. 
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The move from multi-functional agencies to specialised functional bodies in determining eligibility 
to participate in political decision-making on public policy requires closer examination, as there 
would be a significant increase in the number of specialised functional agencies if each public 
policy problem has its own deliberative body that has authority to deal with these matters. The 
Australian Federal government currently has 19 distinct issue portfolios (Australian Government, 
2016a), each of which may be divided into a dozen or more sub-issues. Large multi-functional 
agencies provide a means of organising complex issues in a coherent manner. Demarchy has the 
potential to split each of these into its own specialised functional body. However, Burnheim (1985) 
does not see this as a grave concern. Indeed, he sees his proposal as providing more autonomy and 
bringing the issues closer to those who are affected by them. He argues that there is no reason why 
the various services that the local councils provide, such as “roads, parks, libraries, recreation 
facilities, building regulations, health services, garbage collection and so on, should not be run quite 
independently of each other, with different geographical circumscriptions and with closer relations 
to similar services in other areas than to many other services in their own area” (p. 6). In a modern 
technologically-driven society people increasingly belong to overlapping communities that engage 
in diverse social activities. Burnheim argues that there would be overlapping and interrelated 
functional authorities that would be akin to a political ecosystem, in contrast to the existing 
hierarchy of politics. He aims to create an alternative to geographically based political boundaries 
which have historically been able to delineate communities but become problematic for policy-
making in a globalised context. Simply put, Burnheim is attempting to have people participate in a 
far more pragmatic manner than under other models of democracy. Demarchy aims to create a 
deliberative community; believing oneself to have an objectively correct point of view or doggedly 
pursuing one’s own agenda fails to be pragmatic. A useful though crude starting point for assessing 
eligibility is to look at all those affected and all those who are unaffected. 
 
All governments deal with public issues and policy. Many electoral democracies deal with issues 
through centrally controlled multi-functional authorities, i.e., geographically-bounded entities such 
as local councils and nation states, whereas a demarchy does so through multiple specialised 
autonomous agencies, i.e., functional authorities, of varying geographical scope across issue areas. 
In a demarchy, these functions will vary in accordance with the kinds of work the autonomous 
agencies are required to do. The tasks are split between specialised functional authorities charged 
with deliberation and negotiation over issues, and higher-order committees that have the 
responsibility to coordinate, act as quasi-judicial bodies and develop procedures for selection. One 
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of the difficulties with using this structure is determining who is eligible to participate and who is 
not. Burnheim (2006) proposes that people should come together to address a specific issue, 
whereby the committee discusses the nature of the problem and how they are to begin to address it. 
He points out that the convention for deciding on publicly accepted policy would require that 
people accept the decisions made by a group of volunteers selected by lot who are:  
 
[w]ell informed about the question, well-motivated to find as a good a solution as 
possible and representative of our range of interests simply because they are statistically 
representative as a group. If this group is then responsible for carrying out what it 
decides, the problem of control of the execution process largely vanishes. Those 
directing the execution process are carrying out their own decisions. (p. 84)  
 
He goes on to say that the group could require some stimulation or persuasion to provide motivation 
“but there is no institutional basis for a conflict of interest between bodies responsible for making 
decisions and those responsible for execution” as they “have an overriding interest in showing that 
their decisions were practical and well grounded” (p. 84). 
 
For Burnheim, a person’s interest in an issue makes them eligible to participate in the authority 
administering it, but this participation has term limits. Committee membership is based on rotation 
of the members at regular intervals to prevent the formation of political alliances as well as to create 
a continuity of governance. These groups meet when necessary to deliberate and make decisions on 
a specific issue. This may operate adequately with small issues that only require a single authority 
to administrate it but some issues may begin to overlap with multiple specialised functional 
authorities. For example, an environmental issue, such as preserving a local forest in a township 
may only require a small authority to oversee it but if the town develops or grows then this may 
begin to impact on other issues such as economic development or town planning. Within 
Burnheim’s proposed structure, it is not clear what the organisational relationships are between the 
single-issue authorities.  He argues that committees are to coordinate their activities with one 
another, but this creates the issue as to where authority lies. Agencies would be able to affect the 
outcomes of one another when their issues overlap. For example, a committee tasked with dealing 
with drought conditions may have impacts on other existing authorities, such as those for 
agriculture, environmental protection, and sanitation.  
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Burnheim’s structure leaves too many ambiguities as to the limits and boundaries of each authority. 
An example of this problem can be seen in the need for higher-order bodies; coordinating 
committees which are multi-faceted in the functions they perform. He sees these higher authorities 
as responsible for “setting up the various functional bodies, hearing appeals about their structure, 
restructuring them to meet changed circumstances, and adjudicating their disagreements and 
dividing up resources between them” (p. 87). These bodies are not legislators but do create the 
framework for the functional authorities to operate within. Those people serving on higher-order 
committees are also chosen by random selection, though eligibility is not through legitimate 
material interests. Instead, members must have already served on specialised functional authorities, 
as well as being nominated by peers on those committees as being highly competent and judicious. 
Higher-level bodies are not to set the boundaries or limits on specialised functional authorities 
however; that task is implied to fall to those affected by the specific issue.  
 
I find Burnheim’s stated role of higher-level bodies (to set up specialised functional bodies) to be 
somewhat misguided. If these higher-level bodies set up the specialised functional bodies, they 
violate the autonomy of those with legitimate material interests. Members of the higher-level bodies 
do not have legitimate material interests; their involvement in the creation of functional bodies 
would be dictatorial and authoritarian. They would be dictating who is affected and who is eligible 
to participate, when this needs to be done by the specialised functional body. The higher-level body 
may be useful in arbitrating disputes between the specialised functional bodies, but nothing more. 
For example, a committee dealing with a human rights issue, such as euthanasia, would need to 
carefully consider the limits of its own authority. There are any number of groups which may have a 
legitimate material interest: those with terminal illnesses, medical professionals, families of those in 
palliative care, and even the whole population. The sanctity of life and the way we end life is an 
issue that affects all people, and arguably all people have a material interest in this issue. The 
committee needs to define the scope of this issue for themselves to be meaningfully representative; 
this cannot occur if some external, non-interested body dictates who is eligible to participate and 
who is not. The specialised functional authorities themselves determine their own political 
boundaries, with Burnheim arguing that they do this by looking at legitimate material interests. 
 
The concept of legitimate interests is difficult to define let alone implement when contextualised 
within a framework of modern industrial capitalist societies. Those who have a legitimate interest in 
an issue often come from multiple geographical locations while identifying with many overlapping 
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issues. Historically created boundaries are becoming increasingly inappropriate for democracies as 
they fail to account for the substantial changes the world has undergone. Burnheim (2016) points 
out that lives are now more complex than ever before and do not easily fit into previous notions of 
cities or villages. Political discourse in a demarchy becomes a matter of discussion and mediation of 
interests that are of public concern to make policy decisions. There is a much greater requirement 
for citizens
2
 to recognise how they are affected by issues but this is challenging to measure. The 
community is not comprised merely of those affected by a single issue; citizens are members of 
many constituencies. Burnheim sees all people as part of a larger democratic community, but as 
individually affected by issues. His view more subtly embraces the nuances of contemporary 
political contexts, recognising the complexity of each issue in terms of those affected and how the 
context shapes the issue. The same issue may have completely different interests and implications 
when in a separate context; a specialised functional authority that administers noise pollution in a 
city centre will have different interests than one concerning the same issue in residential suburbs. 
The city centre is a bustling commercial district likely having a 24-hour marketplace and so would 
have a high noise tolerance. The more suburban areas would be residential, requiring lower noise 
ordinances for people at home. 
 
Burnheim (2016) explicitly argues that it is fallacious to view political communities as self-
contained entities, as he states that this perspective of identity is no longer tenable in a globally 
interdependent world. He implies that a more accurate method of looking at this issue is to conceive 
of identity and congruency as: 
 
a global ecosystem consisting of a host of diverse subsystems, each with its own 
specific needs and activities. Each of these subsystems has its relative independence 
from interconnectedness with other systems. The order of any such whole arises from 
the interactions of its diverse constituents. (p. 3) 
 
Though not explicit, Burnheim recognises the difficulty in distinguishing between communities, 
identity, and how they are affected in a contemporary context. It may be the case that there are 
issues that affect groups in a specific manner, but it is becoming increasingly challenging to see 
                                                          
2 The term “citizen” has less significance in a demarchic context, implying that the individual is affected rather than having specific rights and duties 
to a nation or city-state. “Citizen” may have different meanings depending on the social, political or historical context. Burnheim implies that a 
demarchic citizen is eligible to be selected for participation. 
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these issues as clear and distinct. A person may live in one city, work in another, belong to a 
minority group while being a citizen of a completely different nation. Identities and congruencies 
are simply more complex than before. This complexity creates a difficulty for demarchy as it is not 
clear how far the authority of a specialised functional body should extend. The citizen needs to 
evaluate if they are affected and then engage dialogically with the specialised autonomous authority 
to decide whether they do have a legitimate interest. Each demarchic authority is to have 
jurisdiction over those with a legitimate interest in a given issue. 
 
Defining legitimate material interests 
 
In this section I discuss the difficulties in using various types of eligibility requirements for 
participation in a demarchy. Burnheim (1985) argues that a person must be affected by an issue in 
order to be eligible to participate in that issue’s governance. I will, therefore, break down and 
analyse specifically how legitimate material interests are to function. I will look at how legitimate 
interests are conceived; for Burnheim, it is crucial that a person is affected in some way to be 
eligible to participate. I will examine this basic formulation, firstly, as a simple issue and then in the 
context of more complex issues. I argue that the concept legitimate interests or affectedness may be 
effective on a small scale but becomes problematic on a global scale. After this, I will evaluate 
several possible qualifiers for eligibility, including direct interests, strongly-impacting interests, and 
material interests. A directly-impacting interest may be easily determined but this tells us very little 
about the significance of that interest. The strength of the impact may inform us of the importance 
of the interest, but this is both subjective and inconsistent. An issue may impact two people in the 
same way but have very different levels of effect. Burnheim’s “material” interests are designed to 
allow participation for those who are affected in a practical manner, but this is equally as subjective 
and vague. I will conclude that an entirely different type of eligibility requirement is needed for 
demarchy: what I call deliberative pragmatic interests. 
 
The limitations of legitimate interests as an eligibility requirement 
 
There are a significant number of groups and people who are affected by a given issue; it is 
essential to demarcate those who are affected from those who are not. If a lake is polluted, this 
affects the nearby residents and businesses but will not likely affect all citizens in the province in 
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which the lake is situated. The key distinction between these categories is that to be granted affected 
status, one must be causally affected by an issue, and not by its effect on a separate problem. The 
issue becomes muddied when many industries overlap and interrelate over time. In the following 
two examples: local garbage collection and climate change, I will illustrate the difficulty involved 
in determining eligibility to participate using legitimate interests. It becomes difficult to determine 
who is affected and how they are affected in different contexts. 
 
In the case of local garbage collection, suppose it is the case that a sanitation waste committee 
administers this municipal function for an entire city; all those within that city have an interest in 
this function that may deal with broad issues such as health and safety requirements for disposal, 
the acquisition of new dumping grounds and so on. Unaffected persons would be anyone who does 
not have their sanitation administered by this committee, such as citizens of other cities. However, 
if a decision is made to dump waste nearby the bordering city, both cities now have a legitimate 
interest in this problem.  
 
This is not the only committee that would have an interest in sanitation however; there may also be 
several specialised functional authorities that administer the more mundane activities of sanitation. 
There may be a separate sanitation and disposal committee for each electorate in a city, or each 
waste disposal site absorbs so many hundreds of thousands of residential and industrial garbage. If, 
say, there are four disposal sites in the city of Brisbane, each may have its own sanitation committee 
which administers that function for a quadrant of Brisbane. This smaller function may deal with 
issues such as collection days for areas, frequency of collection, allocation of resources and so on. 
A person who is within the boundaries of one of these committees is affected by it and unaffected 
by the other three. The boundary of this issue may be determined by the specialised functional body 
administering it and take into account factors such as physical proximity to sanitation sites and 
population density.  
 
The boundaries of this issue and the people who are eligible to participate are relatively easy to 
determine. It is possible for the city to grow into new territory and require re-evaluation of the 
legitimate interests, but this too is a relatively simple task. There is no strong need to differentiate 
types of interest as all people have similar interests in efficient and timely waste disposal. The 
difficulty in using legitimate interests as an eligibility requirement for demarchy becomes apparent 
in the following example of climate change, where there is a greater complexity in the ways people 
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are affected. It is essential to pay close attention to who is affected, especially when it is easy for 
this context to change. Cities grow, new waste management techniques are created, and scientific 
studies come to light; demarchy needs to be sensitive to these changes to the context. A democracy 
can only make the best decisions it can with the best information available; if there are no apparent 
effects extending past the municipality, the legitimate material interest would not extend any 
further.  
 
At a greater level of complexity, an issue may affect people all over the world in both distinct and 
immeasurable ways. This level of complexity did not exist until the 20
th
 century, when technology 
(such as industrialisation) and size allowed for profound international consequences to result from 
decisions. An obvious example of this is climate change, which will affect every person on earth in 
some way. Whole towns may be destroyed by rising oceans, jobs and industries crushed, and the 
future of humanity itself in doubt. All people are affected by climate change. While I am not 
advocating that a demarchic committee should use a random selection of the entire population, I do 
aim to demonstrate the pervasiveness of some issues. Whatever mechanism is used to select 
representatives, it cannot be denied that all people everywhere are affected by this problem. The 
issue may be a global problem, but there are still differences in the ways people are affected. People 
in a coastal city would have an interest in their own safety; if the ocean levels rise, it is possible that 
their homes may be destroyed. Subsistence hunters and fishers the world over have an interest in 
protecting their way of life, as a shift in the climate may disrupt their means of earning a living. 
Many economies depend on fossil fuels to continue functioning; a drastic shift in environmental 
policy may have drastic ramifications for these economies. Each of these are distinctly different 
interests, and using a random selection on a global scale may not result in a representative sample of 
the interests involved. It is necessary to delineate these legitimate interests further to create a more 
representative sampling. 
 
Types of interest 
 
Legitimate interests tell us nothing about how groups are affected, to what extent, what their 
demographics are and so on, and to ignore these factors would be to overlook crucial elements that 
would affect the deliberative process. For example, all people in a city may be affected by the 
frequency of garbage collection, but there may be those who live close to the garbage dump who 
suffer ill effects from an increased amount of collection. All people may have the same concern 
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over how often their garbage is collected, but some of these people could have additional concerns. 
When there is an overwhelming majority who are affected in a certain way, a random selection is 
likely to represent this group while likely under-representing the minority. A more nuanced 
selection mechanism is needed in all but the simplest specialised functional authorities. 
 
Burnheim (2006) argues that a person’s level of representation is dependent on how strongly they 
are affected by that issue. In his view, “it is desirable that each person or group should have an 
opportunity for influencing decisions of any matter in direct proportion to their legitimate interest in 
the outcome” (p. 3). Some contexts merit equal representation of interests while others merit 
proportional representation; Burnheim is most interested in ensuring that interests are represented in 
proportion to how significantly people are affected by them. This is in contrast to providing 
representation proportionally to the number of people within a territorial boundary. Burnheim’s 
proportional representation does, however, require further qualification to determine eligibility. 
There are several terms, which I will address shortly, that could be used to make this distinction in 
interests: directness of effect, strength of effect, and what how a person is affected materially, but 
these are problematic. While these terms are somewhat interchangeable, a prima facie examination 
of these terms reveals that they are significantly different and must be explored more thoroughly to 
determine whether they are coherent and make the process more deliberative. I find all these notions 
to be problematic; the following means of determining the type of interest require prejudgements as 
to who and to how people are affected.  
 
Directness of effect (i.e., direct and indirect effect) is an eligibility requirement that measures the 
causal proximity between the function and its outcomes. A person is directly affected by an issue 
when they experience an immediate change when dealing with the issue, whereas a person is 
indirectly affected when the interest is one that changes as a flow-on effect of the issue. Deciding by 
direct and indirect effect is not useful as an eligibility requirement for demarchy. The difficulty with 
using indirect and direct as an eligibility requirement is that these terms only give information as to 
the causal relationship between the person and the issue; directness tells us nothing about how 
important the interest is. A person may be directly affected by an issue, but this effect might be 
negligible or completely unimportant to them. There is any number of issues where a person may 
suffer profound consequences without being directly impacted by it. For example, many people in 
the world are directly affected by climate change due to the increased temperatures and increased 
severity of storms and weather events. However, not all people will suffer effects from climate 
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change immediately; many people would not notice an appreciable difference to their lives due to 
their specific context. Those who live at the equator where it is constantly hot and humid may not 
suffer any ill effects at all. However, climate change may indirectly affect people as certain 
industries (such as energy production) become increasingly expensive and costs of living become 
harder to maintain.  
 
Another possible delineation is through strength of effect (i.e., strongly affected/weakly affected). 
The strongly affected are those who are affected in some significant way, whereas the weakly 
affected encounter some change to their interest, but in a manner of limited consequence. Burnheim 
explicitly favours this delineation in The Demarchy Manifesto, as he contends that the interests that 
are most strongly affected are those that should be represented most in a democracy. On a prima 
facie examination of this distinction, his purpose has merit for being representative. Too many 
people have interests that are so weakly affected by the issue that their involvement in the 
committee could be disruptive, rather than deliberative. However, determining how strongly a 
person or group is affected seems to be an entirely subjective matter; two people may experience 
the same outcome but this may have completely different implications for them. For example, an 
issue that may arise is the legality of abortion. All fertile women have some interest in this issue 
(for the sake of simplicity I am ignoring all other potentially affected groups). Two fertile women 
both argue they are strongly affected by this issue, one because she wishes to have the option of 
legal abortion, the other because she has a strong moral objection to abortion. The first woman is 
strongly affected due to her potential need for legal medical assistance, while the latter is only 
weakly affected, due to the fact she will never choose to have an abortion herself due to her beliefs. 
In the latter case, the woman may one day change her mind on abortion, but, for the moment, her 
interest is purely intrusive. The fact that she would not access abortion services means that she only 
wishes to dictate how others should behave; she is not affected by the issue. By Burnheim’s 
criterion, only one of these women should have their interest well-represented on the committee. 
The strength of the effect is of questionable value to a demarchy, as this effect is subjective; it is 
incumbent on each participant to determine whether they think they are strongly affected or not. A 
discussion is needed by all those who are affected in order to determine how strongly or weakly 
they are affected by that issue (otherwise the strong/weak eligibility would be guesswork or 
supposition). Regardless, even if this was possible to predetermine this, it would be impractical to 
distinguish between those who may be strongly affected in the future from those who currently are 
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strongly affected. Not all effects are immediate; climate change is one such issue where all people 
will be affected strongly in the future but not all people are necessarily strongly affected today. 
 
Another potential criterion for eligibility is that of material effects of issues. Burnheim (2006) 
argues that demarchy is meant to be practical, emphasising a historical idea of “material factors, 
technology, forms of power and organisation, as constraints on and opportunities for collective 
action” (p. 140). We can distinguish material and non-material interests in terms of whether an 
interest has some impact on our lives, whether by changing our ability to take advantage of 
opportunities, to access services, or to pursue our own goals. Again, there is a difficulty in the 
subjectivity of this type of interest, especially when groups may claim that all people have a 
material interest. There will be issues where people have a material interest, for example, an 
arguable interest in climate change as it will fundamentally alter all human lives at some point, but 
there are many issues with an unclear material interest. The issue of climate change is problematic 
as all people have an interest in pursuing their own ways of life, and an unliveable earth materially 
affects this interest. If all people are materially interested in an issue and are eligible to participate 
in a demarchy, there is little point in making the material/non-material distinction in the first place.  
 
Even the framing of the interests creates more problems for material interests. Using the abortion 
example, all people may have an interest in determining what the value of human life is, but it is 
harder to argue that all people have a material interest in women’s autonomy. It would seem to be 
an appalling misrepresentation for men to have a material interest in what women can and cannot do 
with their own bodies. There are actually several issues that have been conflated (the nature of 
human life, women’s rights, and the limits of personal autonomy) but a careless or unscrupulous 
framing of the issue may end up obfuscating what the material interests are rather than clarifying 
them. All those affected must be part of the process to determine for themselves what constitutes 
eligibility and what does not.  
 
Demarchy embraces the specificity of each context, and so those affected by a given issue should be 
able to deliberate on eligibility. Creating pre-conditions for eligibility before the context has been 
examined privileges singular perspectives on the matter when multiple points of view need to be 
included. A more inclusive and flexible eligibility criterion is needed for the democracy to be 
representative in the shifting context of globalisation. Each committee needs to be able to evaluate 
what their context is and to self-determine the interests for their own issue. They need to be able to 
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problematise the issue themselves, and not have any group (affected or unaffected) dictate what 
interests should be included or excluded. 
 
Deliberative Pragmatic Interests 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, there has been a move away from the discourse on positive and negative 
conceptions of liberty, and a greater emphasis in debate on achieving a more deliberative 
democracy. Mansbridge (2010) and Fishkin (2011) favour democratic processes that allow citizens 
to develop and convey deliberative preferences. Dryzek (2000) argues in favour of models that 
require public justifiability for the democracy to have legitimacy in decision-making. There is a 
much greater emphasis on having pragmatic inquiry in democracies. Theorists such as James 
Bohman (2004), Cheryl Misak (2004) and Robert Talisse (2005) all argue that deliberative 
democracies are inquiry processes (I explore this discussion in Chapters 4 and 5). I argue in favour 
of a conceptually updated term for legitimate material interests: deliberative pragmatic interests. 
The two essential components of deliberative pragmatic interests are its discursiveness and its 
inquiry process. The purpose of this type of interest remains the same as Burnheim’s: to assess 
eligibility to participate and demarcate the boundaries of the specialised functional bodies. 
However, I aim to ensure that all who claim to have an interest in an issue have an opportunity to 
shape the authority, but to do so they would have to participate in a communal inquiry process. 
 
Charles Peirce (2001) argued that a pragmatic attitude must “consider what effects, that might 
conceivably have practical bearings, which we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, 
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (p. 185). For Peirce, 
pragmatism is a method of examining the logical validity of a proposition. Ideas on their own are of 
little consequence for Peirce; he argued that truth was not some objective quality of the world but 
an agreed upon reality. This pragmatist approach was expanded upon by education philosopher 
John Dewey (2013) who argued that experience played a vital role in the inquiry process. For 
Dewey, a pragmatic inquiry drew from both ideas and experience: 
 
We know that some methods of inquiry are better than others in just the same way in 
which we know that some methods of surgery, farming, road-making, navigating or 
what-not are better than others. It does not follow in any of these cases that the “better” 
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methods are perfect, or that they are regulative or “normative” because of conformity to 
some absolute form. They are the methods which up to the present time shows to be the 
best methods for achieving certain results, while abstraction of these methods does 
supply a (relative) norm or standard for further undertakings. (p. 104) 
 
Dewey argues here that pragmatic inquiry is more than assessing logical validity; it also 
incorporates the perspectives, histories and experiences of those involved. In a democratic context, 
this type of pragmatism would involve assessing how people think and feel they are affected, and 
not simply checking if they are materially affected. People could only agree upon the truth after 
extensive and inclusive investigation, and for a demarchy this means including a wider conception 
of interests to include all those affected.  
 
For a demarchy, an appeal to pragmatic interest looks to addressing a common goal to create some 
type of practical solution. A deliberative pragmatic interest is a pragmatic interest that aims to 
contribute to the discursiveness of the political process. There is a necessary component of 
interacting with the functional authority and conjointly discussing what the person’s interest is and 
how they are affected; the pragmatic interest is, thus, a process of engaging deliberatively. In order 
to determine a deliberative pragmatic interest, those who face a common problem must come 
together voluntarily to determine the range of interests and the scope of the issue. A person must be 
willing to rationally articulate how they are affected. A deliberative pragmatic interest is one that 
not only aims for some practical goal, but also to explain, justify and discuss that goal. It is virtually 
impossible to claim a pragmatic interest without explaining what that interest is and how the public 
would benefit from it. Citizens must be willing to state and justify their interests; if they cannot do 
that then it fails to meet the criteria for being deliberative or pragmatic. Deliberative pragmatic 
interests may be shared by large groups of people and so instead of representing a certain material 
interest, they represent a certain point of view or perspective. The purpose of this distinction is to 
ensure that both types of interests are represented in the specialised functional authority. 
 
My concept of deliberative pragmatic interest is imperfect however; it assumes that participants are 
both willing and able to coherently discuss what constitutes a pragmatic interest in an issue. 
Participants may not be able to articulate or understand a logical argument, or disagree with the 
logic of an argument, or frame an issue entirely differently, or may not be willing to listen to any 
arguments in opposition to their own. The perspectives and dispositions of participants may 
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enhance or disrupt the process; a particularly contentious issue (such as marriage equality) may be 
incredibly difficult to agree upon from the outset. Potential participants may be unable to recognise 
the difference between agreeing on the scope of the issue and the administration of that issue, and 
attempt to exclude those they do not wish to have in opposition to themselves. There are many 
possible pitfalls to this type of eligibility requirement. Deliberative pragmatic interests are not 
designed to fully solve the problem of issue complexity; it is indeed a challenge to determine who 
should be eligible to participate. What matters most is not that people have their rights or duties 
clearly defined, but that there is a process for all people to participate. Deliberative pragmatic 
interests are a process designed to make demarchy more dialogic. There are issues that are messy, 
inconsistent and at times unsolvable; what is needed is for participants to improve the quality of 
their interactions over time, rather than to address a specific policy problem.  In the following 
example, I explore a complex problem that has unclear boundaries and participants. 
 
Marriage equality is currently a contentious issue in Australia. The definition and purpose of the 
institution of marriage is being re-evaluated to see whether it is still appropriate to the contemporary 
Australian context. Generally speaking, the issue is whether marriage is a union of a man and a 
woman, or a union of any two adults regardless of gender. There are several different issues in play 
here, and each creates new deliberative pragmatic interests. The first is the societal conception of 
gender, sexual orientation and marriage. Many Christian groups are vocal that marriage should be 
between a man and a woman only. To state that marriage is only between a man and a woman is to 
reject all other sexual identities and orientations, and a pluralistic society is one that tolerates many 
points of view. In order to become a more pluralistic society, the democracy needs to have 
mechanisms that allow for the expression and development of these points of view. The question 
becomes how this could work for a demarchic specialised functional body? 
 
To be eligible to participate in discussion on this issue a person would have to claim that they are 
somehow affected by marriage equality. Many homosexual couples are affected as they do not have 
the same access to services and benefits as heterosexual couples. Homosexual people would be able 
to readily demonstrate their deliberative pragmatic interest in the issue through public discussion. 
These groups would suffer both in terms of practical issues such as accessing services and benefits, 
as well as the social side effects of being considered second-class citizens. Defining marriage, 
however, is a more challenging problem as all people arguably have some type of interest in it. All 
adults in Australia have a right to enter into unions, and thus they have an interest in the definition 
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of these unions. Currently married heterosexual couples may have to redefine their own unions, and 
would likely be able to demonstrate their deliberative pragmatic interest. People would have to 
demonstrate or argue how they are affected in order to be eligible to participate. Conservative 
Christian groups that ideologically oppose marriage equality would unlikely be able to successfully 
argue that they have suffered some ill-effect from other couples being able to marry. It is possible 
that those with intrusive interests may still be able to participate, but the standard for entry here is 
much higher, requiring public justification and inquiry.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Legitimate material interests could be seen as a kind of demarchic boundary but I have argued they 
are too exclusive as they ignore a large portion of the population who are affected and have a claim 
to eligibility. Burnheim has attempted to create democratic boundaries with his conception of 
legitimate material interests; the idea that anyone who had an interest that is both morally sound and 
tangible. However, neither “legitimate” nor “material” is useful as criteria on its own; democratic 
boundaries need to be less vague to serve a deliberative or legitimising purpose. Any existing 
system would be able to claim certain people and groups have unsound moral interests and, 
therefore, are made ineligible to participate. Even taking legitimate material interest for its implied 
intention, it is fraught with difficulties as Burnheim seeks to represent those interests which are 
strongly affected, as this implies that only these interests are to be given deliberative consideration. 
Material interests as a qualifier is not without merit. However, in his zeal to remove undesirable 
elements from the democracy, Burnheim (2006) has excluded many who still are arguably eligible 
for representation and participation, contending that “participation in the decision-making process 
in each body should extend not to the people generally, but to those who are affected by the 
decisions in question” (p. 5). It is possible to imagine those who do not encounter material 
consequences but are affected nonetheless, and thus I have argued that a different conception of 
interests is needed. 
 
Instead I have argued in this chapter that the eligibility requirement for demarchy should be 
determined in each context through a dialogic process. Deliberative pragmatic interests require that 
those affected by an issue collectively discuss how they are affected, with those who are unable to 
coherently demonstrate this being ineligible to be selected for that specialised functional authority. 
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It is my aim to create stronger conditions for citizens to discuss the issue together; there are no pre-
conditions or pre-political assumptions when all must work together to discuss what those issues 
limits are in the first place. A person’s claims to eligibility are somewhat ambiguous by nature, 
requiring collaborative agreement to determine in each unique context. I see this ambiguity as a 
reality in many cases; no two issues will be the same and eligibility to participate needs to be 
determined on a case by case basis. Using deliberative pragmatic interests is one of the conceptual 
updates I have made to reconstruct demarchy for the contemporary discourse on deliberative 
democracy. There is significant debate over the purpose and effectiveness of deliberative 
democracy, and in the next chapter I will re-situate demarchy within this discursive context. 
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Chapter 4 
Demarchy: a model of deliberative democracy 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that eligibility to participate in a given demarchic committee 
should be based on deliberative pragmatic interests. This is to create a mechanism for assessing who 
is to participate given the vagueness of Burnheim’s definition of legitimate material interests. 
However, there is another problem that I aim to address; Burnheim’s implication in the third edition 
of Is Democracy Possible? (2014) is that demarchy is a deliberative democracy. He suggests that 
the adoption “of certain procedures that have proved very successful in the limited contexts in 
which they have been tried [and] would lead to better decisions about public goods more generally, 
with very beneficial consequences for us all. The procedures in question are those of ‘deliberative 
democracy’” (p. ii). His proposal for demarchy is meant to address conflicts of interest and opinion, 
and deliberative processes the mechanism to accomplish this task. The legitimacy of demarchy 
appears to be derived from the selection mechanism of participants, with deliberative procedures to 
be used experimentally to improve decisions over time. His proposal removes the problems that 
come with partisan politics and popular elections, and gives people an equal opportunity to engage 
in public participation. However, I argue that providing better or equal opportunities for 
participation does not guarantee that meaningful deliberation would occur or that decisions would 
be well reasoned.  
 
I argue that Burnheim’s purpose in improving deliberation is too narrowly focused on the 
democracy’s procedural and instrumental qualities. He places too great a value on demarchy’s 
ability to protect liberties and not enough on the expressive and substantive qualities of democracy. 
In this chapter I will reconstruct demarchy explicitly as a model of deliberative democracy. To do 
this, I will describe the various facets of contemporary deliberative democratic theory. There are 
multiple points of contention over the purpose of deliberative democracy, and I situate Burnheim’s 
demarchy within these debates. After this, I will explore how his demarchy may be characterised as 
having specific deliberative democratic purposes: procedural, instrumental and pluralist. Finally, I 
will reconstruct demarchy as being more flexible than this. I will argue that no single approach to 
deliberative democracy is wholly appropriate, but that demarchy is a sufficiently malleable 
democratic model to suit many contexts. I will argue that demarchy is a model of deliberative 
democracy, and is flexible enough to be adapted to many contexts. 
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Why Deliberative Democracy? 
 
In this section, I will explore the justification for the use of deliberative democracy. Burnheim 
implies that demarchy is a deliberative democracy, but of what kind? To answer this question, I will 
discuss the various debates within the discourse as characterised by deliberative democratic 
theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. They argue that there are three significant points of 
contention within the discourse: whether the purpose is to be procedural or substantive, instrumental 
or expressive, consensual or pluralist. To begin, however, I will give a general description of 
deliberative democracy. 
 
Theories of deliberative democracy places authentic deliberation at the heart of its processes 
(Dryzek, 2000). For decisions to be legitimate, decision-makers must consider reasons and 
justifications for preferences and not just the preferences themselves. Deliberative democracy is 
compatible with both representative and direct democracies as justification can be used as a central 
process in both. This is distinct from theories of liberal democracy which derive their legitimacy 
from the consent of the governed and can also use deliberation, but regard liberty as a substantive 
necessity. According to Burnheim, the legitimacy of electoral (and historically liberal) democracies 
has been compromised over time; ballots cannot express the preferences voters have on the myriad 
of issues facing them. In contrast to electoral democracies, deliberative democracy links preferences 
and reasoning to the legitimacy of the democracy. Decisions cannot be made in a deliberative 
democracy without justification; regardless of how decision-makers are selected, their decisions 
will be illegitimate if they are not publicly reasoned. Deliberative democracy can reveal preferences 
and ideas of participants by engaging in a public inquiry process (Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2009; Talisse, 2004), as well as having greater ability to develop citizens’ democratic 
capacities (Cooke, 2000; Enslin, Pendlebury, & Tjiattas, 2001; Fishkin & Farrar, 2005; Mansbridge, 
2007, 2010) This quality is essential in ensuring that participants have a more substantively 
egalitarian ability to affect the outcomes of the democratic process.  
 
In order to reconstruct demarchy explicitly as a model of deliberative democracy, I will first need to 
describe the characteristics of deliberative democracy. These characteristics are thoroughly 
explored by political theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2009) in their book Why 
deliberative democracy. Gutmann and Thompson argue that there is not a single dichotomy (liberal 
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vs republican) anymore, rather, there are three distinct debates on how a deliberative democracy can 
operate. They argue that there are multiple perspectives that one can take when analysing 
democratic theory, each with a different goal but none being wholly able to achieve their aims. 
They argue that deliberative democrats often have little consensus on  
 
the value, status, aims, and scope of deliberation, and their disagreements yield different 
versions of the theory of deliberative democracy. Some of these differences, we suggest, 
can be reconciled, and some cannot. In either case, recognizing the differences can help 
clarify the nature of both the theory and the practice of deliberative democracy.(p. 21) 
 
The first debate is between a procedural or substantive perspective; a proceduralist account of 
deliberative democracy holds that legitimacy is created in decision making by using certain 
procedures rather than by furthering some abstract principle. Conversely, a substantive account 
aims to further principles such as equality and fairness within the polity, protecting the liberty and 
autonomy of citizens. The second is an instrumentalist or expressive view; democracies can serve 
an instrumental purpose in achieving justifiable decisions, or expressive in creating circumstances 
for citizens to be respectful to one another. The third debate on deliberative democratic discourse is 
a consensual perspective against a pluralist view.  Consensualism holds that the deliberation should 
attempt to work towards a common good, whereas pluralists aim for a method of allowing all to live 
as they see fit. 
 
It is not my aim to debate the relative merits of each perspective (Gutmann and Thompson have 
done that succinctly in Why deliberative democracy) but instead to create a discursive context for 
Burnheim’s conception of demarchy. This contemporary debate views many of those methods as 
compatible with one another, rather than mutually exclusive. It is possible to incorporate elements 
of proceduralist and substantive, instrumental and expressive, consensual and pluralistic goals 
within the democracy. I will argue that Burnheim’s (1985) demarchy can be seen as particular 
arrangement of deliberative democratic purposes (Proceduralist, instrumental and pluralist). 
 
Proceduralist vs. substantive  
 
The first major debate about the purpose of deliberative democracy is whether it should use 
procedures to bring about legitimacy, or alternatively to seek some substantive goal. The primary 
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point of contention for proceduralists is that democratic theory “should not incorporate substantive 
principles such as individual liberty or equal opportunity because such constraints are not necessary 
to ensure a fair democratic process” (p. 23). They do not argue that these principles or values are 
unimportant, only that democracy should not be a vehicle for furthering them. There are 
fundamental disagreements on principles such as equality and freedom, and proceduralists aim to 
avoid making these the basis of democracy.  
 
John Rawls’ (1971) book A Theory of Justice argues that democratic equality is needed for 
deliberation (pp. 68-70), and is arguably proceduralist in nature. His focus was on creating a process 
for legitimate decision-making that emphasised public justification. Rawls (1996) public reason 
method of creating a more deliberative democracy provided a start-point for this changed focus of 
the philosophical discourse on democratic theory. In his view, laws and policies created to govern 
could only be considered legitimate if they are a result of reasonable discussions by the citizens. His 
conception of deliberative democracy held that if decisions are made using certain procedures 
(public justification, reasonable discussion, avoidance of unproductive debate), their decisions 
would be legitimate. Rawls (2005) saw the limitations of political liberalism as it does not embrace 
the reality that democracies contain “reasonable pluralisms” (pp. 765-766), meaning a plurality of 
conflicting ideologies, religions, doctrines and moral perspectives. Public reason is a method of 
protecting the liberties of citizens while also allowing for the reasonable deliberation of those 
groups.  
 
Substantive accounts of democracy argue that procedures alone are inadequate in creating just 
outcomes. Gutmann and Thompson (2009) argue that a “theory that allows for the possibility of 
[unjust] outcomes are justified should be especially objectionable to deliberative democrats. A 
fundamental aim of deliberative democracy is to offer reasons that can be acceptable by free and 
equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation” (p. 23). Deliberative democrats such as 
Mansbridge can be seen as pursuing a substantive method, arguing that the principle of equality is 
fundamental in achieving just outcomes. Mansbridge argued in her 1983 book Beyond Adversary 
Democracy that adversarial democracies provided a procedural equality in voting, but the lack of 
deliberation resulted in inequitable outcomes. In her view: 
 
The implication of combining the goal of equal protection of interests with the 
assumption that individuals always protect their own interests better than they protect 
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other people’s interests is that only a fully equal distribution of power can guarantee 
equal protection. The logic of equal value, equal weight, and equal power pushed 
adversary democracies both into extending the vote to more and more members of the 
polity and into efforts to ensure that each vote carries equal weight. The same logic 
inevitably produces disillusionment, however, since even an equal vote cannot 
guarantee equal power. (pp. 17-18) 
 
Distributions of power have as much to do with the individual’s capacities to interact in the political 
sphere as it does their formal rights to participate. The right to vote or to form a political party is of 
dubious value when the participant may not be capable of effectively communicating. For example, 
this can be seen today as a challenge to the legitimacy in making policy for Indigenous issues in 
Australian democracy. Major political parties wield a significant amount of power over minorities 
such as Indigenous Australians; minorities have the same voting power as majorities, but have 
substantially less ability to affect policy outcomes due to their social and cultural 
disenfranchisement (see Lane, 1997). 
 
Dryzek (2001)can be seen to take a substantive approach to deliberative democracy as he contends 
that all citizens must be able to engage with the process beyond mere acceptance. There are many 
diverse methods of communication due to ethnicity, culture, socioeconomic status, gender and so 
on. It is crucial that all these groups can influence the decision-making process. Authentic 
communication is required for citizens to make their concerns and preferences known, and this 
requires a recognition of the differences in society. Citizens and interested parties will have 
different ideas about how they wish to live and use public resources, and an understanding of their 
differences is more important than agreement on their conceptions of the good life. Dryzek argues 
that to have legitimacy in a deliberative democracy, a decision “must be subject to the reflective 
acceptance of those subject to it, who should be able to participate in deliberation concerning the 
production of the decision. But reflective acceptance must be attained in a way that does not impose 
impossible burdens on the deliberative capacities of individuals or polity” (p. 662). Dryzek 
contends here that a decision can only be legitimate if those affected can meaningfully participate in 
the making of that decision.  
 
In my view, Burnheim (1985) uses a proceduralist approach to demarchy. His aim is to create a 
series of processes better able to allow people to protect their own liberty. He pays little attention to 
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the content of deliberations and their outcomes, arguing that his procedures result in a more 
legitimate democracy: 
 
The crucial problem is that our present procedures of public decision-making are 
incapable of registering reliably a number of aspects of the situation that are of great 
concern to those who understand them, and incapable of drawing reliably the 
appropriate conclusions even from the information they do register. Because they deal 
with vital questions they must be changed. The change will not be an improvement 
unless certain other conditions are present. Above all, there must be enough people who 
in their own interests are willing and able to make the changed procedures work. I shall 
argue that it is not unrealistic to suppose that there are enough such people, and that 
there are practical strategies of change available. A major point is that nobody is 
required to participate in the political process, but just to trust those who do. (p. 11) 
 
For Burnheim, demarchy is a mechanism that can be used to legitimise the decision-making 
process. The sortition mechanism allows for equal opportunity to participate, and functional 
decentralisation allows for citizens to clearly reveal their preferences on a given issue. From this 
point of view, a statistically-representative demarchy is a deliberative democracy as it has clear 
procedures for revealing the preferences of its citizens. The vast majority of preferences do not need 
to be well-considered or well-informed, but they do need to be clearly expressed for democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
Instrumental vs expressive 
 
According to Gutmann and Thompson (2009), the instrumentalist (or epistemic) view is that 
democracy is merely a means of legitimate decision-making. An instrumentalist view of 
deliberative democracy holds the democracy’s legitimacy is contingent on arriving at good policies. 
Under this perspective, “deliberating about political issues has no value in itself. It is valuable only 
to the extent that it enables citizens to make the most justifiable political decisions” (p. 21). If the 
democracy does not create adequate policies and laws, it would not be fulfilling its instrumental 
purpose.  
 
73 
 
 
 
Deliberative democratic proponents such as James Fishkin (1991) and John Uhr (1998) also argue 
that deliberation offers superior instrumental value in legitimising democracies. Fishkin (1991) 
argues that deliberation (along with equality and non-tyranny) is a necessary condition to have 
legitimacy in decision-making. He argues that without deliberation, “democratic choices are not 
exercised in a meaningful way. If the preferences that determine the results of democratic 
procedures are unreflective or ignorant, then they lose their claim to political authority over us. 
Deliberation is necessary if the claims of democracy are not to be de-legitimated” (p. 29). This 
sentiment is echoed by Uhr (1998), who argues that “the standard against which one judges the 
adequacy of any system of discussion and dialogue is said to be ultimate criterion of agreement 
among political equals” (p. 18). What is, for Uhr, more important than consensus (in the sense of 
perfect agreement among voters on a given decision) is that participants agree on the sufficiency of 
the mechanisms for deliberation. A democracy that has adequate communicative forums has a 
greater epistemic value than one that privileges certain modes of speech or fails to create sufficient 
opportunities for all interested groups to make their views understood. An electoral democracy 
oversimplifies the plethora of views and beliefs (especially in a two-party preferred system), 
because an insufficient amount of information is communicated through public deliberation. A 
deliberative democracy emphasises the communicative process, revealing the complexities of the 
context rather than simplifying views for easier decision-making.  
 
By contrast, an expressive perspective places value in the deliberative democracy’s ability to bind 
decision-makers to their own decisions. Deliberators must cooperate and behave respectfully to one 
another and the polity if their decisions are to be accepted as legitimate. Gutmann and Thompson 
(2009) state that politicians “cannot rightly decide an issue simply by claiming they know that their 
preferred policies are right for their fellow citizens. They need to seek the views of those citizens 
who have to live with the results of the policies” (pp. 22-23). Conversely, Geoffrey Brennan and 
Loren Lomansky (1997) view this from the perspective of the voter rather than the politician, seeing 
voting as a potential exercise in expressiveness. They argue that individuals have two personas: the 
consumer; who uses their vote to instrumentally pursue their preferences, and the more civically-
minded person; who expresses their personality, ideology and belief through voting. Their purport 
is that in a mass voluntary voting exercise, there are three reasons (p. 176) why a person would 
vote: 
1. A belief that a single vote still has a reasonable chance of having some effect, even if it is 
not decisive; 
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2. A desire to vote against a certain person or group to avoid the worst outcome; and 
3. To express one’s moral convictions. 
 
In all three reasons, there is an extremely minimal belief that voting will be instrumental in 
furthering personal preference. Brennan and Lomansky view voting as a potential means of self-
identification, as well as being expressive of one’s morals, saying that “[people] are morally 
responsible not only for what they bring about, what they intend to bring about, and what they help 
bring about; they are also responsible for what they endorse and for that with which they choose to 
identify themselves” (p. 187). 
 
Expressing ideas, reasons and preferences reveals more about people and their interests, and taking 
these into account can strengthen the decision-making process. This view can be seen in John 
Dewey’s (1940) article “Creative Democracy – the Task Before Us” in which he argues that 
democracy as more than a series of political rights or decision-making mechanisms; he sees it as a 
way of life. He argues that merely setting up civil liberties and procedural equality does nothing to 
address societal issues of communication, suspicion, hatred and segregation. Democracy, he says, 
“is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that 
the special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order the 
ongoing process” (p. 3). 
 
Dewey is arguing that democracy is experiential, educative, and is of value in itself; it can be more 
than merely instrumental in creating legitimacy or revealing preferences. These other aims may be 
achieved but they are only incidental to the democratic process. He contends that the fixation on 
end goals focus too much on “what has been gained instead of using it to open the road and point 
the way to new and better experiences” (p. 3), and, therefore, he puts dialogue in a central role for 
his theory of democracy. His pragmatic approach to democracy requires that citizens learn how to 
communicate and deliberate more effectively together as a community. Citizens can begin to see 
themselves as sharing common aims and goals rather than seeing the democratic process as the 
means of competition. Each political context is unique, requiring more than mere justifications for 
political decision-making. A mixture of both facts and inquiry together allows for participants to 
situate their knowledge and understanding within their context. The democratic process develops an 
appreciation for nuance, with participants seeing the flaws and advantages of the perspectives 
involved. They can see the value of alternative viewpoints and preferences without needing to agree 
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with them. Democracy becomes a process of conjointly constructing knowledge, with the citizens 
discussing how to achieve the outcomes they discovered. 
 
This expressive and educative quality is also arguably shared by Lyn Carson (2009) in her article 
“Ignorance and Inclusion Mr Jefferson, Might be Good for Democracy”. What is needed for 
participants is to rapidly acquire the knowledge and understanding during the democratic process in 
order to create policy recommendations. Carson argues that well-informed constituencies are not a 
prerequisite for democracy, rather, a stronger context for the development of knowledge. For 
Carson, a combination of people with various levels of competence is desirable in a democracy as 
this leads to productive discussion. These groups “depend on open minds, skilful questioning, deep 
listening and learning, close analysis and a tendency towards exploring common ground. By the 
end, the group is competent to decide [on the issue]” (p. 11). What is crucial is that participants 
have certain cognitive and social capabilities to engage in the process. Carson contends that these 
capacities can be built over time when citizens have the opportunity to regularly participate; small, 
single-issue deliberative bodies are ideal for this purpose. Each specialised functional body can 
determine what impacts its decisions will have and to what degree they affect people.  
 
Deliberative democracies have a greater capacity to educate and develop participants (Englund, 
2000; Enslin et al., 2001; Young, 1996). The increased amount of communication allows 
participants to gain a much greater understanding of the context, resulting in a clarification of a 
person’s own interests and preferences. When participants engage in this type of deliberative 
process, they are exposed to new ideas, alternative perspectives and other ways of thinking (Banks, 
2008; Landemore, 2013). However, deliberative democratic processes place a great deal of 
responsibility on participants to engage in meaningful discourse. This requires certain cognitive 
tools (such as critical reasoning) as well as democratic dispositions (toleration and willingness to 
listen) in order to engage in a deliberative process (Gutmann, 1987, p. 171). A deliberative 
democracy provides a mechanism for citizens to develop these capacities.  
 
Meaningful communication is needed in local, national and global contexts in order to discuss 
political issues. If citizens are to work together to discover the best solutions to their problems, it is 
vital that the democracy itself be a vector for development. Citizens continually develop their 
capacities and understanding through interaction, and this is reflected in their decision-making. 
Better interactions create better conditions for development; this deliberative process improves 
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upon itself over time. Citizens can improve their deliberative capacities by participating in the 
conjoint construction of problems (rather than participating to merely voice their opinions). The 
strength of deliberative democracy is in the long-term improvement of society, rather than in the 
potency of any one decision. It takes a great deal of time to develop the quality of decisions and the 
capacities of participants; using deliberative processes (such as engaging in a communal inquiry 
process and collectively problematizing an issue) improves the democratic dispositions of those 
involved much in the same way muscle tone is developed through exercise. Repeated practice 
continually improves the deliberations. It is an ongoing cycle aimed at incremental improvements 
each time it occurs. 
 
For demarchy, Burnheim (1985) implies a balanced perspective on instrumental and expressive 
approaches to deliberative democracy, but in actuality favours instrumentality. He strongly opposes 
electoral democracies due to their failure to create satisfactory policy outcomes (p. 77), and because 
they fail to adequately consider citizens’ preferences on any given issue. He argues that the plurality 
of policy problems make it less likely that “the outcome of voting will be translated into the sort of 
concrete output that any particular voter wants” (p. 63). Voting becomes an inefficient way of 
communicating ideas and preferences due to the practical limitations of interaction on this scale. 
For Burnheim, both of these qualities are important; a democracy that fails to create adequate 
policies or laws is not legitimate. Similarly, if the democracy does not interact with those with 
legitimate material interests, it also is not legitimate. He ultimately aims to create circumstances for 
participants to create stronger decisions, which is the purpose of instrumentalism. He repeatedly 
articulates the experimental nature of demarchy (2006, p. iii; 2014, p. ii; 2016, p. 10), implying that 
if the demarchic processes were not producing satisfactory results, other processes should be tried 
instead. 
 
Consensual vs pluralist 
 
The last major debate on the purposes of deliberative democracy is about consensual or pluralist 
concerns. Gutmann and Thompson (2009) characterise a consensual approach as reaching for a  
comprehensive common good (p. 27). Pluralists hold this view as well, with the difference being 
that consensus democrats “criticise pluralists for having too thin a conception of the common good. 
Agreement on fair terms of cooperation, they argue, does not create a community in which citizens 
find common ground at the deepest level of their social identities. It does not even require citizens 
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to engage deeply with one another over their deepest moral differences” (p. 27). Consensus 
democrats argue that a deliberative democracy has the capacity to help citizens collectively develop 
an idea of the common good. Joshua Cohen (1997) argues that consensual deliberation is somewhat 
idealistic, but is an attempt to find “reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting 
on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals” (p. 75).  Consensual 
perspectives of deliberative democracy hold that it is worth the attempt to persuade all involved of 
the value of a policy, and so the policy has greater legitimacy than if it was enacted through an 
aggregation of preferences. Pluralists also agree that they should aim for the common good but view 
some disagreements as irreconcilable (or at least impractical to solve). Gutmann and Thompson 
refer to these conflicts as “deliberative disagreements” (p. 28), and Rawls attempts to avoid these 
with his public reason method of deliberative democracy. Benhabib (1996) aimed for a balance 
between consensual and pluralist perspectives by including discussions on the irreconcilable 
conflicts of interest but excluding a comprehensive common good. 
 
Burnheim (1985) can be seen to be taking a pluralist approach to deliberative democracy. His stated 
aim is clearly to ensure that as many relevant interests as possible are included in public 
deliberation (pp. 81-82) but he makes a direct argument against the search for a comprehensive 
common good: 
 
Moreover, in many cases there is no “right” decision. Our long-term interests are not 
fixed. Different and largely incommensurable possibilities exist. Choosing one or other 
of those possibilities means entering a different situation in which some of our tastes, 
hopes and relationships will change. There is no unchanging point of reference, no fixed 
set of needs or preferences, against which such possibilities can be so measured and 
evaluated as to produce a right answer. There are indeed many wrong answers. It is not 
the case that we are infinitely malleable. We need to be assured that clearly wrong 
choices are not made. But the quest for a way of finding the right answer is radically 
pointless. 
 
Burnheim’s entire assertion here is that the demarchic process should not service some absolute 
ideal of the common good. Demarchy is designed to represent interests in order to create a more 
competent deliberation than under electoral systems. Participants in a demarchy may attempt to 
reach for a common good in the issue at hand, but this is for the sake of practicality rather than from 
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an ideological position. The emphasis for Burnheim is on solving a shared problem. He is not 
adverse to the building of personal deliberative capacities and the development of a sense of 
community, but these aspects are secondary to the problem-solving purpose of his demarchic 
proposal. 
 
I do not entirely agree with Burnheim’s (1985) assertion that it is futile to search for correct answers 
or truths (p. 83). His desired quest to avoid making wrong choices is the same process as his 
undesirable quest of making right choices. A genuine inquiry process is less concerned with picking 
the right outcomes and more concerned with determining what the outcomes may be. The purpose 
of my “deliberative pragmatic interests” eligibility requirement is also to create a mechanism to find 
all the available choices. There may be no objectively right choice, but each demarchic committee 
needs to look to whom is affected and how they will be affected. An expressive inquiry process is 
essential if demarchy is to be an effective deliberative democracy. 
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Burnheim’s model of deliberative democracy: Procedural, instrumental, 
pluralist 
 
In this section, I will briefly explore some of the proposals put forth by Burnheim and analyse their 
deliberative democratic methodologies. Burnheim emphasises different aspects of deliberative 
democracy depending on the context of the issue, though he has an overarching instrumental 
perspective of democracy. While The Demarchy Manifesto is a new project (rather than a 
conceptual update to Is Democracy Possible?), it provides an insight into the way Burnheim 
envisages deliberative democracy. At the municipal or local level, he does advocate some more 
expressive aspects of the democracy. Issues of national importance balance consensual and pluralist 
approaches. Global issues tend towards instrumental and pluralist approaches. However, it is 
important to note that none of these are definitive statements of deliberative democratic purpose. 
Burnheim is seeking the best practical solutions to existing problems, and views different 
deliberative democracies as methods for creating these solutions.  
 
At the local level are the issues that affect people most directly. Burnheim (2016) recognises that 
these issues may not have the profound, far-reaching consequences as other issues but he still 
advocates the use of decentralised demarchic councils in order to ensure all affected by pervasive 
issues have a say in decision-making. In some ways, he sees local governance as challenging to 
address as the acquisition of consumer goods and services is one of the most common local issues, 
and globalisation allows of large number of these to be imported. There seems to be a decreased 
need for politics at this level. He views local politics as an area of democracy that can be improved 
through the diversification of local functional institutions such as local municipal councils. We can 
conceive of this as a more expressive deliberative democratic method as Burnheim aims to create a 
legitimate decision-making process. He argues that through negotiation “people who have a 
problem of reconciling the impact of conflicting interests in their own case can often be very useful 
in evolving ways of bringing those interests into harmony” (pp. 85-86). At the local level demarchy 
clearly also serves an instrumental purpose; it is a conduit for strong decision-making. Burnheim 
could also be said to allow for a more consensual approach at a local level; small communities may 
aim for the creation of a common good or ethos in order to become harmonious and cooperative. 
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At the national level, we can see a clear depiction of Burnheim’s instrumental approach to 
deliberative democracy. He contends that electoral democracies fail their instrumental purpose in 
creating strong policy outcomes, as well as having poor procedures for communicating preferences. 
Instead, he aims to create procedures for citizens to express their views in order to develop a more 
deliberative public opinion (p. 89). The purpose of demarchy on a national scale is “to institute a 
practice of deriving from public discussion a practical policy that politicians would have to take 
seriously as what the voters expect of them” (p. 87). He does not create demarchic models for 
national issues, instead he argues that a democracy at this level of complexity would only be 
legitimate if it was instrumental in communicating the preferences of the polity. This aligns with the 
Rawlsian perspective of autonomy and public justification I discussed earlier. Burnheim is arguing 
that decisions are only legitimate if they result from reasonable discussions on citizens’ interests. 
Partisan politics obstructs deliberation, and Burnheim contends that this type of politics introducing 
factors that are irrelevant to dealing with a policy problem. Public discussion can be far more 
deliberative on the issues when they are no longer entangled with aspects of partisan politics such as 
careerism
3
 and vote trading.  
 
At a global scale Burnheim’s demarchic proposal is most closely aligned with instrumental, 
proceduralist and pluralist approaches to deliberative democracy. He argues what is needed are 
procedures for nations to recognise issues as globally-shared problems. In his view: 
 
The ability of any state to act effectively on the problem depends on the problem being 
addressed from a global perspective. As long as the decision about what needs to be 
done is primarily a matter of the internal politics of each state and power struggles 
between states – any attempts to get effective agreement about how to deal with global 
warming are doomed to fail in a welter of faked agreement and mutual recriminations. 
At both national and global levels the solution is to put policy on specific matters in the 
hands of those who are most competent and strongly motivated to get it right. (pp. 92-
93) 
 
                                                          
3 Independents and non-partisan politicians can also be careerists. However, political parties provide clearer opportunities for career advancement and 
progression in electoral democracies than for single individuals without these institutions. 
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Burnheim points out here the difficulty in approaching a contextual problem from singular 
perspectives, but he still implies that there is a most appropriate perspective for that problem. He 
assumes that on a given issue (such as climate change), participants are more likely to create the 
best possible policy if they address it from a certain point of view. His solution requires that 
participants already have the deliberative qualities that the demarchy aims to use; the council is 
almost superfluous if participants are already capable of deliberating from a global perspective. 
 
Reconstructing demarchy as a flexible model of deliberative democracy 
 
In this section I will explicitly re-characterise demarchy as a flexible model deliberative democracy 
using the frameworks developed by Gutmann and Thompson. To do this, I will first argue that any 
deliberative democracy needs to have some type of genuine inquiry process, and that Burnheim too 
narrowly defines his inquiry as avoiding “wrong choices”. After this, I will argue that no one 
approach would work for demarchy as a model of deliberative democracy. What is needed is for 
each specialised functional body to determine for itself what it can accomplish and what it aims to 
do.  
 
A conclusion that can be drawn from the discourse on deliberative democracy is that no one 
approach will work in all situations. There is a huge complexity in the debate itself; taking Gutmann 
and Thompson’s characterisation of the discourse, there are many different approaches to 
deliberative democracy from instrumental, procedural and pluralist to expressive, substantive and 
consensual. This is further complicated by the fact that these approaches are not mutually exclusive 
(for example, it is possible to have both procedural and substantive elements in a democracy). The 
discourse on democratic theory from the 1970s and 1980s from theorists such as Rawls (1971), 
Hayek (1973), Nozick (1974) and Pateman (1975) lack the nuanced analysis of contemporary 
democratic theory. While I have attempted to couch Burnheim’s demarchy within this 
contemporary context, it remains strongly instrumental in the protection of liberty. In my view, 
demarchy can create conditions conducive to many of these deliberative democratic methods. 
Reconstructing demarchy requires an examination of the context (local, national, global issues) in 
order to determine the balance of conceptual priorities, i.e., there will be times where an 
instrumental approach is needed and others where an expressive approach is needed. For example, a 
more expressive approach may be needed for an issue such as marriage equality; the homosexual 
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minority of citizens are greatly affected by this issue as it affects not only their ability to access 
government services, but also because it alters public perception of them as a group. Homosexuals 
face prejudice and discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation, and the population may 
not fully understand the ramifications of this law for this group. An expressive approach allows for 
these experiences of prejudice to influence the decision-making process. Alternatively, health 
policy is an issue that may need to be taken from an instrumentalist approach. For example, anti-
vaccination advocates may utilise anecdotal evidence to portray the dangers of forcing all citizens to 
be vaccinated. Not all issues call for balance, and expressive approach may create a false 
equivalence between two radically unequal perspectives. There is significantly more evidence on 
the benefits of vaccination than the evidence of vaccines causing autism (Dixon & Clarke, 2013). 
There should still be a component of expressivism still, in that vaccination is a public scientific 
controversy and that dissenting voices should be able to be expressed. Citizens should have the 
opportunity to debate and discuss their concerns, particularly with regards to whether vaccination is 
mandated or voluntary. However, there is a scientific consensus on the importance and benefits of 
vaccination; an instrumentalist approach requires that citizens provide clear reasons for their beliefs, 
and anecdotal evidence (even case studies) would likely be inadequate as a basis for deliberative 
decision-making.  
 
Are any components of deliberative democracy needed regardless of context? The many methods of 
deliberative democracy highlight the idea that failing to serve one purpose does not mean the 
democracy is a complete failure. Burnheim (1985) criticises electoral democracies (particularly in 
Australia) for failing to achieve anything but a weak form of procedural equality (pp. 62-63). On 
this view, electoral democracies do not meaningfully express preferences, and so they fail their 
instrumental purpose of creating good policy outcomes. Demarchy has a malleable structure that 
allows it to conform to the context it is situated within. However, I argue that there are several 
aspects of deliberative democratic theory that need to be attended to for demarchy to be effective, as 
inequalities would still exist in citizens’ abilities to participate due to socioeconomic status, level of 
education, culture, ethnicity, gender and so on. Demarchy can use an inquiry based process to 
develop the capacities of participants as well as being instrumental in creating publicly justified 
policy. 
 
A problem discussed by Dryzek and Mansbridge is that without some regard for substantive 
outcomes, a democracy lacks legitimacy. Merely having fair or equal procedures in place does not 
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ensure that the outcome will be fair or equal. However, it is as problematic to attempt to pre-
determine concepts such as fairness and equality as these may need to be determined by the context 
itself. For example, having equal opportunity to access the decision-making process is not 
equivalent to having equal ability to affect the decision-making process. Competent or highly 
proficient speakers from a dominant social background may have an advantage in affecting policy, 
whereas the poorly educated, the introverted and minority groups may be at a disadvantage in 
deliberations. Some contexts may be able to aim for a substantive goal, whereas it may be 
counterproductive in others. At the very least, I maintain that demarchy should assist in the 
development of participants’ deliberative capacities. It may be impractical for committees to 
directly create substantive outcomes, but they can still contribute to these outcomes over time by 
helping build competencies in participants. 
 
The functionally decentralised structure of demarchy and its use of sortition are instrumental in 
bringing about deliberation and inquiry. However, I also agree with Dewey and Carson that 
democracy is a mechanism for expressing and developing citizens’ preferences. There must be a 
balance for these goals in each demarchic committee. For local level issues, the expressive aspects 
could be seen as of greater importance than other contexts. Immigrants can become more integrated 
in their local communities through an expressive approach, as both newcomer and native can 
develop an understanding of the other through this type of participation. In a national or global 
context, an individual’s experiences become far less salient to deliberation due to the sheer number 
of people affected; it is more practical to develop and aggregate preferences. Representatives, as 
participants can directly gain experience in cooperation and develop deliberative capacities through 
their demarchic service. There are far more opportunities for people to participate in their local 
issues due to the smaller number of affected people than in nationwide or global problems. Equality 
is achieved procedurally through the random selection mechanism, and the decentralisation of 
issues provides many opportunities for people to contribute to decision-making.  
 
A possible example of demarchy can be seen in the Western Australia municipal project “Geraldton 
2029 and Beyond” which aims to create sustainability plans for the long-term future of the region. 
The project invited stakeholders with a diverse range of financial, social, cultural and religious 
interests together to address shared ecological and environmental problems. It was an opportunity 
for many groups, from local residents to large corporations, to express their preferences and 
interests and learn about the preferences of others. The project, “through a series of deliberations, 
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some organised by decision-makers, others by community, ordinary citizens were given 
opportunities to engage with scientific data, differing viewpoints and each other to develop local 
solutions. Focussed recruitment strategies ensured inclusion of marginalised groups, while random 
sampling ensured representation of diverse community views” (newDemocracy Foundation, 2010, 
para. 5). What this project demonstrates is the potential of a demarchic body to operate effectively 
as a deliberative democracy. The body was highly expressive, providing opportunities for all of the 
interested groups to meaningfully influence the strategic direction of sustainability plan. It created a 
type of substantive equality by ensuring that no one perspective (economic, residential, Indigenous 
and so on) was perceived of as having greater importance than any other. The project provided 
opportunities for ordinary citizens to develop their knowledge of the issue by participating in a 
multi-faceted discussion. Additionally, the body was able to use a consensual approach, 
demonstrating that it is possible to reach for a common good using this type of deliberative 
democratic process on a local scale. 
 
For issues of national or global complexity, demarchy is invaluable for its instrumentality. 
Functional decentralisation removes the issues from the quagmire of centralised governance; with 
fewer issues bound together than in multifunctional agencies, there are better conditions to allow 
participants to engage in a genuine inquiry process. People may still be able to gain competence in 
deliberation but what is essential is that there is a collective problematisation of the issue without 
conflating it with other issues. Examples of this type of process can be seen in the use of 
deliberative mini-publics in Oregon and British Columbia. Matthew Ryan and Graham Smith 
(Setälä, 2014) view a deliberative mini-public as a “governance-driven democratization” (p. 11) that 
utilises democratic innovations; in most cases, this involves in a direct citizen engagement, with 
these citizens playing a role in the decision-making process. This can be seen in the Oregon 
Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR), which had the task of deliberating on legislation to be put before 
the state-wide electorate. This panel of 20-24 citizens would hear testimony on a single ballot issue 
for 3-5 days before writing a voting recommendation (Gastil, Rosenzweig, Knobloch, & Brinker, 
2016, p. 175). This recommendation would be a part of an official voter’s information package. The 
wider electorate would be able to peruse this information package to make a more informed 
decision, thus the mini-public serves to improve the quality of citizen engagement by directly 
involving them in deliberation on a single issue. Another example of a mini-public can be seen in 
the British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly, which utilised a random sampling method to discuss 
possible changes to their electoral system. In this particular case, the recommendations for change 
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were put to the vote in a referendum. The Citizen’s Assembly was empowered to frame the 
referendum itself, rather than the more passive influence of recommendations in the Oregon CIR 
(this will be further discussed in Chapter 7). These mechanisms can be seen as a type of demarchic 
procedure, as they utilise functional decentralisation and random selection, as well as emphasising 
deliberation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have resituated demarchy within the discourse on deliberative democracy and 
defended it as a means of creating better conditions for deliberation. There is a great deal of 
complexity within this discourse; there is no clear point of contention with theorists clustering on 
one side or the other. Some argue that the fundamental purpose of deliberative democracy is to 
create publicly justified policy, while others place more emphasis on the deliberative democratic 
process’ ability to communicate and develop preferences. I have pointed out that all these 
approaches have value. 
 
The debates on the value of and differences between procedural and substantive, instrumental and 
expressive, consensual and pluralist models all indicate that the requirements and purposes of a 
deliberative democracy should be sensitive to context. It has been my contention that demarchy can 
satisfy the deliberative needs of any democratic context. Burnheim’s goal in Is Democracy 
Possible? to create strong procedures for deliberation is valuable albeit slightly misaligned. A 
comprehensive analysis of each context and the most appropriate deliberative democracy is 
unnecessary. Each specialised functional body would be best positioned to determine what its 
deliberative purposes should and can be. As long as there is a genuine inquiry process, these 
committees are more able to operate effectively as deliberative democracies. 
 
A significant challenge that remains unresolved is how to bring about the social and intellectual 
dispositions needed for meaningful deliberation. One of the criticisms I have made about 
Burnheim’s conception of demarchy is that he removes obstacles to deliberation, but that this does 
not necessarily mean that deliberation would improve. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the 
idea that citizens can develop their deliberative capacities by expanding into the territory of 
educational philosophy. It is my contention that participation in demarchic committees can be a 
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learning process; citizens can learn the habits and dispositions needed for effective deliberation with 
experience over time.  
Chapter 5 
Demarchic citizenship: developing democratic habits through 
communities of inquiry 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that demarchy can be conceived of explicitly as a model of deliberative 
democracy. Every context in which demarchic procedures are used is different, and the use of 
deliberative pragmatic interests would allow participants to be able to define the boundaries of their 
own specialised functional bodies. To recap, I use the term deliberative pragmatic interests to 
characterise the method by which the interest is utilised. It is essential that, for an interest to be 
represented in decision-making, it is subjected to public discussion (hence it being a deliberative 
interest). However, deliberation may be meaningful or meaningless depending on how it is 
conducted; it must also be considered in a certain manner. I have argued that it should be 
deliberated on through pragmatic inquiry; an inquiry process consistent with Peirce’s (2001) 
pragmatic maxim: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of 
our conception of the object” (p. 293). This creates better conditions for those who are affected by 
an issue in which to participate, and at the same time makes it more difficult for those with merely 
intrusive interests to interfere. In this way, I have aimed to create better procedures for deliberative 
democracy, but this in itself may not be able to produce a substantively equal outcome (such as 
giving all participants the opportunity to affect decision-making). Many processes may be put into 
place to create better conditions for deliberation, but it is unrealistic to assume that most citizens 
would actively participate as representatives on specialised functional bodies without appropriate 
citizenship education. Existing political and educational mechanisms are not designed to develop 
the social and intellectual dispositions needed for genuine deliberative democracy. 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that demarchy is a learning process for citizenship and that it can use a 
community of inquiry model of learning. To do this, I will first explore the various conceptions of 
citizenship. Debates over citizenship have been dominated by liberal discourse in which the citizen 
is the bearer of abstract rights. However, communitarians who favoured participatory democracy 
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have reshaped the notion of citizenship as a critique of the liberal concept of the citizen by 
appealing to the citizen as an active and engaged member of society. More recently, with the 
debates on deliberative democracy attention has also been focused on radical pluralism, where 
emphasis is on a transformative view of citizenship that is embedded in ideas of radical democracy. 
Nevertheless, liberal discourse has retained its foothold in the debates on citizenship, even more so 
with the onset of neo-liberalism in the 21
st
 century. Emphasis is placed on citizenship as a legal 
status and a preoccupation with equality over a recognition of difference, while less importance is 
placed on inclusion with emphasis on stability of culture and identity—what Gerard Delanty (2003) 
refers to as “disciplinary citizenship”. This “governmentalisation” of citizenship tends to emphasise 
the teaching of the official values of a polity as interpreted by public officials, that immigrants 
should become citizens by participating in a discourse that redefines social relations according to 
fixed categories and measured by cognitive competence, and that citizenship should be reduced to 
measuring competence through formal learning (p. 599). Delanty challenges this conception of 
citizenship by appealing to what he calls “cultural citizenship”, in which citizenship is taken to be a 
learning process. This conception of citizenship holds that citizenship, if understood as a learning 
process, can have a major impact on the cultural processes of society.  
 
Burnheim’s demarchy implies a type of citizenship as a learning process but his notion of 
citizenship retains some remnants of disciplinary citizenship. I will explicitly reconstruct demarchic 
citizenship as a learning process. I will argue that participation in a demarchy creates strong 
conditions for the development of democratic habits and dispositions. An important method in the 
development of these habits and dispositions is to appeal to doubt to maintain an attitude of 
fallibilism to engage in genuine deliberative inquiry; without these, it is difficult to engage in 
meaningful deliberation. I advocate the use of communities of inquiry as a learning process. Finally, 
I argue that demarchic committees can function as communities of inquiry. Regardless of the 
context, there are opportunities for participants to conjointly construct their understanding of an 
issue and engage in genuine inquiry. 
 
Conceptions of citizenship: Contemporary debates 
 
In this section, I will explore the changing conceptions of citizenship that have occurred in the last 
30 years. The shift in discussion about citizenship is more salient in the scholarly literature on 
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democratic theory, but the ideas have filtered into public discourse, especially among political 
interest groups and politicians outside of mainstream political discourse. Prior to this shift, 
citizenship was seen by political theorists by-and-large in one of two ways; through liberal or 
republican conceptions of politics. Liberal citizenship is seen as a stewardship of rights. On this 
view, citizenship is a method of protecting the liberties and autonomy of individuals. Republicans 
conversely view citizenship as an active and engaged mode of political interaction. In the 1970s and 
80s, the debate on the role of citizens more greatly emphasised participation as legitimising 
democracies. Authors such as C B Macpherson (1977) and Carole Pateman (1975) saw participation 
as a growing and necessary component of citizenship. At that time, participatory democracy seemed 
like a utopian concept; Pateman contended that participatory democracy depended on “the 
educative function of participation, and the crucial role of industry” (p. 44). Participatory 
democracy would be ineffective if citizens did not develop their capacities from their participation, 
or if the political institutions did not provide opportunities for this participation. This type of 
citizenship, communitarianism, was influenced by Aristotlean and Rousseauian conceptions of civic 
republicanism.  
 
Burnheim’s 1985 demarchic proposal is situated within this discourse. He argued that a more 
deliberative and participatory form of democracy is needed in order for decisions to be legitimate. 
Demarchy is a procedure for citizens to participate more equitably than existing political institutions 
allowed. Burnheim used a Marxist perspective to criticise existing political structures, arguing that 
the classless society he lived in may have been able to avoid grotesque concentrations of economic 
power, but this came at the cost of political power. A ruling class was beginning to emerge: small 
groups of elites came to hold authority over decisions they were unaffected by. He argued that in 
this context, citizenship should be conceived in terms of as participatory, not as explicit rights and 
duties. However, discourse in the 1990s shifted away from participatory democracies towards a 
pragmatic mode of engagement due to the greater emphasis on deliberative democracy (see 
Benhabib, 1994; Bohman, 1997; Cohen, 1997; Estlund, 1997; Young, 1996). Citizens were seen as 
needing democratic procedures to express and develop their preferences. Democratic institutions 
were seen as possible venues for the development of the intellectual and social habits conducive to 
effective deliberation. 
 
In “Three Normative Models of Democracy” Jürgen Habermas (1994), a German sociologist and 
philosopher in the tradition of critical theory and pragmatism, conceives the discourse about 
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citizenship and democracy in a new way. He moves beyond the notion of citizenship as negative or 
positive liberties; the liberal and republican conceptions of politics focus too greatly on ethical 
conceptions of identity. Habermas argues that in value-pluralistic societies, political decision-
making occurs by interests and groups that do not represent the identity of the entire state: “The 
political and interests and values that stand in conflict with each other without prospects of 
consensus are in need of balancing that cannot be achieved through ethical discourses ” (p. 5). He 
contends that the social, cultural and religious pluralisms of society require a re-characterisation of 
democracy and citizenship away from the liberal/republican discourse. The variety of forms of 
communication require a deliberative form of politics; a democracy “that depends on a network of 
fairly regularly bargaining processes and of various forms of argumentation, including pragmatic 
and moral discourses” (p. 6). Democratic legitimacy relies on decision-making being deliberative, 
having both substantive quality and procedural mechanisms to allow this to occur. In effect, he 
argues what is needed is a confluence of opinions in a democracy, rather than a consensus. As 
Habermas puts it, “The required balance of competing interests comes about as a compromise 
between parties that may rely on mutual threats. A legitimate kind of bargaining certainly depends 
on prior regulation of fairy terms for achieving results, which are acceptable for all parties on the 
basis of their differing preferences” (p. 5). It is important that citizens have equitable access to 
decision-making, and that their participation has some type of deliberative character. 
 
Since the turn of the century there has been a revival of the discourse of pragmatism and 
citizenship; challenging the liberal and communitarian discourses on citizenship which was no 
longer seen as applicable to an increasing globalised context (see Bohman, 2004; Misak, 2004; 
Talisse, 2004). An argument for liberal citizenship or republican citizenship was largely irrelevant 
to the issue of democratic legitimacy, as the questions about citizenship focused more on the type of 
processes needed to create legitimacy. Some political philosophers used variations of deliberative 
democracy as a solution to the legitimacy issue that was at least in part based on Peirce’s 
pragmatism. Talisse (2004) contends that deliberation is crucial to democracy but that there is now 
disagreement as to the role deliberation plays. In his view, discourse is needed “that is not pre-
committed to the aims and principles of antecedent political theory” (p. 6), namely the liberal and 
communitarian theories built from the traditions of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, there are many different purposes for deliberative democracy, and I 
next will discuss the citizenship requirements for these. In particular, I will discuss the procedural 
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and expressive requirements for deliberative democratic citizenship. The proceduralist model of 
democracy views deliberation as “a way in which individuals collectively decide whether a policy is 
legitimate. A policy or law is just only if (1) all those affected by it have an opportunity to consider, 
collectively, whether or not the policy or law is just, and if (2) all those affected assent to the 
policy” (McAfee, 2004, p. 50). Proceduralist democracies emphasise the participatory mechanisms 
of the institutions themselves. If those institutions do not provide those affected by issues access to 
the decision-making process, they fail to include relevant information, and the democracy is not 
adequately deliberative.  
 
Rawls (1996) and Benhabib (1996) initially argued that proceduralism was an important component 
of a deliberative democracy, creating procedures for legitimate decision-making. Rawls favoured 
public reason as a model of deliberative democracy, emphasising that a policy position could only 
be valid if it was subject to public deliberation. However, his model also avoids contentious lines of 
inquiry. Rawls argues that some topics are antithetical to productive deliberation; he considers 
debates on fundamental beliefs or ideologies to be fruitlessly divisive. For example, Rawls might 
argue that topics such as the value of human life do not belong in the public forum due to the 
inability to form legitimate arguments on the matter. Issues such as the sanctity of life have what 
Rawls (2001) refer to as “non-public reasons” (p. 799); beliefs that a person may hold but should 
not influence policy deliberations. Benhabib, on the other hand, does not ignore expressive value in 
even unproductive deliberations, as they are opportunities for participants to better understand one 
another. She, thus, advocates a model of discursive democracy, arguing that all topics and issues 
were open for discussion. Benhabib would likely include a topic such as the value of life, as 
participants can come to a better understanding of the issues and perspectives involved. She views 
the discussion as having value in itself, rather than simply being instrumental in producing 
legitimate decisions. Cheryl Misak (2004) follows along proceduralist lines of reasoning, arguing 
that deliberation is essential to democratic justifiability. In her view, deliberation “is justified 
because it is the best way of exposing and communicating the reasons that matter and democratic 
deliberation is justified because we need to expose all the reasons that matter, not just a subset of 
them” (p. 65). Misak argues that deliberation is the only way for citizens to engage in pragmatic 
inquiry; decisions would have a weaker claim to legitimacy without considering all relevant 
interests involved. Fishkin and Luskin (2005) and Mansbridge (2010) argue in favour of 
deliberative opinion polls as a procedure. A deliberative opinion poll takes a representative random 
sampling of citizens and engages them in discussions on specific issues, such as energy policy, 
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economic policy and even potentially changing the structure of government (see Fishkin & Luskin, 
2005, p. 662). Participants talk with subject matter experts in order to develop more well-considered 
and well-expressed opinions. Fishkin (1991) argues that deliberative opinion polls are a procedure 
that allows people to meaningfully express themselves, overcoming “non-attitudes” and “pseudo 
opinions” (p. 83) of mass publics.  
 
There is, however, a question overlooked by most of the theorists mentioned: What are the habits 
and dispositions of citizens prior to participation? This is an important question because these 
qualities can substantively impact on our ability to reason, to form opinions, and to understand the 
views of others. People learn how to think and behave through childhood and their lives, with their 
experiences forming the basis of their ability to form preferences. Dewey and Delanty imply that 
the way people think is of as much significance as what they are thinking; greater attention must be 
paid to the development of citizens’ social and intellectual capacities. Dewey, in particular, argued 
that democracy is a way of life and not just a means of legitimising political decisions. 
 
Experience, learning and habits 
 
To examine how people are predisposed to interact in a democracy, I will explore how societies 
develop their citizens’ intellectual and social capacities. To do this, I will discuss Dewey’s notion 
that education is life itself, and this forms the basis of our thought processes and habits of mind. 
Next, I discuss Delanty’s view of cultural citizenship, a form of lifelong learning that is both an 
individual endeavour and a collective experience. After this, I will discuss the deliberative 
dispositions that are crucial for engagement in a deliberative democracy. These dispositions are 
needed as a component of cultural citizenship; citizens need to develop capacities for pragmatism, 
toleration and listening in order for the democracy to be meaningfully discursive. 
 
Dewey (2002) argued in Human Nature and Conduct that all behaviour is a shared experience. 
People naturally adopt the customs, language and beliefs of those around them; these habits are 
developed through peoples’ past experiences. The kind of habits a person has determines whether 
those habits will actively perpetuate themselves or develop into something new. Dewey contends 
the view that bad habits “are disserviceable and that bad habits are conventionally enumerable, 
conduces to make all habits more or less bad. For what makes a habit bad is enslavement to old 
92 
 
 
 
ruts” (p. 66). We cannot escape habit, nor is it necessary to. Habits form a significant component of 
our socialisation and there is nothing essentially good or bad about them. What is problematic is 
relying on these habits without proper acknowledgement of whether they are being appropriately 
applied in context. Dewey goes on to contend that these habits are difficult to change once they are 
in place; the reality of changing people’s socialisation is never quite as easy as it seems. He argues 
that beliefs, expectations, judgements, and attendant emotional dispositions of like and dislike, are 
not easily modified after they have taken shape. Political and legal institutions may be altered, even 
abolished; but the bulk of popular thought which has been shaped to their pattern persists (p. 108). 
Dewey is arguing here that it is not enough to restructure political institutions; that alone is not 
sufficient to change the habits of mind of participants. 
 
According to Dewey (2004), a superficial analysis of the role of education in democracy is that is it 
prepares citizens to give informed consent as electors. He considers democracy to be more than a 
type of governance, but also “primarily a mode of associate living, of conjoint communicated 
experience” (p. 93). To live democratically is to live with others, understanding diverse points of 
view and including their interests. Dewey sees education as a process of reconstruction; each 
experience a person has adds meaning to both the previous and subsequent experiences. He argues 
that the greater awareness of shared concerns and improvement in people’s capacities was not 
initially caused by deliberation. Rather,  
 
they were caused by the development of modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, 
migration, and intercommunication which flowed from the command of science over 
natural energy … a society which is mobile, which is full of channel for the distribution 
of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal 
initiative and adaptability. (p. 92)  
 
Dispositions for tolerance and listening can be developed through the practice and process of 
democracy. By directly experiencing the plurality of their own contexts, citizens can develop to 
have more democratic dispositions. Their experience of democracy is to be as co-creators of both 
knowledge and of policy. Democracy becomes an educative, experimental space where all 
participants recognise the limitations of their own experiences and beliefs. He contends that 
expecting people to alter their habits immediately would be akin to having a society stop eating or 
breathing; it is an essential part of people’s existence and it will take time for them to adjust. 
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One of the dispositions that needs to be developed is the attitude that democracy is itself an  
 
experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is 
an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and 
impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. But the 
trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. (Dewey, 2002, p. 190)  
 
Sociologist Gerard Delanty argues along similar lines, conceiving of citizenship as a lifelong 
learning process involving active engagement in society. Delanty (2003) understands democracy to 
be a mechanism that could develop the cognitive and communicative competencies of citizens. He 
argues against the liberal conception of citizenship in favour what he calls cultural citizenship, 
which involves “learning processes that have a development and transformative impact of the 
learning subject” (p. 605). Delanty’s cultural citizenship stands in opposition to the static, 
reproductive quality of disciplinary citizenship, which requires the governmentalisation of 
citizenship. He argues that societies instil the traits and skills that are deemed necessary for good 
citizenship, and, thus, reproduce existing norms and values. Delanty places his emphasis instead on 
the transformative qualities of citizenship. Individuals have the capacity to influence the shape of 
their society, just as society can influence the shape of the individual. It is an interplay of people, 
culture and society; identity takes on a more fluid and dynamic quality than is possible with a 
disciplinary approach to citizenship. Citizens require both cognitive and interpersonal development, 
and this is conducted through communication. He embraces the ambiguities and far-reaching 
consequences of this perspective; there is no single competency that characterises citizenship. 
Delanty goes on to argue that the task of citizenship is to enhance the capacity of a society to learn. 
The overall average competency of society develops due to the development of individuals. 
However, bringing about this type of citizenship is a difficult task to accomplish. There is no formal 
institution that can teach them and there is no way to ascertain whether those values have been truly 
instilled.  
 
Delanty argues that there are five mechanisms that can be used to build cultural citizenship: process, 
connectivism, development, construction, and transformation (p. 601). Process is an active 
mechanism that builds on concepts, as opposed to merely articulating ideas. Connectivism is a 
process entailing pulling together concepts and ideas from more than one discourse. Development 
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involves the change and improvement of competencies over time. Construction is a mechanism that 
involves the development of knowledge and understanding through inquiry. Finally, transformation 
involves the potential for the learning subject to change their views, identity, beliefs and actions as a 
result of the learning. Each society needs to be able to define its own normative principles and 
cultural values. Cultural citizenship is defined by values and participation; those who engage in 
these learning processes can develop both themselves and the society in which they inhabit over 
time. However, there are some dispositions and habits of mind that are needed to engage in a 
deliberative democracy. Cultural citizenship provides mechanisms to develop these deliberative 
dispositions, and in the next section I will discuss what these dispositions are and their necessity for 
democratic engagement. 
 
Deliberative dispositions 
 
I argue that the ability to engage in pragmatic inquiry, which includes communication skills, are 
needed to engage in a deliberative democracy. These intellectual and social dispositions cannot be 
directly taught; they are slowly developed through experience and socialisation throughout life.  
The ability to engage pragmatic inquiry is important as it allows the person to identify facts relevant 
to an issue, along with its potential consequences. Having an approach for identifying facts related 
to issues that are of public concern in a coherent manner is important to deliberative decision-
making (I discuss this is more detail in the next section). Pragmatist Charles Peirce asserted that all 
beliefs should be subject to amendment based on their consequences. He argued that a conservative 
perspective (those who regard all perspectives but their own to be fallible) shunned paying attention 
to consequences, and “is altogether out of place in science – which on the contrary [has] always 
been forwarded by radicals and radicalism, in the sense of eagerness to carry consequences to their 
extremes. Not radicalism that is cocksure, however, but the radicalism that tries experiments” 
(2012, p. 58). For Peirce, belief is a calm and satisfactory state of equilibrium we are not inclined to 
avoid or to alter in favour of a belief in something else. Indeed, “we cling tenaciously, not merely to 
believing, but to believing just what we do believe” (2009, p. III). Doubt is a different state to 
belief; it is an uneasy and dissatisfied state of “from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass 
into a state of belief” (2009, III).  
 
Peirce argued that humans are compelled to move from the disequilibrium of doubt to the 
equilibrium of belief. However, while the irritation of doubt is an immediate motive for the 
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attainment of belief, we cannot assume a “social impulse” to seek truth or “coincide with fact”. In 
practice, we are not always inclined to settle opinion through a rigorous method of scientific inquiry 
and satisfy our desires to alleviate doubt through uncritically retaining our belief through various 
methods of belief fixing, such as the method of tenacity, i.e., refusing to consider contrary evidence, 
the method of authority, i.e., accepting an institution’s dictates, or the a priori method, i.e., the most 
coherent and/or elegant-seeming belief-set. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs are firmly 
established through rigorous inquiry so that they should be such as they can truly guide our actions.  
 
Firstly, it is important that the doubt is authentic otherwise the inquiry is merely an intellectual 
exercise that doesn’t have the motivation for truth seeking. Secondly, we must be aware of the 
indubitability of the premises of the argument, to remain fallible but not sceptical as it is not 
possible to genuinely doubt everything. Thirdly, there must be a cessation of mental action once the 
doubt has been resolved. Peirce argued that once the doubt is settled, no further deliberation needs 
to take place: 
 
In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is 
considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the 
question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. 
We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we 
pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if 
disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this 
ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (p. 229) 
 
According to Michael Pardales and Mark Girod (2006), participants must come to the inquiry with a 
willingness to engage in genuine deliberation; without this, the focus of discussion is likely to be 
competitive or adversarial rather than a genuine inquiry. They go on to say that the community of 
inquiry is crucial for Peirce, for his rejection of certainty or absolute knowledge demands a rigorous 
collective and conjoint process for resolving doubt. In an inquiry “where people come together in 
agreement, one can speak of knowledge, truth and reality, but these concepts will be grounded in 
the community of inquirers, not in the individual consciousness” (p. 301). In practice, engaging in a 
community of inquiry requires more than putting forward a perspective or having a willingness to 
participate. It requires that participants have the capacity to recognise and acknowledge their own 
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prejudices; to understand “the force of habit, having the ability to stop our habitual actions long 
enough to question our judgements and re-evaluate our beliefs” (p. 171).  
 
Toleration is an important social and cognitive disposition for participation in a community of 
inquiry. Citizens may bring many perspectives and approaches to inquiry, and it may take a great 
deal of time for participants to understand one another. This understanding may not occur at all, but 
in order to have any chance of success the participants must be willing to tolerate these 
perspectives. Toleration is a disposition required for pragmatic inquiry; without access to certainly 
or absolute knowledge, citizenship in a pluralistic society requires the tolerance of other views to 
explore alternative ideas further (see Gutmann, 1987, pp. 310-316). Enslin, Pendlebury and Tjiattas 
(2001) define toleration as “the capacity and willingness to act accordingly – to forbear from 
denigrating the positions of others or even from insisting on the truth of one’s own view in the face 
of reasonable disagreement” (p. 120). A citizen, whose habits and dispositions do not include 
toleration, is unlikely to engage in genuine inquiry. They may be willing to deliberate over 
disagreement but could become intransigent on possibilities that do not fall with 
in the scope of their beliefs. For example, a person might be participating in a discussion on public 
health, specifically dealing with an increase in teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. 
Genuine inquiry requires that participants discuss all aspects of the problem, asking what the facts 
are, how families are coping, what the current state of sexual education is, what resources are 
available, and so on. There may be participants who are conservatively religious who disapprove of 
promiscuity and pre-marital sex. There is nothing necessarily wrong with holding this belief, nor 
with any person presenting their reasons in favour of position for public deliberation. However, 
there can be distinct differences for the community of inquiry depending on the presence of 
dispositions of tolerance. If this conservative group is intolerant of exploring the issue from 
perspectives other than their own, it becomes unlikely that they would experience genuine doubt. 
Without this doubt, there is no genuine inquiry; they would likely not experience the learning 
processes that other participants do in the community of inquiry. Intolerance makes it difficult to 
engage in the development, construction or transformation that Delanty argues is important for 
cultural citizenship. It is not necessary for individuals to reach new conclusions or agree with 
others. What is crucial is that they are willing to accept the possibility that all perspectives, even 
their own, are fallible.  
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Another important aspect of demarchic citizenship is communication skills, although these could be 
said to be important to any democracy. We live in increasingly value-pluralistic societies, and 
disciplinary citizenship becomes correspondingly inappropriate to this context. Citizenship requires 
ongoing learning, “an open process defined in movement rather than in finality (Delanty, 2003, p. 
601). Delanty views this process as occurring through communicative links and situations, and thus 
it is important to develop communication skills in participants. In a pluralistic context, it is essential 
that participants come to appreciate the different modes of communication employed by others. 
Those skills need to be developed not only among citizens belonging to marginalised groups with 
limited power but also citizens who generally hold the beliefs and values of the dominant culture. 
One of the challenges of democratic interactions is testimonial injustice. Feminist philosopher 
Miranda Fricker coined the term in her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the ethics of 
knowing. In it, she discusses how a person’s words, thoughts and ideas are taken less seriously due 
to a prejudice against that person. In her words, “testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes 
a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (p. i). In the context of a 
democracy, the dominant discourse silences marginalised discourses due to this testimonial 
injustice; if a speaker belongs to a marginalised discourse, it is likely that they will have greater 
difficulty in persuading others than those from a dominant tradition. Fricker specifically exemplifies 
this in the disparity in the credibility of women, arguing that “a man makes (possibly unintended) 
use of his identity as a man to influence a woman’s actions – for example, to make her defer to his 
word” (p. 14). A woman may be perfectly rational, articulating reasons for certain preferences but is 
still perceived as a dubious political actor due to her gender.  
 
A specific example of this silencing of a marginalised discourse can be seen with the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia. Aboriginals have faced substantial prejudice in Australia for hundreds of 
years, from the “old-fashioned” prejudice (biological superiority of whites over blacks) to the more 
modern prejudices against affirmative action (see Pedersen & Walker, 1997). In her article 
“Language, culture, identity and empowerment in the dominant culture”, Virginia Phillips (1992) 
argues that many Aboriginal people find Standard Australian English to be difficult to use. This 
dominant dialect is used for formal communication, journalism, official correspondence and the 
like, but this type of discourse is jarring for many Aboriginals. Phillips argues this difficulty comes 
from the structures the language uses to express thought; Standard Australian English has 
differences between verbal and written versions, uses abstract notions,  and utilises complex 
negations (pp. 25-26). Due to the marginalised Aboriginal discourse having difficulty using the 
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dominant colonizing discourse, they suffer testimonial injustice; Phillips states that Aboriginal 
people are perceived as “speaking funny” (p. 25), and feel shame due to a their lack of equality in 
the discourse. 
 
A deliberative democracy can be an inquiry-based mechanism for revealing the various discourses 
that are being used within the polity. As I discussed earlier, inquiry is the process of moving from 
the disequilibrium of doubt to the stability of belief; this doubt is caused by an uncertainty when 
dealing with a problem. Epistemic injustice may be a factor in any society, and thus should be a 
factor in a community of inquiry. Genuine inquiry requires real doubt, and a shared aim to solve a 
problem. What matters most for Peirce’s conception of inquiry is the method that produces 
knowledge and belief (Pardales & Girod, 2006, p. 301). If the method excludes an examination (or 
at least cognisance) of the relationships between discourses, then the inquiry process is less likely to 
yield a shared belief. A democratic community of inquiry needs to ensure that participants are made 
aware of the discourse-based prejudices at work. The best possible judgements can only be made 
when all evidence, from the scientific facts to the epistemic frameworks, is used to reconstruct the 
issue as a shared problem.  
 
Developing pragmatic habits and communities of inquiry 
 
So far, I have argued that citizenship can be conceived of as a lifelong learning process, and that 
this process can develop certain dispositions (such as toleration and listening). In this section, I 
describe how communities of inquiry can operate as a democratic learning process. I will then argue 
that demarchy itself can be utilised as a community of inquiry. The decentralisation of issues can 
create learning processes for citizens to understand the issues, as well as develop their deliberative 
capacities.  
 
Every context is different and the outcome of each inquiry will be different. Different intellectual 
traditions produce different methods of thinking, communicating, imagining and problem-solving; 
diverse approaches create new questions, perspectives and outcomes (see Seixas, 1993, p. 308). It is 
the conjunction of these disparate perspectives and the recognition of the contingency of knowledge 
that creates the most effective form of inquiry. Philosopher of education Maughn Gregory (2002) 
applies this constructivism more directly to the community of inquiry, saying that “a consensus in a 
community of experts is not a final truth, but merely the most reliable knowledge the community 
99 
 
 
 
can produce by applying the best methods to the available evidence” (p. 399). Gregory primarily 
applies his notion of a community of inquiry to an explicitly educational context. Teachers serve as 
co-inquirers and facilitators of students’ learning. The teacher’s role as facilitator of knowledge 
development is an important one, as the teacher is needed to maintain a productive line of inquiry 
whilst giving students the freedom they need to discover and learn on their own. Inquiry must be 
followed to wherever it may lead in order to be intellectually honest and meaningful. Gregory 
argues that this type of community also needs to engage in what he refers to as ‘meta-inquiry’: a 
discussion that examines how the participants interact, what their existing habits and prejudices may 
be, and whether the process may be subtly disadvantageous to certain participants (p. 407). This 
conception of inquiry can be seen to work in the context of deliberative democracy. A facilitator is 
still important to this model even in the context of adult deliberators, but a community of inquiry is 
conceptually compatible to deliberative democracy. This is a process that operates much in the saw 
way Delanty articulates cultural citizenship, namely, providing opportunities for development, 
construction, and transformation of participants (pp. 601-602). The role of facilitator is to help 
participants engage in inquiry and to model democratic values such as toleration and respect. They 
ensure that participants are reasonable and keeping a civil tone in their interactions, as well as 
helping all involved to see themselves as part of a community with a shared problem. The facilitator 
encourages participants to engage in a genuine inquiry process, and this allows for a conjoint 
reconstruction of the issue, rather than merely debating preferences. 
 
It is here that we can begin to see democratic dispositions being developed, particularly in regard to 
listening and tolerance. Participants in such a community can gain a strong understanding and 
appreciation for others’ values and beliefs; this understanding can continue to grow over time and 
those involved become more competent deliberators, which is necessary for active and informed 
citizenship. This type of democracy shifts the emphasis away from outcomes and towards the 
character of the discussion itself. Pardales’ and Girod’s version of a community of inquiry focuses 
on reasoning, as well as being “a place where mutual respect and concern for all participants is a 
primary value” (p. 307). A crucial component of a democratic community of inquiry is the 
development of citizens’ dispositions. A demarchic committee can be a type of community of 
inquiry in itself, fostering the qualities needed to engage in genuine inquiry. For Gregory, and 
Pardales and Girod, a crucial component of any community of inquiry is the facilitator. In a 
classroom, this is the teacher, but the conception of this role is more difficult in a democratic 
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context. Communities of inquiry do not naturally arise in any context; they require participants with 
greater levels of competence and experience to guide and scaffold the process.  
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Demarchic citizenship 
 
Burnheim’s (2006) second edition of Is Democracy Possible? added a preface to clarify his view 
for the new political context at the time, but not to the contemporary political discourse. In the 
preface, Burnheim recognises the limitations of his discussion on Marxism and class conflict, 
stating that “the procedure of attributing conflicts of interest to conflicts between social classes or 
other groupings is rarely useful in understanding these conflicts or dealing with their effects” (p. 
viii). He seeks to look to each political context and make the best decisions possible in that context. 
Burnheim’s (2014) third edition  still looks to the contemporary political context but he admits that 
he has not kept up to date with the philosophical discourse (p. ii). The Demarchy Manifesto (2016) 
similarly did not engage with the debate, and is still situated within the discourse of the 1970s and 
1980s. Burnheim construes the problem as being of power “torn between two objectives, giving 
power to the people and minimising power over the individual” (p. v). This understanding of the 
democratic debate is still couched in terms of positive and negative liberty: republicanism and 
liberalism. Burnheim argues that electoral democracies do not adequately represent the views of 
constituents; party packages remain as problematic as they did in the 1980s. Elected governments 
still fail to act on the basis of clear reasoning and fail to create well-justified policies. Genuine 
inquiry does not occur as each political party, due to member’s solidarity, are likely to not act on 
any doubt over any personal beliefs or ideologies they hold: 
 
Public discussion is likely to be inconclusive because in such a discussion the difference 
between diverse considerations may well emerge clearly, but no particular resolution of 
those differences may emerge as uniquely preferable. So political parties pick the bits of 
public discussion that suit their strategies and reject the rest as irrelevant or mistaken. 
(p. 39) 
 
For Burnheim, the solution to non-deliberative electoral politics still involves taking decision-
making away from those who have incentives to ignore genuine inquiry using a demarchic process. 
I agree with this, but I contend that representatives need to see the value of inquiry; demarchy can 
be a learning process for citizens to develop their deliberative capacities.  
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Demarchy as a learning process 
 
In my view, demarchy cannot be fully achieved without an emphasis on pragmatic inquiry 
processes as vital to deliberation. Every decentralised issue may change over time, as well as being 
subject to the perspectives of those affected by it. Creating a demarchic community of inquiry 
requires the inclusion of those affected by that committee. If the participants are not affected, they 
would be sharing irrelevant information and perspectives to the decision-making process. Genuine 
inquiry requires the inclusion of all the relevant evidence. The demarchy provides an opportunity 
for participants to share their understanding of the issue and then begin to reconstruct that issue 
together. This conjoint understanding of an issue relates to Delanty’s point of connectivism; 
learning occurs as the participants develop an understanding of how their interests interact and 
overlap. 
 
One aspect that Burnheim overlooks in his discussions on demarchy is the inherently social 
component of all political activity; it is not enough to assume that participants will come together, 
speak in the same way and have the same idea of the common good. He does not assume that 
interaction will be simple or will solve all problems, but he also ignores the challenges this method 
of governance will face. Burnheim (2016) argues that demarchic procedures would be sufficient to 
create meaningful deliberation, as he contends that rectifying basic flaws in democracy brings about 
better decision-making. His solutions are:  
 
practical proposals based on procedures that can be easily implemented if enough 
people are prepared to put in the work and resources. The success of those proposals in 
practice probably depends on enough of the one percent being prepared to use their 
wealth to suppose the widespread experimentation with better ways of reaching 
collective decisions without any return to themselves. (p. 136)  
 
There seems to be a necessary precondition for demarchy to work in that citizens need to be 
democratically-minded in some fashion already. This is especially problematic as Burnheim argues 
that this change is needed from the wealthy and political elites (what he is referring to with the “one 
percent”). His perspective relies on a change of heart on the part of elites to care (or recognise) that 
the current system no longer works as means of pragmatic decision-making. Given that elites have 
incentives to maintain the status quo, it seems unlikely that this change would occur on its own. 
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This may be a throwaway comment, but I contend that the success of demarchy depends on the 
development of all citizens’ capacities, including that of elites. If all people become capable of 
recognising the weaknesses of current methods of decision-making and the strengths of genuine 
inquiry, change is more likely to occur. Decentralised structures increase the chance that 
participants will discuss the relevant issues, and a random selection mechanism gives all affected 
people an opportunity to participate equally. However, more procedures must be implemented to 
improve the quality of deliberation beyond what exists in current politics. Demarchic participants 
need deliberative habits to be able to engage in genuine inquiry.  
 
Concordantly, a demarchic decentralisation of functional issues may not be sufficient to develop the 
democratic dispositions of those participating. Delanty would refer to this as a developmental 
mechanism, and potentially a transformative learning process. Demarchy needs an approach that 
gives participants the time they need to slowly change their belief-habits. This change is on-going, 
as the desired qualities in citizens form an improved deliberative character, including qualities such 
as such as equality and rationality (Dutwin, 2003, p. 239). Citizens develop a stronger 
understanding of how issues affect others by engaging in the community of inquiry, and seeing 
themselves as part of this community develops the notion that they an equal member and 
participant. The inquiry process helps citizens to develop and articulate reasons for their preferences 
while not privileging a particular method of discourse. The British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly is 
an example of citizen engagement that emphasises the social inquiry process of democracy. There 
was a greater focus on inclusiveness, team-building and creating a collective identity (Warren & 
Pearse, 2008, p. 81). Participants developed a set of shared values including respect and open-
mindedness, meaning that they could continually improve the quality of their discourse as the 
deliberations continued. Similarly, every demarchic committee should be approached flexibly, 
engaging in genuine inquiry into the interests and perspectives involved. No two demarchic 
committees would be structured the same, but the method of engaging in inquiry may be similar. 
My model of demarchy creates a focus on the inquiry process; I contend that there are no political 
contexts which would not benefit from genuine inquiry.  
 
Demarchic communities of inquiry 
 
A demarchic committee can be both a decision-making body and a community of inquiry. The 
entire demarchic process can be educative and deliberative. When an issue arises, those who are 
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interested conjointly construct the boundaries of the issue through their deliberative pragmatic 
interests. This initial process emphasises communication, toleration and listening as the specialised 
functional bodies cannot be fully constructed without the participants deliberating on the nature of 
their shared problem. Participants can only do this effectively through engagement in pragmatic 
inquiry; it becomes essential that they listen to the justifications of those who claim to be affected in 
order to create the boundaries of the issue. Once these boundaries have been determined, the 
committees can operate in much the same way as a community of inquiry; the rotational 
membership provides an opportunity for this. 
 
The selection of facilitators could operate in the same way that Burnheim (1985) proposes for 
members of higher-level bodies: 
 
The people chosen to staff such bodies should have substantial firsthand experience of 
the problems and practices of first-order bodies. They should be able and trusted. The 
best way to meet these requirements would be to choose them by lot from a pool of 
candidates nominated by their colleague on first-order bodies as having shown the 
special skill, knowledge an dedication that would fir them for a judicial role. (p. 87) 
 
In the case of my proposal for demarchic committees, potential facilitators must have served a 
minimum of one term as a participant on a specialised functional body. Colleagues must nominate 
potential facilitators as having deliberative character, possessing qualities of rationality and 
equality. They must be perceived of as trustworthy, capable of being impartial for a role where they 
must mediate the diversity of perspectives in a fair and equitable manner. The facilitator requires a 
demonstrated ability to lead a community of inquiry, as they have a role in ensuring that citizens 
engage in a learning process.  
 
As a matter of practicality, the facilitator may be rotated at a different rate to the other participants. 
For example, a committee of twelve might have a three-year term of service, with a rotation of one 
member every three months. A new facilitator might be rotated annually; the short term of service 
places a reduced burden on the facilitator. It is possible that issues may overlap and this could 
potentially cause a conflict of interest. Thus it is necessary that a person can only serve on one 
committee at a time (as a participant or facilitator). However, being a facilitator requires that a 
person no longer has a voice in policy-making. The shorter term of service allows for a person to 
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facilitate without giving up too many opportunities to participate on other specialised functional 
bodies. Additionally, this shorter term of service provides a safeguard against incompetent or 
ineffective facilitators. It is possible for a person to be nominated as being suitable as a facilitator 
while not actually having the necessary qualities for such as role. It could be the case that the 
facilitator fails to adequately recognise the epistemic injustices that occur in the discussions of a 
given committee, or perhaps they have unrestrained opinions that influence the committee. In any 
case, the annual rotation creates a term of service of reasonable length; there is sufficient time to 
meaningfully fulfil the role as a facilitator. 
 
My deliberative pragmatic interest method of assessing eligibility is also potentially a learning 
process that can operate as a connective and constructive mechanism for cultural citizenship. 
Participants would need to engage in a public forum and engage in an inquiry process in order to 
participate in a specialised functional process. This can be seen as one of Delanty’s connectivist 
learning processes (p. 601); the inquiry requires that participants connect different ideas and 
information about the interests involved. They would also need to develop their social capacities to 
adequately deliberate with others, including listening to other perspectives and being tolerant of 
others points of view. If participants are required to articulate how they are affected by an issue, 
they are likely to stop and think about how they are affected. People may not always succeed in 
convincing others that they are affected by issues, but they would develop habits of mind by 
engaging in this process. The more they consider how they are affected, they better they should be 
able to describe their interest. Citizens may even potentially cease to participate in issues as they 
realise they are not actually affected, and merely have strong opinions on those issues. For example, 
a person might have strong feelings that the definition of marriage should be a union of a man and a 
woman. This person might have well-defined arguments to support the claim, and is married in a 
heterosexual relationship. The challenge for this person is now to genuinely inquire into how they 
are affected; many marriage equality opponents claim that their marriage is threatened by including 
homosexual relationships in the definition of marriage. If the person can articulate how they are 
affected, how their marriage is threatened, or other specific deleterious effects they might suffer, 
they arguably have a deliberative pragmatic interest. If they are not able to reasonably justify these 
thoughts, they may reconsider their perspective. The process is beneficial to developing their habits 
of mind in terms of pragmatic inquiry; to participate in the next issue, they would be more likely to 
consider how they are affected in more detail. 
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Conclusion 
 
People develop habits of mind and social dispositions throughout the course of their lives. This 
begins in early childhood and continues to play a role in the way we interact, make decisions, and 
simply order our thoughts. Deliberative democracies can be instrumental in bring about publicly 
justified policies, but can also be an avenue for the development of habits and dispositions 
conducive for effective decision-making. Burnheim sees demarchy’s purpose as that which 
improves the quality of outcomes in a democracy, with the changed structures and modes of 
interaction creating a better environment for deliberation. He focuses on creating practical solutions 
for improving the quality of decisions in a variety of contexts as existing political institutions are 
becoming increasingly inappropriate to this task. However, Burnheim downplays the importance 
the habits and dispositions have in deliberation. In his view, deliberation would become much more 
effective when removed from the problems of electoral politics; people are freer to engage in 
pragmatic inquiry using Burnheim’s structure. The re-structuring of democratic institutions would 
most certainly have a substantive effect on the way in which decisions are approached, but the 
critical reasoning, toleration and listening skills of participants may have an enormous impact on 
the quality of deliberation as well. The ways in which demarchic participants approach issues, solve 
problems, and interact with each other has a substantive effect not only on outcomes but on future 
deliberations.  
 
Demarchy can provide an opportunity for citizens to experiment with new approaches and 
perspectives; emphasising this learning process increases the likelihood that participants can 
improve their deliberative capacities. If we conceive of demarchy as a method of engaging in a 
democratic community of inquiry, we have an opportunity to develop the capacities of citizens as 
well as improve the quality of political decision-making. The changing context of politics, 
particularly with regards to globalisation, requires that all have the chance to re-situate their habits 
and beliefs. How these processes work is explored in more detail in the next chapter, where I 
describe methods for specialised functional bodies and higher-level bodies to interact and 
interrelate.  
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Chapter 6 
Adaptive demarchy: multiple approaches to deliberative 
democracy 
 
I have, so far, discussed the historical and discursive background of demarchy to provide context 
for my argument that demarchy can be used as a model of deliberative democracy. I have analysed 
Burnheim’s proposals and the criticisms these have received over the past thirty years. Of particular 
contention are the limitations of Burnheim’s demarchic eligibility requirements, which I have 
argued needs revision and that eligibility to participate should be based on deliberative pragmatic 
interests. Unlike Burnheim, I re-situated demarchy within the contemporary discourse on 
deliberative democracy, contending that a democracy could create procedures for effective 
decision-making. I argued that demarchic committees could be used as a means of developing 
citizens’ deliberative capacities; each specialised functional body is an opportunity to engage in a 
community of inquiry.  
 
In this chapter, I will synthesise all these arguments to create an alternative demarchic model of 
deliberative democracy. My model is adaptive, meaning that it is used specifically on a case-by-
case basis. To do this, I will first (briefly) explore how Burnheim’s original demarchy can be seen 
as a deliberative democracy. According to his model, democracy is legitimated by procedures 
designed to accurately determine who is eligible to participate. Next, I will explore two alternate 
models of demarchy. Burnheim’s (2016) new proposal for demarchy is focused on strong decision-
making; he contextualises his democratic structures to suit the scope of the problem. Gilbert 
Burgh’s (1998) alternative proposal of cross-section demarchy is a variant on Burnheim’s original 
project, but emphasises a more impartial selection mechanism as well as learning processes to 
develop citizens’ deliberative capacities. Both of these models can be seen as taking different 
approaches to deliberative democracy, which I will then use to argue that a demarchy can 
accomplish many different aims. I will argue that each specialised functional body can be adapted 
to the context of each issue, creating different deliberative procedures and outcomes. More 
substantive outcomes can be sought for small scale issues, as there are more opportunities for 
citizens to directly engage in decision-making. For issues of greater complexity, specialised 
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functional committees provide a means of engaging in authentic inquiry, and ensuring that decisions 
are legitimised through deliberative justifications. 
  
Burnheim’s original demarchy as a deliberative democracy 
 
In this section I will provide an overall summary of Burnheim’s original demarchic project with a 
focus on instrumental and pluralist aims as a model of deliberative democracy. I am focusing my 
attention on his 1985 proposal as it has the clearest articulation of democratic legitimacy. The 
Demarchy Manifesto (while a new project) is still fundamentally the same type of demarchy, albeit 
with more practical solutions for implementation and inquiry. I will first argue that legitimate 
material interests serve as a procedure for determining eligibility to participate. Legitimate material 
interests allow for pluralistic societies to equitably grant citizens opportunities to participate. Next, I 
discuss his contention that legitimacy in demarchy comes from a representative sampling of those 
who are affected; the random selection process is a practical attempt to protect the liberties of all in 
a more effective manner than in electoral democracies. After this, I will discuss how higher-level 
bodies are used as deliberative bodies. For Burnheim, these bodies serve an instrumental purpose in 
creating legitimate, publicly justifiable decisions. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of his 
proposal for a statistically representative demarchy. I argue that Burnheim’s demarchic proposal 
offers limited learning processes for citizenship. Citizens do have an opportunity to develop their 
deliberative capacities, but there is no requirement for them to do so. Instead, decisions are 
legitimised through the selection process, not by inquiry, learning or public reason. 
 
To briefly recap the purpose of legitimate material interests in Chapter 3: Burnheim aims to 
improve the quality of political decision-making by excluding those groups who did not have a 
material interest in the issue at hand. Is Democracy Possible? intends to offer an alternative 
mechanism to existing politics to improve deliberation. Burnheim (1985) also emphasises the 
legitimacy of political participation: he argues that tyranny results when a person has decision-
making authority while they are unaffected by that issue. 
 
People are exercising authority over others, without warrant and without regard to their 
proper autonomy, by virtue of possessing political power. All present forms of 
democracy and hitherto proposed forms of it not only permit by encourage tyranny. The 
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result is that they strain their claims to be called democracy and their claims to 
superiority over monarchies and oligarchies. Normally they become oligarchies that are 
defensible only on the grounds that no better alternative is available. (p. 4) 
 
Burnheim views the normative processes of existing democracies as encouraging tyranny; a 
benevolent and unobtrusive democracy but with non-deliberative and non-representative decision-
making. However, it could be argued that the unaffected do indeed have a place within the 
democratic process. Interested groups and people have specific goals and agendas, making their 
deliberations and decision-making biased. Unaffected people conversely are far more likely to be 
impartial, paying the most attention to the pragmatic realities as opposed to having some pre-
determined desired outcome. When a person has no stake in an issue, they are more likely to be 
unbiased and engage in more meaningful deliberation. While this claim is most likely true, 
Burnheim would probably object to it for the same reasons he objects to politicians making 
decisions on issues they have no stake in: it is possible for an impartial deliberator to also be an 
apathetic deliberator. Participants may not care about the outcome of the issue at hand and trade 
their vote in the issue for another one that they do care about. I find it highly unlikely that a person 
would self-select to participate in an issue that they are not affected by. There is no incentive for a 
person to participate in these issues when they have no stake in it. Additionally, I find it important 
that those who are affected by the issues have the opportunity to interact with one another and come 
to a more nuanced understanding of the decision. Those who are biased, who are prejudiced, who 
have a material stake in an issue, can learn about others and the value of “opponents” perspectives. 
The affected groups are the ones who most need to develop their social and intellectual capacities; 
involving the unaffected may potentially improve the impartiality of the decisions, but I seek to 
improve the learning process and not simply the quality of the immediate decision. I contend that 
more people will benefit in the long run from the development of citizens’ capacities for toleration 
and respects, and this will happen less meaningfully if only the unaffected participate.  
 
To address the problem of the unaffected participating where they have no stake, he argued that a 
functional decentralisation of issues would greatly reduce this type of tyranny. He further contends 
that statistical sampling “is the most reliable way of getting a group that is representative of a 
particular population” (p. 110). A demographically-representative sample of the population is 
chosen from a pool of legitimately interested volunteers. Each participate would serve a term of 
rotational office before another volunteer selected as a replacement. Burnheim’s purpose in using a 
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random selection mechanism is to create a type of equality of access to the decision-making process 
otherwise unavailable in electoral democracies. All potential participants have an equal opportunity 
to be involved, regardless of circumstances beyond their control such as gender, socioeconomic 
status, education and ethnicity. Additionally, the random selection process (and rotation) provides a 
safeguard against power-trading and careerism. There is no way for demarchic participants to build 
power bases or political coalitions when representatives are randomly selected, and there can be no 
political careerism when each person is limited to a fixed term of service.  
 
Each specialised functional body administers its own matters of public concern, but there will be 
instances where issues overlap and these committees would need to work together in order to 
address their common problem. However, there are still several problems to be addressed regarding 
the formation of specialised functional bodies, arbitration of inter-committee disputes, and dealing 
with any possible changes to the context that the committees may not be able to do themselves. 
Burnheim resolves these problems using higher-level bodies: multifunctional deliberative entities 
designed to address any of the gaps that may occur in the decision-making process. Higher-level 
bodies “would not be empowered to initiate policy, much less to dictate to various functional 
bodies, but to provide a legal framework within which productive bodies operate” (p. 87). 
Burnheim implies that these higher-level bodies are to create general guidelines for specialised 
functional bodies to operate within, but lack any coercive powers. Membership and participation in 
these higher-level bodies is not based on legitimate material interests, but on nomination. Potential 
members of higher-level bodies must have served on specialised functional bodies and be 
recognised by their peers “as having shown the special skill, knowledge and dedication that would 
fit them from a judicial role” (p. 87). Burnheim explicitly regards higher-level bodies as being 
deliberative bodies; they are to deal with the interjurisdictional or procedural issues that the 
specialised functional bodies are not qualified to deal with. 
 
Burnheim also implies that when the specialised functional bodies turn to the higher-level bodies 
for arbitration, all would agree to abide by its judgement. As the higher-level bodies comprise more 
experienced and well-respected members, Burnheim would argue that the lower-level bodies would 
defer to their judgement. Whenever disputes cannot be resolved through the inter-coordination of 
specialised functional bodies, the higher-level body may encourage specialised functional bodies to 
resolve their differences, share burdens and behave sensibly. When a decision is made, this sets a 
precedent for future instance.  
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There are several limitations to Burnheim’s statistically-representative model however. I agree that 
while it may create several improvements over electoral democracies (as explored in Chapter 1), 
there is a significant downside due to the type of deliberative democracy this model of demarchy 
creates. This limitation is that a demarchy based on statistical representation is that it requires 
representative to have certain habits of mind as well as social and intellectual capacities and 
dispositions to create publicly justifiable decisions, and these are by no means necessarily present in 
all people who nominate as representatives.  
 
Legitimacy in a deliberative democracy comes from the decisions themselves, and not merely the 
representative selection mechanism. Participants need public justifications for their decisions to be 
legitimate. The problem with a demarchy based on statistical representation is that it does not 
require public justifications for its decisions. Legitimacy comes from the selection mechanism (a 
sampling of those with legitimate material interests) and not inquiry or consensus decision-making. 
Burnheim’s version of deliberative democracy is proceduralist, as he argues that using this selection 
mechanism is sufficient to create conditions for strong deliberation. I find this notion somewhat 
idealistic however. As I discussed in Chapter 5, democratic habits and dispositions are crucial if we 
want representatives to engage in genuine inquiry on matter of public concern to negotiate policy. 
The specialised functional bodies are set up here to be practical decision-making authorities but not 
to explicitly engage in inquiry. Participants would undoubtedly gain experience and competence 
through this process. However, participants are not necessarily going to engage in genuine inquiry, 
or have a willingness to listen to the perspectives of others to formulate public opinion. Burnheim 
might respond to this by arguing that participants are volunteers; by virtue of volunteering they 
indicate their willingness to cooperate with one another. However, all that can be known for certain 
about the representatives selected by lot is that they are volunteering to be a decision-maker, not a 
deliberator.  
 
Another potential issue is in the limits placed on the powers of higher-level bodies. Burnheim 
articulates that the higher-level bodies have no coercive powers whatsoever. Specialised functional 
bodies are to submit themselves to the judgement of the higher-level body voluntary, but it also 
seems likely that this voluntarily submission would also allow them to ignore this judgement. The 
higher-level body compels the specialised functional bodies to make a decision, but this can result 
in no decision being made at all. This is not necessarily a poor outcome, as no decision may be a 
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better alternative than a bad decision. For example, a natural resources committee administering the 
mining of coal may come into conflict with an environmental protection committee over time. The 
environmental committee may have evidence the mining is causing harm and present it to the 
natural resource committee, which has an indifferent response to the problem. After several futile 
attempts to resolve this, the environmental committee appeals to a higher-level body. Burnheim 
views higher-level bodies as having an important role in facilitating discussion, consulting with 
experts and making recommendations. In cases where there are stalemates and intractable positions, 
Burnheim relies on the rotational membership to eventually change the outcome. The committees 
do not necessarily seek consensus for decision-making, and the rotation of several representatives 
may be sufficient to alter the majority. However, I find this solution to be somewhat limited as it 
does not improve the conditions for deliberation or engage in further inquiry. The rotation merely 
removes certain proponents of a given policy (I will argue later that what is needed is a means of 
improving deliberation, rather than removing obstacles to deliberation).  
 
Alternative demarchic projects  
 
In this section, I analyse the differences between two alternative models of demarchy. The first is 
Burnheim’s new approach in The Demarchy Manifesto, which aims to use demarchic structures to 
better address modern issues. Burnheim has become more concerned with the quality of decisions, 
but still places a great deal of emphasis on practical deliberations legitimised by the quality of 
representation. It offers more flexible, context sensitive procedures and aims for better 
representative decision-making on public policy. The other model I will discuss is what Burgh 
(1998) refers to as a cross-section demarchy.
4
 Burgh argues for an unconditional random selection 
of all volunteers and by doing so, create a more representative sampling of those affected by a given 
issue. For Burgh, this process creates a more legitimate democracy than Burnheim’s model due to 
its clearer eligibility requirements and equality of access. I conclude that while each of these models 
has something to offer in terms of democratic legitimacy, demarchy can be made highly adaptable 
as a learning and decision-making process. I refer to this as adaptive demarchy: a functionally-
decentralised body which is deliberation is central to its decision-making. My model emphasises 
inquiry in any democratic context.  
                                                          
4 Burgh, G (1998) Is Demarchy Possible? A case of ruling and being ruled in turn. Note: this title is an unpublished thesis available for the University 
of Queensland Fryer Library. 
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The Demarchy Manifesto 
 
In this section, I will explore Burnheim’s proposal in The Demarchy Manifesto. This includes his 
justification for the legitimacy of his process by representing citizens’ interests, and then I will 
describe several of his new demarchic procedures, including community building, auditing, and 
global juries. By 2016, Burnheim conceded that many of his proposals were utopian due to their 
lack of practicality. He still contends that many of his theories have merit, but focuses his efforts 
now on improving the quality of decision-making procedures. In his view, the problems of electoral 
democracies are just as pervasive today as they were in 1985. He now offers a variety of normative 
approaches to improve the quality of decision-making within this contemporary context. However, 
his proposals are ultimately still situated within the original discursive context of Is Democracy 
Possible?, meaning that legitimacy is still sought through consent of the representative selection 
mechanism, rather than deliberative justifications. There are several improvements to his demarchic 
procedures such as having councils set up in response to a specific problem, having representatives 
chosen by lot, using these councils to guide public opinion, and having public justifications for 
decisions (2016, pp. 74-75). Burnheim views these procedures as assisting in the decision-making 
process, but this model of democracy is still legitimated through representation, not inquiry. 
 
He clarifies his view that the legitimacy for democracy lies not in the representation of people but in 
the representation of their interests. What he offers in The Demarchy Manifesto are suggestions for 
improving existing political institutions, not a holistic change to the way democracies operate. 
Burnheim (2016) argues that an “important aspect of representation that has always been important 
is that it contributes to assuring people that not only their instrumental interests but their expressive 
interests are given due weight” (p. 40). He seeks to include some of the less material interests in 
demarchic deliberation, but these “expressive interests” are not enough to qualify a person for 
participation. He explicitly argues that policy makers should be divorced from defined jurisdictions 
because “interests are fluid and that what interests and what considerations are relevant to a specific 
problem are relative to that problem, not to any fixed group of people” (p. 42). Problems may 
transcend political boundaries, and it is important that decision-makers can address the problem 
itself and not just the problem within a geographic boundary.  
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Burnheim offers a proposal for the development of trust in decision-making at a local level through 
the discussion of expressive interests. However, he still implies that democracy is instrumental in 
gaining the consent of those involved. We need, he says “to be assured that the processes by which 
the choices available to us are defined and assessed are likely to enrich rather than impoverish our 
lives. We can have the sound assurance we need if we understand and trust those decision 
processes” (p. 81). He goes on to argue that an effective method for developing trust in the 
decision-making process is through community building. If citizens contribute to the development 
of public goods at the level of local communities, all participants would gain a greater awareness of 
the range of preferences in these communities. In this way, Burnheim is taking a far more 
expressive approach to local governance. Gutmann and Thompson (2009) would likely view this 
process as a balance of instrumentalism and expressivism: the democracy is legitimised by making 
good policies. Good policies are made in this instance by seeking “the views of those who have to 
live with the results of the policies” (pp. 22-23). 
 
On a wider (possibly national) scale, Burnheim argues in favour of “auditing” (p. 103); an 
instrumental deliberative democratic process. Participants can use this as a means of finding the 
best policies available to them through a cost-benefit analysis of tasks and activities. This is an 
inquiry procedure which has the aim of simply and quantifiably measuring the performance of 
public servants. In his view “[i]f the amount of tax and the compensations to be made were set by a 
demarchic council with no policy agenda, all major parties might prefer to agree with its verdict” (p. 
105). Burnheim aims to remove non-deliberative elements (such as the politicisation of public 
service or taxation) by using demarchic audits. He suggests that auditing services could be 
implemented, independent of government institutions, which analyse the sustainability of 
government activities. An institution that profoundly affects communities must submit to audits “if 
they [are] to meet public demand for accountability” (p. 108). Participants in these auditing services 
would be made up of a randomised selection of accountants, economists and community members. 
This type of demarchic council would provide authorities, businesses and communities with an 
appraisal of their activities and allow them to assess which of their alternatives provide the best 
hypothetical outcome.  
 
Burnheim offers a more radical demarchic approach to global problems such as climate change. He 
suggests instead that a large panel of two hundred people from all nations, and a jury of about a 
dozen people be randomly selected from the larger group to serve as a demarchic jury. The jury 
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would then examine a specific issue, with each juror asked to give their appraisal of the quality of 
the scientific evidence presented to them. The aim of this process would be to give all participants a 
chance to assign their own weight to each piece of evidence from their own perspective. The body 
would seek to agree on the pertinent facts (such as accepting scientific conclusions, potential 
economic impacts), but would not necessarily offer policy recommendations. Burnheim recognises 
the difficulty in getting this committee to set targets as different nation-states may not fully agree to 
these targets or policies. Some may react poorly to the policies set by a transnational specialised 
functional body. In Chapter 3 I argued that all people may share a common interest in a problem, 
but at the same time different groups with overlapping interests and concerns may experience any 
impacts different that result from the shared problem. For example, coastal cities and island nations 
would more greatly suffer from the effects of climate change due to the rise of sea levels and more 
severe weather events. A shift in energy policy to reduce the amount of carbon emissions would 
have drastic economic consequences for countries that rely on coal and oil for energy. Wealthier 
nations may have the infrastructure to develop cleaner energy sources, whereas poorer countries 
might find themselves without a viable alternative. The most effective way of approaching this 
problem, Burnheim thinks, is to have participants give provisional consent to the demarchic 
council’s policies, or at the very least a willingness to experiment. 
 
I agree with the aims of these proposals as they provide a more balanced deliberative democratic 
approach. The local level proposal creates opportunities for citizens to participate in governance and 
develop their deliberative capacities. Auditing is a mechanism that engages in inquiry, as those 
participating can see the practical effect of their representatives’ policies and performance. The 
global demarchic jury similarly focuses on inquiry. It is an opportunity for those affected by an 
issue to collectively develop their understanding of that issue. 
 
Community-building, auditing, and global demarchic juries offer practical solutions to improving 
the quality of decision-making. However, they still do not alter the legitimacy of existing political 
institutions. Burnheim attempted to remove these institutions in his original demarchic project, and 
this new approach does not solve any of the problems he identified in Is Democracy Possible?. 
Auditing is an interesting check-and-balance approach to assessing the quality of a government’s 
policies through a cost-benefit analysis, but I find it difficult to believe that a politician would 
welcome an audit. The process is one that looks to their performance, and I would argue that a 
politician would only invite an audit of their opponents, not themselves. Burnheim argued that the 
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term “council” was preferable to “committee” due to the negative connotation of the latter term. 
“Auditing” suffers from a similar problem, as it comes with an implied negative outcome. A global 
demarchic jury is appealing as a deliberative democratic approach to solving an international crisis, 
but there is little to ensure that any nation is obliged to follow the jury’s recommendations. Under 
this model, nations may simply refuse to capitulate. It may be a near impossible task to have 
international agreement on issues regardless; I am not arguing that this type of demarchy is not 
workable due to its inability to solve intractable problems. What is needed, however, is a 
requirement that decisions are subject to genuine inquiry in order to be legitimate. If political 
leaders can simply ignore the need to deliberative prior to decision-making on policy matters,  the 
system fails to be a deliberative democracy. 
 
Cross-sectional demarchy 
 
In this section, I will explore Burgh’s (1998) alternative model, cross-section demarchy. I will first 
discuss the potential advantages of unconditional random selection over statistical representation 
using legitimate material interest as selection criteria. There are almost more opportunities in 
Burgh’s model to use demarchy as a learning process, allowing people to develop their deliberative 
capacities. In many ways, his theory foreshadowed much of the discourse to come in the following 
decade. He put a greater emphasis on developing citizens’ deliberative capacities through 
communal inquiry. He argued that deliberation was necessary for the public to accept decisions. He 
also utilised an unconditional random selection to place more emphasis on deliberation; in his view, 
this selection method allowed for the representatives to develop an understanding of people’s 
interests. Deliberation is important for developing understanding and for decision-making 
outcomes. Burgh placed greater emphasis on the value of citizenship education than Burnheim, as 
well as arguing that his selection mechanism would result in more deliberative participation. 
However, his model is still couched within the discourse of liberalism and republican participation 
rather than deliberative democracy, and as such his model does not make deliberation central to its 
legitimacy.  I do not aim to create a comprehensive analysis of this model (as my overall goal is to 
reconceptualise demarchy within contemporary discourse on deliberative democracy). The most 
significant aspect of Burgh’s model is his removal of legitimate material interests and statistical 
sampling as criteria, and instead replacing them with an unconditional random selection. He 
contends that this change creates a strong procedure to achieve equality of opportunity for all to 
engage in matters of public affairs, and that this equality provides better opportunities for 
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participants to develop their deliberative capacities. Burgh’s cross-sectional demarchy aims to 
create more legitimate democratic process through giving all citizens the opportunity of ruling and 
being ruled in turn through random selection and rotation of office by lot.  
 
Burgh argues that the use of legitimate material interests as a necessary condition of the sortition 
process creates several problems, such as the need for a tribunal, pre-political assumptions about 
what constitutes a material interest, and allows “for those whose opinions and interests which might 
at the outset be considered illegitimate to contribute to the discussion” (p. 176). He has a much 
greater focus on deliberation, rather than on the committee being statistically representative of the 
population as necessary for legitimate policy making, i.e., gaining trust in the population that 
matters of public interest are taken seriously so that the decisions are accepted. Burgh creates better 
by requiring each specialised functional body to decide for themselves who to include in the 
process. When the specialised body deliberates on the boundaries of its own issues,  
 
no individual or group is excluded from having an equal chance of an active 
participation in the affairs of a particular decision-making body. All citizens have an 
equal opportunity to determine political outcomes. The issue of who is most affected by 
the decisions of the body in question thus becomes an integral component of the 
deliberative process. (p. 189) 
 
Whereas Burnheim’s statistically-representative demarchy requires a pre-judgement of the 
importance of participants’ interests in order to apportion representation, Burgh’s unconditional 
random selection is advantageous as it allows for the specialised body to deliberate on the 
importance of issues after it has been convened. By removing the difficulties involved with using 
legitimate material interests unconditional random selection “places responsibility on each 
functional body in cooperation with higher-level bodies to decide whether or not a particular claim 
is relevant to the supervision of that function” (p. 176). His goal is to create a cross-section of the 
population, meaning that a greater diversity of a polity is represented over time. He does not aim to 
create an immediate or perfect cross-section of the community. Burgh intends for this to be an 
ongoing, self-correcting process where the number of volunteers for an issue give a representation 
of those concerned by that issue. He argues that “statistically, the different rates of volunteering 
may not be an accurate reflection of the interest or of the overall population; but as each office is 
rotated the pool of volunteers, and hence, the composition of the groups will, over time, certainly 
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comprise a representative cross-section of the community” (p. 201). This is distinct from 
Burnheim’s statistical sampling, which provides a snapshot of the interests involved but is only able 
to determine how many people share interests. Burgh uses this cross-sectional method to also 
determine how important these interests are to participants.  
 
In his article “Translating Democracy into Practice: a case for demarchy” Burgh (1996) also argues 
against statistical representation, contending that if the state is not willing to develop substantive 
democratic values through education, every citizen should be entitled to participate. He argues that 
procedural equality can be achieved by utilising a lot-based random selection (p. 17). Participants 
can determine for themselves which issues are of importance to them; citizens demonstrate their 
priorities and interests by choosing which committee they participate on (as they can only 
participate in one at a time). Burgh argues that the self-selection involved in these committees 
would create a demographically-representative sample of the society over time rather than for any 
given committee at one particular moment. Arguably it is possible that this sortition process could 
create a non-representative body due to the randomness of the selection process, but in Burgh’s 
view the rotation of participants would create an accurate sampling of a cross-section of the 
population over time. He further contends that if there were to be a non-representative sampling 
over time this might spur non-participants into action and provide an opportunity for a surge of 
people volunteering in order to increase their chances of being selected for participation. He does 
not deny this this might not occur, hence his emphasis on education as a long term solution to 
citizen apathy and non-engagement by developing the social and intellectual dispositions and 
capacities for active and informed citizenship (see Burgh, 2003, 2009; 2014; Burgh & Yorshansky, 
2011; Golding, 2008). 
 
I agree with Burgh’s aim of allowing each specialised functional body the ability to deliberate on 
which individuals and groups are affected. I discussed this in detail in Chapter 3, where I argued 
that having pre-determined eligibility requirements may fail to be both pragmatic and deliberative. 
Burgh’s purpose in preventing a pre-determined legitimate interest aligns with my own: participants 
will be misrepresented if some pre-existing group informs the specialised functional body of the 
limits of its authority. However, I do not entirely agree with the notion of using unconditional 
random selection in all contexts. There are some issues that would benefit from the unconditional 
selection, and others where this process would be unrepresentative. An example of this problem can 
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be seen by examining two completely distinct issues, such as local garbage collection and marriage 
equality in Australia.  
 
In the first issue, an unconditional random selection is adequate for the limited range of interests 
involved. There is little variance in the ways people are affected by garbage collection; anyone is 
eligible to participate in this committee. However, it is extremely unlikely that people living outside 
that local garbage collection zone would attempt to participate in this type of body when it is 
outside their own locality. The second issue is more problematic. There are a huge variety of groups 
with differing interests related to Australian marriage equality: homosexual and heterosexual people 
alike, traditional family proponents, religious groups, human rights advocates and more. There are 
many who would be completely unaffected by the issue, but would still wish to participate in this 
committee to pursue their own intrusive agendas. For marriage equality, it may be important to 
ensure that those who are strongly affected by this issue are represented. It is possible for an 
unconditional random selection process to accidentally exclude those who are significantly affected. 
I agree that all interests would likely be represented over time, but this could still leave periods that 
are years long with inadequate representation of interests. It may also take a significant amount of 
time for enough people of a given interest to volunteer to be selected; the learning process is a slow 
one and a non-representative body could conceivably do considerable harm to interest groups 
before they are rotated off for more representative cross-sections.  
 
Burgh’s sortition process creates a type of procedural equality but it has the potential to have non-
deliberative decision-making. Burgh’s process relies on participants volunteering for the committee, 
and this is problematic in terms of demographics. By this, I mean that the majority will always be 
able to field more volunteers than the minority, and those who feel strongly about an issue are far 
more likely to volunteer their time. If 10% of the population identifies as belonging to an LGBT 
group, then in a random selection only 10% of the committee is likely to be comprised of LGBT 
participants. Cross-sectionally, the pool of volunteers may include significantly more from an 
LGBT group but those from conservative religious groups can field a much larger number of 
volunteers. In any case, there are potentially too many zealous participants with strong ideological 
positions, and it would be naïve to assume these groups would aim for genuine inquiry and 
compromise. This is not to say that genuine inquiry is impossible in a group of opinionated 
participants, but only including those with specific policy goals in this way may not be conducive to 
effective deliberation.  
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I also agree with Burgh’s conception of democracy as a process of emphasising the “self-
development and community development, and not on immediate organisational decisions” (p. 18). 
He sees demarchy as a means of balancing interests and the need for participation; his cross-section 
demarchy provides a clearer route to equal access to democratic participation than a model of 
statistically-representative demarchy would. This aligns with the learning processes that Delanty 
argues are necessary for cultural citizenship. There are better opportunities for learning on how 
interests connect, as well as requiring that participants construct their knowledge when there is no 
pre-determination of legitimate material interests. However, I am more dubious of the ability of 
cross-section demarchy to bring about meaningful deliberations or genuine inquiry. It is possible 
that an unconditional random selection would result in an over-representation of interest groups. 
The specialised functional bodies would become filled with many of the most ardent supports of 
one particular interest, and if these participants do not have substantive democratic values (the 
deliberative capacities I explored in Chapter 5), genuine inquiry is unlikely to occur. Burgh’s model 
would benefit from the facilitator that I proposed in Chapter 5 in order to improve inquiry; my 
eligibility requirement of deliberative pragmatic interests cannot fully address non-deliberativeness 
of participants either, however, I aim to make inquiry a crucial process from the start of each issue. 
Burgh’s solution to this over-representation (that people with other interests would volunteer) may 
not be able to address this, as it requires a recognition of the lack of diversity in the committee and a 
willingness to participate. I agree with Burgh’s solution in long term education; he argues that 
without lifelong learning, all models of demarchy are ultimately doomed to fail. However, I argue 
that the demarchy must be a mechanism for learning, as the model itself allows for the development 
of citizens’ deliberative capacities. These are several deliberative capacities that have not yet been 
developed either by the democracy or any other system and overrepresentation is a problem for 
demarchy without these deliberative capacities. 
 
Burgh’s cross-section demarchy provides a number of procedures that improve the deliberativeness 
of decision-making. At that very least, the removal of legitimate material interests allows for a more 
diverse inquiry process, as many of the interests previously considered to be illegitimate are now 
included. However, demarchy can be a model of deliberative democracy, rather than merely 
creating better conditions for deliberation to occur. It’s not enough to remove barriers to 
deliberation. The democracy can be use deliberative mechanisms for making strong decisions, as 
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well as being a learning process where citizens develop deliberative capacities such as toleration 
and listening skills. 
 
Adaptive demarchy as a model of deliberative democracy 
 
It appears then that only one method of selecting participants will not work effectively in all 
contexts. In small scale contexts, an unconditional random selection (or simple random sampling, 
where every person has an equal probability of being chosen) would likely ensure that a fair 
representation occurs over time, but this mechanism may not be effective on issues of nationwide 
importance as the problem may require a representative sample. A stratified sampling (randomly 
selecting participants within a particular strata of the whole group) may be able to accurately 
represent the population, but this process may not represent the most important or crucial interests 
well. There may be instances where it may be prudent to have quotas; dedicated selections of 
specific interest groups. For example, Indigenous groups in Australia are marginalised, and have 
different interests to the dominant white social group. Given their minority status, having a quota 
would ensure that their interests are not overlooked. The specific method of selecting from those 
with deliberative pragmatic interests does not need to be usable in all contexts; it is ultimately an 
issue best left to each specific functional body to decide whether it is practical to use stratified 
sampling, simple random sampling (and so on). However, it may be possible that there is a 
stalemate as to which selection mechanism should be utilised. I offer two methods of resolving this 
problem. Firstly, frameworks for the selection mechanism would be developed over time. 
Committees would be able to peruse recommended selection procedures that other committees have 
historically applied and could simply follow these examples. Newly established committees would 
need to experiment to discover what is effective and what is not; citizens would need to be willing 
to test what works to pioneer the way for subsequent committees. Secondly, is that if committees 
are to be formed, there must be general agreement as to who should participate. Many would find it 
preferable to have a less than ideal selection mechanism than to have no committee at all. It may be 
utopian to assume new participants to democratic decision-making would be able to reach 
agreement over contentious issues, but deciding on an equitable selection mechanism is a 
significantly less difficult task. Once the relevant interests have been established through 
deliberation, there should be less difficulty in determining which selection mechanism is most fair 
and equitable in that context. 
122 
 
 
 
 
Deliberative systems 
 
The more places deliberation occur within a society, the stronger the deliberative democracy will 
be. As I discussed in Chapter 5, democratic habits of mind are developed over the course of a 
lifetime, and not simply during moments of limited exposure to deliberation. An ideal deliberative 
democracy is deliberative at many levels and in many ways: governments and bureaucracies, 
schools and universities, businesses, charities, the military, and even religious institutions. The 
more of these that utilise deliberation, the more effective the deliberative democracy will be. 
Conversely, a society that is non-deliberative in most of these institutions are likely to have a 
weaker deliberative process in political decision-making. 
 
A method of assessing this problem is in what Jane Mansbridge and John Parkinson (2012) refer to 
as deliberative systems. A deliberative system analyses each component of a democracy to 
determine whether that component contributes to an epistemic, ethical or democratic function. Each 
component (such as schools, governments, businesses etc.) is interconnected but distinct from one 
another, and each component does not have to serve all functions. Mansbridge and Parkinson’s 
purpose in the systemic approach is to ensure that “the entire burden of decision-making and 
legitimacy does not fall on one forum in institution but is distributed among different components in 
different cases” (p. 5). In this way, a failure of the functions of any individual component does not 
entail the failure of the entire system. Mansbridge and Parkinson argue that a deliberative system 
can assess the epistemic, ethical and democratic functions of a component. 
 
An epistemic function of a component is to develop and reveal preferences, opinions and decisions. 
This could be said to be one of the most important functions of the electoral components of a 
democracy; there would be little purpose in an election if it did not produce a winner. The electoral 
process may grant citizens equality in voting, but the process fundamentally exists to reveal 
citizens’ preferences. Epistemic functions are important in public forums but less so in other 
institutions such as schools or businesses. A school serves an educative purpose, ideally fostering 
social and intellectual dispositions in children but schools largely do not develop preferences or 
provide a means for the expression of these preferences. An ethical function is a component that 
ensures mutual respect between citizens, or what Mansbridge and Parkinson refer to as “the 
lubricant of effective communication” (p. 11). This function may be weak if the component fails to 
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treat citizens as autonomous agents who can self-govern to some degree. A possible example of this 
is in the case of schools, where children may be treated variably as moral agents or not depending 
on the age of the child. The last function is the democratic function, or its inclusivity and equality. 
For Mansbridge and Parkinson, the legitimacy of the democracy is reliant on the inclusion of those 
who should have a voice in the democracy. There must be a strong justification that can be 
reasonably accepted by citizens for the systemic exclusion of certain groups and people from 
decision-making. The democratic function is also one that promotes and encourages participation in 
the system; there must be reasonable and equal opportunities for citizens to participate (p. 12). A 
deliberative system examines each of these functions, and this allows for coherent assessment of the 
component. This in turn creates conditions for ongoing self-improvement. 
 
How would a deliberative system be integrated with demarchy? Demarchy would undoubtedly 
benefit from a systemic approach due to the increased number of deliberative bodies and 
opportunities for citizens to participate. Deliberative systems would need to assess the functions of 
the society just as in any other democracy, but there is a need to examine how well the bodies 
interact in a demarchy. There is a much greater number of components in a demarchy due to 
decentralisation of each issue. Each specialised functional body would benefit from an assessment 
of its epistemic, ethic and democratic functions; the random selection of participants would cause a 
much greater variance in the citizens’ personal experiences. Using deliberative pragmatic interests 
serve both an epistemic function and a democratic function, promoting the inclusion of all those 
with a justifiable interest in the specialised functional body. Regardless, this would need to be 
monitored in order to minimise the inclusion of unaffected participants. The various methods of 
random selection serve a democratic function as well, and an analysis of this would allow for an 
appraisal of the effectiveness of those methods. If the type of sortition is resulting in the over-
representation of certain groups or the under-representation of others, then a systemic approach will 
be able to recognise this. 
 
It is not my intention to offer a specific means of implementation for deliberative systems. However 
what I am arguing is that a demarchy would be improved as a deliberative democracy with the use 
of a systemic approach and analysis of its components. My conception of demarchy is as a 
deliberative democracy, which means that the democracy operates across many institutions and 
interactions, and not simply at a policy-making level. Deliberative systems can help identify 
potential defects or weaknesses with any of these components, and this will aid in the self-
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improvement of specialised functional bodies over time. The strength of demarchy using this 
systemic approach is in the many places where the quality of deliberation can be improved. Each 
demarchic body is a component in the system, and each can then be monitored for its epistemic, 
ethical and democratic functions. 
 
Creating specialised functional bodies 
 
Regardless of adaptive demarchy’s deliberative systems, there is still a significant issue in how to 
set up the specialised functional bodies. The process of creating these bodies also needs to be 
deliberative and cannot be determined without the collective problematisation of the issue by those 
affected. I use deliberative pragmatic interests as a method of determining the boundaries of an 
issue. The criteria to be used do not have to be complex, and could include questions such as “do 
they provide a reason for their participation?” and “is this a reasonable concern?”. As a deliberative 
democracy, reasons must be central to decision-making; these criteria may be imperfect and vague 
but these are still justifications.  The term “reasonableness” may be vague, but removing vagueness 
requires understanding and this is only discoverable through rigorous communal inquiry. This is an 
inquiry process designed to allow all involved to assess eligibility to participate without making any 
pre-judgements as to whose interests are relevant or not. After this, I will discuss the different 
deliberative democratic approaches that can be taken depending on the complexity of the issue and 
its context. At a local level, demarchy provides opportunities for citizens to develop their 
deliberative capacities and to take a more consensual approach to decision-making. For national 
issues, demarchy creates procedures for genuine inquiry and to legitimise decisions through public 
justification. On a global scale, a demarchic committee can be instrumental in creating deliberative 
policy, though it would likely be an advisory body rather than a legislative one. In all three contexts, 
authentic inquiry is crucial to the democracy’s legitimacy. I then will argue that higher-level bodies 
have an important role in being a highly deliberative body. However, I differ from Burnheim in that 
I argue these bodies must have one explicit power: to reject to veto non-deliberative policies made 
by specialised functional bodies. Higher-level bodies are to create a form of deliberative oversight; 
specialised functional bodies are to be aware that their policies may be audited and vetoed if they 
fail to meet a standard of reasonableness. 
 
Different models of demarchic bodies 
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I will now discuss how Burnheim envisages the creation of specialised functional bodies, then offer 
my alternative inquiry-based process. So far, I have offered mechanisms for deciding who should 
participate in a demarchy in Chapter 3 as well as exploring how demarchy can be a deliberative 
democracy. However, I have not as yet given an explicit explanation as to how demarchic 
committees are to be created. Burnheim (2006) implies that higher-level bodies act as midwife to 
the specialised functional bodies, “setting up the various functional bodies, hearing appeals about 
their structure, [and] restructuring them to meet changed circumstances” (p. 87).  He views this as a 
process in which the higher-level bodies facilitate in setting up the specialised functional bodies. 
Burnheim argues that as participants in higher-level bodies have experience in specialised 
functional bodies, the process is legitimate. Christopher Pollitt (1986) argued that higher-level 
bodies might wield a questionable amount of authority due to the reliance on these bodies being 
cooperative, and functional bodies voluntarily submitting to arbitration. Burgh (1998) largely 
dismissed this concern however, arguing that higher-level bodies held a collaborative role rather 
than a supervisory one. In his view, “more emphasis should be placed on the coordination by 
negotiation among all relevant bodies, including higher-level bodies, to increase the likelihood of 
functional interdependence without arbitration” (p. 180). My only criticism of this is the voluntary 
aspect of collaboration; if a specialised functional body refuses to cooperate there is little to be done 
but wait for a rotation of membership. If the higher-level body has some type of coercive power, 
there is at least a small safeguard against committees being uncooperative. 
 
In The Demarchy Manifesto, Burnheim (2016) moves away from this type of model and argues that 
many issues need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis without the need for an explicit 
demarchic structure. He argues that whenever a specific issue arises that cannot be adequately 
administered by existing policy bodies (such as what he terms supranational issues), a new body 
needs to be created with “sufficient authority to demand that states accept its directions” (p. 76). I 
agree overall; specialised functional bodies need to be created in response to a policy problem, and 
this committee needs to reflect the breadth of interests involved. However, I find that Burnheim 
focuses far too much on creating practical solutions to existing problems without giving sufficient 
regard for process. My proposal aims for genuine inquiry in order to create substantive outcomes 
over time, and not simply practical solutions to immediate problems. This perspective is similar to 
what Gutmann and Thompson (2009) call a substantive account of deliberative democracy (p. 23), 
as they argue that deliberative procedures alone may still produce unjust outcomes. For a more 
substantively just outcome, demarchy needs to provide equitable access to decision-making, public 
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justifications for its decisions, and opportunities for participants to develop their deliberative 
capacities.  
 
I contend that a specialised functional body must be created from collective inquiry into a given 
issue. How does this work? For any issue, there are potentially many ways of looking at a problem 
and many possible solutions that require rigorous inquiry prior to making decisions on matters of 
public policy. Those who believe that they should have a voice in decision-making must deliberate 
together to determine the parameters of the problem. This is where deliberative pragmatic interests 
come into play; they are a method of determining eligibility to participate. The boundaries of a 
given specialised functional body are determined through a conjoint construction of the problem.  A 
stalemate due to ideological concerns, adversarial interactions or unwillingness to cooperate may 
very well be likely because of the purpose of this inquiry. The deliberative pragmatic interest 
requirement is a method of discussing who is involved and revealing how they are affected. 
Resolving an issue may be an incredibly problematic task, whereas determining who is affected is 
comparatively less so. The discussion of interests must be more than each participant stating what 
their interest is; they must deliberate on whether the person making the claim has made a reasonable 
argument. The process may be thus: a person argues that they are affected by the issue due to a 
particular interest. Others in the discussion may be able to refute this entirely; the reason put 
forward by the original participant may be incoherent or perhaps is not seen as the genuine reason.  
This participant is denied eligibility to the committee as their interest has been determined to be 
inadequate. However, to deny this eligibility would take significantly more effort than to assert it in 
the first place. If participants are to justify their interest, others must provide even stronger 
justifications to deny this interest. The group has responsibility to make the final decision on the 
matter, and this could possibly result in a committee stacked with unreasonable or biased 
participants. Facilitators provide a partial safeguard against this problem as they can advise the 
community of inquiry of unreasonableness and a lack of justification. This process is imperfect, but 
this is the nature of a social, dialogic decision-making procedure. It is designed to allow the 
decision-making process to be a learning process; a form of cultural citizenship that Delanty refers 
to. It is a connective and constructive process, as all the representatives have to apply their 
knowledge and understanding of the issue to synthesise a clear idea of their shared problem. When 
an issue is identified, a specialised functional committee can be created to deal with it. I concur with 
Burnheim and Burgh that rotational membership is vital to demarchy. As long as the committee 
exists, members need to be replaces at regular intervals to increase the changes of the committee 
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remaining representative over time. This gives all people an equal opportunity to participate in the 
community of inquiry on matters of public interest. When the issue no longer exists, the committee 
is either dissolved or in recess. Each new committee provides another opportunity to develop their 
competencies.  
 
An adaptive approach to demarchy provides different deliberative democratic opportunities 
depending on the scale of the issue. In some contexts, legitimacy can be achieved through 
democratic procedures, while in others, more substantive goals can be sought such as equality and 
fairness. Demarchy can be both instrumental in making legitimate decisions and allow for an 
expressive approach to deliberative decision-making. There are contexts in which a consensual 
approach can be taken, and others where a more pluralistic method is required to ensure that all 
participants’ perspectives are respected. I argued this in Chapter 4; deliberative democracy can 
achieve different goals to different extents. These aforementioned approaches are not mutually 
exclusive, but they cannot be all achieved at the same time. In the following section, I outline the 
different approaches that can be taken depending on the context. For issues of limited scope, I argue 
that demarchy creates learning processes for the development of citizens’ capacities, as well as 
providing a more expressive quality to decision-making. For more complex issues (that may affect 
many thousands or millions of people), demarchy can be instrumental in creating legitimate 
decision-making. This is done through a sampling of the interests and a requirement of public 
justification. For issues of global complexity, genuine inquiry is paramount; a demarchy is more 
likely to be an advisory committee than an explicit governmental authority. Implementation of a 
worldwide legislative body is enormously problematic, but an international deliberative body that 
conducts independent inquiry would be a practical alternative. This body would be able to provide 
impartial recommendations to nations. 
 
Adaptive demarchy: various complexities, varying purposes 
 
In this section, I will show how an adaptive model of demarchy can emphasise different democratic 
approaches. My model of demarchy is inherently adaptable; its purpose is to make deliberation 
central to all of its processes. One of my criticisms of previously explored models of demarchy is 
that they use deliberation, but their decisions are legitimised by the consent of the governed. I aim 
to legitimise the democracy through authentic deliberation, and this deliberation begins the moment 
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there is a shared problem to be solved. Each context is different and by engaging in genuine 
deliberation, participants can identify the specialised needs of this context. 
A local level specialised functional committee can operate as a more substantive deliberative 
democracy, providing learning processes for democratic values and opportunities for many to 
express their concerns. Smaller communities and fewer interests brings more opportunities to seek 
consensus. Engaging in deliberative disagreements is a chance for citizens to come to better 
understand themselves, other perspectives and the context of the interests. However, this does create 
a problem of infinite regression: who decides who is affected to decide on who is affected? The 
only even partially satisfactory method to solve this is using the collaborative assistance of another 
authority. This is not an ideal solution, as the authority of specialised functional bodies now rests on 
another source of authority than itself. Higher-level bodies are a reasonable mechanism for 
addressing this problem, though these bodies would have the task of collaborating with participants 
of potential specialised functional bodies, not specifically directing them. The greater level of 
experience in higher-level bodies would allow them to facilitate the creation of specialised 
functional bodies through an initial community of inquiry. There would be no infinite regression, as 
higher-level bodies are created in a different manner (through nomination). The process is 
imperfect, but allows for each new specialised functional body to be created through an inquiry 
process; the purpose and scope of these bodies can be self-determined through deliberation. The 
process of creating specialised functional bodies needs to be sensitive to each context, not 
indifferent to them. 
 
I contend that the crucial aspect of this type of demarchy is that it is an expressive procedure for 
deliberative inquiry. Once the nature of a given problem has been determined, those involved can 
use a random selection mechanism to choose who is to be a representative. Different problems merit 
different methods of selection. For example, a local issue such as garbage collection and sanitation 
may favour an unconditional random selection. The lack of wide ranging and diverse interests 
indicates that the simplicity of this selection method is appropriate. A more complex issue, such as a 
committee dealing with the destruction of the Great Barrier Reef, might merit a stratified sampling 
from each of the deliberative pragmatic interests involved. With this type of problem, volunteers 
might be categorised by their nominated interest, and a minimum number of participants could be 
selected from each group. Suppose there are economic, environmental, residential and scientific 
deliberative pragmatic interests, with twelve total seats on the specialised functional body. Each 
interest group could receive three seats, with specific members chosen through random selection. A 
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global demarchic body might specialise even further, with a dedicated single seat for each of the 
major world powers and a random selection for the remaining seats. There might be an international 
specialised functional body dealing with nuclear proliferation. Each nuclear power has a dedicated 
seat on this body, with one additional seat given to a randomly selected country. For an issue as 
difficult as nuclear proliferation, all nuclear-capable countries would need to be involved in 
decision-making. The presence of a rotating member would be able to articulate a different interest 
to the other members, but would not disrupt the power balance of this committee. In this case, the 
demarchic selection method slightly improves deliberation to the process.   
 
This entire procedure is an opportunity for participants to engage in learning processes. Citizens 
would gain an appreciation for the perspectives of others and express their concerns in a communal 
setting. This can be seen as a developmental and potentially transformative learning process for 
cultural citizenship, as change may occur when participants come to better understand each other’s 
interests. While Burgh’s unconditional random selection creates conditions for this as well, the 
initial use of inquiry when creating committees would create more opportunities for these learning 
experiences. It is an imperfect, messy process; this specialised functional body may not necessarily 
assess the issue competently or accurately to begin with. Citizens would require time to understand 
one another, and on this small scale it is important that the specialised functional body has 
expressive procedures. I argued this in Chapter 4; a deliberative democracy has the ability to reveal 
the ideas and preferences of those involved. This is a practical endeavour in a local governance 
context, where there are many opportunities for citizens to develop their capacities for toleration, 
listening and reasoning. A demarchic system of unconditional random selection may be suitable 
within this context, as this type of selection allows all those who have a deliberative pragmatic 
interest an equal opportunity to participate. A local level specialised functional body becomes a 
deliberative democracy that creates more substantive equality through its equality of access and 
expressive inquiry process. It becomes a greater possibility to gain consensus when all involved can 
agree on the nature of the problem and determine together the most suitable or effective possible 
courses of action. 
 
Specialised functional bodies would need to have a different focus for issues with greater 
complexity. The context may vary depending on a number of factors such as the socioeconomic 
status of the participants, the dominant and marginalised cultures, historical background, the 
number of people affected by the issue and so on. Issues that affect a great number of people would 
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need to take a more instrumentalist approach, as it is impractical to allow all potentially affected 
equal opportunity to express their interests. There are simply too many people involved; the 
legitimacy of this type of deliberative democracy would rely more on the democracy’s ability to 
create deliberative decisions. In a multicultural community, a more expressive and pluralistic 
approach may be needed, as the selection of participants may need to be representative of the range 
of interests involved. It becomes more and more challenging to create coherent policies for issues 
when there are so many more varying interests. For example, a country may face a serious 
economic downturn. Nearly all people within a country have an interest in economic matters, 
particularly when the downturn affects all to some degree. There are many interests involved: large 
corporations, employers, workers unions, real-estate developers, speculative investors, and so on. 
Each has a different interest in the problem, and the collective problematisation allows them to 
determine what the deliberative pragmatic interests are. It may be equitable for there to be a 
stratified sampling for this context, choosing candidates in a way to ensure that each of the interests 
is represented.  
 
Consensus on this selection mechanism is not guaranteed though. Undoubtedly there would be 
many participants unhappy about how representation is apportioned. I have no foolproof method of 
solving this. However, this initial inquiry into the context and the interests involved provide a 
clearer starting point for participants in their decision-making. If higher-level bodies are 
collaborative in the formation of the specialised functional bodies, there is a much greater 
likelihood of agreement on the selection method. The higher-level body might be able to 
recommend methods that have proven to be historically fair and effective. The process is designed 
to be self-reflective and self-correcting much like Burgh’s model. However, my model introduces 
this additional inquiry process to create better conditions for deliberation. This is a method of better 
creating or demonstrating an overlapping understanding (Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012, p. 38); a 
mechanism as a part of a deliberative system to help people share their understanding of the 
problem at hand. It may be highly instructive to see where citizens’ understanding does not overlap, 
as it will be in these discrepancies that all will learn where the disagreements lie. 
 
Demarchy on a global scale would be an instrumental, procedural, and pluralist deliberative 
democracy. It is a challenge to have deliberative democracy for international issues; genuine inquiry 
requires a willingness to cooperate on an enormous scale. It is not entirely possible to remove issues 
from their nationalised contexts, as it is unlikely that any country would voluntarily cede 
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sovereignty to an international decision-making body without having dedicated representation. At 
the very least, the transition from a nation-state model to a world-wide functional authority would 
take a significant amount of time and experimentation. Specialised functional bodies for each 
country involved would likely need to nominate their own representatives with a random selection 
choosing which countries are to participate. For example, suppose an issue affects 40 countries. 
Each of those countries sends a delegate, and a random selection of eight delegates occurs, with a 
rotation of members occurring annually. The overall aim of this body would be to generate 
deliberative policy solutions based on a collective inquiry into the issues but these global policies 
would have to be non-binding.  Enforcing international policies is a task of significant complexity; 
the only practical way for these solutions to be enacted is through joint agreement. For an issue, 
such as this one, the delegates who are not selected may still contribute to the inquiry but have no 
vote on the committee. Many global issues are not binding, as there is little way of enforcing 
decisions on this scale. The inquiry process is designed to create strong conditions for authentic 
deliberation, not to enforce the decisions on a global scale. Adherence to these decisions would take 
further development of the democratic character of participating nations. Burgh argues this point, as 
he contends that education is the best solution in the long run.  
 
The authority of higher-level Bodies 
 
Higher-level bodies hold an important role in an adaptive demarchy as procedural authorities. They 
are highly deliberative bodies whose purpose is to provide a type of oversight for specialised 
functional bodies. In this section, I will provide an overview of their role as auditors. They are not 
empowered to enact policy themselves, though I contend that they have the authority to veto 
unjustifiable policies and laws from specialised functional bodies. The purpose of this explicit 
power is twofold: firstly as a safeguard against non-deliberative decisions, and secondly, to create 
an incentive for specialised functional bodies to ensure their decisions meet a minimal standard of 
genuine inquiry. The role of the specialised functional bodies is to create strong deliberation; their 
legitimacy as decision-making body is tied to their inquiry and public justification. A higher-level 
body no longer would have a role, as Burnheim suggests, in creating the specialised functional 
bodies. In this section, I will argue that they can still be useful as a deliberative body, overseeing 
disputes between specialised functional bodies and ensuring that a minimum standard of inquiry has 
been used in decision-making.  
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I disagree with Burnheim’s proposal that higher-level bodies do not need coercive powers. There is 
always the possibility of misconduct, corruption, non-deliberativeness, and of a failure of 
perspective. Decisions are not required to meet these standards at all times, but there must be some 
mechanism to deal with poor deliberation when it occurs. Burnheim (2016) recognises the fallible 
nature of democracy, saying that “the world we live in is changing rapidly, inevitably creating new 
problems or posing old ones on a new scale. It is essential that we develop flexible and effective 
ways of responding to these problems” (p. 3). However, he places too much trust in his idealised 
citizenry to solve this independently, referring to a sophisticated ethos and tolerance required from 
citizens to engage using deliberative methods  (p. 41). What is needed is a democratic procedure 
that can provide some safeguards against non-deliberative policy and to assist in the development of 
deliberative capacities. 
 
Higher-level bodies would have the role of facilitating the creation of specialised functional bodies, 
developing frameworks for potential selection mechanisms and overseeing discussions on 
deliberative pragmatic interests. However, the higher-level bodies would have one explicit power: 
to reject policies from specialised functional bodies. The higher-level body cannot unjustifiably 
veto a bill, but they must also point to where the specialised functional bodies may have flaws in 
reasoning and perhaps offer commentary on how to address this. When a bill is passed by a 
specialised functional body, the higher-level body is then tasked with evaluating whether the bill is 
publicly justified. The higher-level body does not need to agree with these reasons; what is essential 
is that the bill clearly articulates the reasons for why it is to become law. Higher level bodies also 
play an important role as part of the deliberative system. They prevent the institutional domination 
of large and powerful specialised functional bodies by having the authority to veto bills. This bears 
some similarity to the mechanism of sanctions outlined in by Mansbridge and Parkinson (2012) in 
Deliberative Systems; it is a method of imposing a negative consequence for those who do not 
conscientiously pursue their common aims (p. 41). In this particular instance, failing to adequately 
justify bills is strongly disincentivised. 
 
It is my contention that it is a higher-level body’s task to ensure that lower-level body decisions are 
sufficiently deliberative, but that they have specific and limited authority over them. Specialised 
functional bodies have the task of deliberating on their own issues, but not necessarily to analyse 
the broader implications of their decisions. Some committees may be capable of this but it is not 
their explicit task to do so; some may be less capable of doing this than others due to complexity or 
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levels of education. This problem would extend far less to the higher-level bodies as these are 
comprised of of experienced participants nominated specifically for their capacities of deliberation 
and understanding. Specialised functional bodies are able to administer their own issues but there 
will be instances where specialised functional bodies have an overlapping problem. When these 
circumstances arise, one of two processes could occur: a benign negotiation between affected 
specialised functional bodies, or an arbitration from a higher-level body. Not all conflicts between 
bodies would merit appeal to a higher-level body; two committees may be fully capable of 
deliberating or negotiating together when their issues begin to overlap. It is only when this joint 
negotiation fails that the higher-level bodies are needed. The affected specialised functional bodies 
could petition the higher-level body to have the original policy audited; when this occurs, the 
higher-level body examines whether the policy does have broader implications than the legislating 
authority considered and would make a determination as to whether the policy was sufficiently 
deliberative. The higher-level body primarily has the role of ensuring that the lower-level bodies do 
not infringe on each others’ boundaries. The higher-level body may take several possible actions in 
response to a claim that an issue is cross-jurisdictional. Each situation is unique, and the higher-
level body needs to identify the best course of action for that context. This solution might be to hold 
a joint session of the committees involved, or to set up an entirely new committee with newly 
assessed deliberative pragmatic interests. 
 
My proposed model is an improvement on the other models of demarchy, as it mitigates or 
eliminates some of the problems I argued are inherent in them. To recap: an adaptive approach to 
demarchy places deliberation and inquiry at the forefront of its processes. All potential participants 
have an opportunity to engage in an inquiry process prior to any decision-making, to determine who 
is affected and how they are affected. It is a learning process, as these participants have the capacity 
to shape the specialised functional bodies as they are formed. My model allows for the use of 
different selection methods to suit the specific context. This overcomes the problem of requiring 
pre-conceived notions of what constitutes a legitimate material interest and how these should be 
sampled. I incorporate Burgh’s use of unconditional random selection, as it can provide an equitable 
selection of candidates. However, my model recognises that this unconditional random selection 
may not be equitable in all contexts, and allows participants in this initial inquiry to explore other 
mechanisms that may be more suitable. My model also grants higher-level bodies the power to veto 
bills from specialised functional bodies. For the decisions of specialised functional bodies to be 
legitimate, they must have publicly justified reasons for their decisions. The higher-level bodies 
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under my model creates a mechanism to both deter and prevent non-deliberative policies from 
becoming law.  
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Models of demarchy 
 
 Selection 
mechanism 
Eligibility 
requirement 
Model of 
deliberative 
democracy 
Prerequisite 
level of 
education 
Statistically 
representative 
demarchy 
 
Stratified 
sampling 
Legitimate 
material 
interests 
Procedural, 
instrumental, 
pluralist 
Democratic 
habits of mind 
Statistically 
representative 
demarchy 
(2016)
5
 
Stratified 
sampling 
Legitimate 
material 
interests 
Procedural, 
instrumental, 
pluralist 
Democratic 
habits of mind 
Cross-sectional 
demarchy 
Unconditional 
random 
sampling 
None (assumed 
interest based 
on concern over 
public issue) 
Procedural, 
pluralist,  
collaborative 
decision-
making 
None 
Adaptive 
demarchy 
Context-
dependent 
sampling 
Deliberative 
pragmatic 
interests 
Flexible (with 
deliberative 
systems) 
None 
 
  
                                                          
5
 Burnheim’s version of demarchy, in terms of selection methods and eligibility requirements, remain fundamentally the 
same as the model originally offered in 1985. His purpose in demarchy has shifted in Manifesto to focus more on the 
problem of ensuring decisions are being made, away from the more explicit goal of maximising representativeness.   
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explicitly placed inquiry and deliberative justification at the heart of 
democratic legitimacy. Centralised democratic authorities have increasing difficulty in being 
meaningfully deliberative, and this is partly due to the complexities involved in each issue. A 
decision-making process for an issue such as municipal sanitation would likely be inappropriate for 
a much more challenging problem requiring international cooperation. 
 
As I argued in Chapter 4, there are a multitude of approaches to deliberative democracy. Due to the 
fact that so many decision-making contexts exist, I have argued that no single approach to 
deliberative democracy can be universalisable. A adaptive demarchy provides a deliberative 
democratic approach that can be used in many contexts; legitimacy in this type of democracy comes 
from the decision-making process itself, and not just the representativeness of the participants. It is 
not always possible to seek substantive equality or have all interests accurately represented in 
decision-making. What I have argued is that genuine inquiry and deliberativeness should be central 
to all demarchic bodies, no matter whether it is more expressive for simple issues or more 
instrumental for complex issues. I have not attempted to create a holistic model of demarchy; 
ultimately, each specialised functional body needs to be adapted to the specific context to maximise 
its deliberative potential. 
 
In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how demarchy can be implemented in a practical manner. 
Burnheim did this in The Demarchy Manifesto but I will pursue this problem of implementation 
slightly differently. He speculated on several hypothetical structures that could improve 
representativeness and deliberativeness, whereas I offer specific changes to existing political 
institutions that would make them more into more deliberative democratic organisations. I contend 
that demarchy can be used in piecemeal fashion; different aspects of a demarchy can be utilised to 
pursue varying deliberative democratic approaches.  
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Chapter 7 
Adaptive demarchic structures for Australia 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to reconstruct demarchy as a contemporary model of deliberative 
democracy. This has included a major adjustment by making public deliberation a crucial aspect in 
determining eligibility for representation to participate in policy making on matters of public 
interest. I have argued that demarchy can utilise various selection mechanisms and use communities 
of inquiry to strengthen the quality of deliberation. No single method of participant selection is 
appropriate in all contexts, as some issues may require more expressive or substantive approaches 
of selection to ensure meaningful deliberation occurs. In the Chapter 5, I offered a revised proposal 
for demarchy that incorporated emphasised notions of inquiry and learning processes to improve the 
quality of deliberation. However, my proposal is intended to do more than offer an analysis of 
demarchy. I have argued that my model is adaptive; it is a deliberative democracy that can serve to 
improve deliberation and inquiry in all contexts. In this chapter, I will provide several real world 
examples of how demarchy can be adapted to improve the quality of democratic deliberation. My 
purpose is to identify specific weaknesses in existing democratic processes, and then offer an 
adapted demarchic procedure to address these weaknesses. 
 
To do this, I offer three proposed demarchic procedures for weaknesses in deliberation and inquiry 
in the Australian political process.
6
 The first proposal is for ‘demarchic commissions’. These 
operate in principle in the same manner as Official Inquiries: Government-created investigations 
into an issue of public importance. These are designed to utilise demarchic selection procedures 
rather than having participants appointed by governments. The second proposal is for demarchic 
plebiscites. Plebiscites in Australia are a direct democratic procedure with little or no deliberation 
and inquiry (for the majority of the population), and have an advisory role only. This differs from 
referendums, which are required by law as a procedure to change the constitution. A demarchic 
plebiscite alters the procedure to be a series of democratic forums as opposed to merely being an 
exercise in mass voting on an issue to determine popular opinion or preferences. The purpose of my 
proposal is to create a well-informed and considered representation of a nation’s preferences. 
                                                          
6 There is no greater purpose in selecting Australian politics other than that I am familiar with its processes as a resident. There are undoubtedly a 
thousand other opportunities in other local, national and global contexts. 
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Finally, my most ambitious proposal is for the re-introduction of an upper house in Queensland but 
as a house of review. Queensland is the only state in Australia to lack an upper house and has been 
without this body for nearly a century. This proposal incorporates elements of the previous two 
procedures to improve the quality of deliberation in the Queensland parliament. My intention is to 
illustrate how procedures such as specialised inquiry committees and deliberative polling can 
enhance deliberation without providing a complete blueprint of the entire procedure. I do not meant 
to supplant the existing Westminster Parliamentary system in Australia, only to supplement it. They 
are meant to demonstrate that demarchy can take many practical approaches. In each case, there are 
elementals of functional decentralisation and random selection. However, what is crucial is the 
improvements to political deliberation that these processes create. 
 
Demarchic commissions 
 
Australian governments already have a type of deliberative democratic process at its disposal: 
public inquiries (Australian Government, 2016c). When there is an issue that is broad public 
significance, the government may opt to create a specialised investigative body known as a 
commission to conduct inquiries into the matter. These range broadly on their content but have to 
do with any issue that does not require discreet investigation. Possible issues for public inquiries 
could be on the national broadband network, building energy alternatives for the nation, 
environmental protection, and so on. A specific person is appointed by the government to lead a 
commission, who then has the authority to appoint further commission members and then inquire 
into the matter as they see fit. The commission usually has between sex and twelve months to 
inquire into the issue and then present a report of their findings to parliament. A traditional 
commission is a public inquiry process, meaning that its investigations and forums are accessible to 
the broader public. The commissions usually put out a call for expressions of interests, and then 
invites specific submissions to contribute to the inquiry proceedings. After this initial consultation 
process, the commission publishes a draft report and invites further submissions on this report. 
Once hearings have been conducted on this draft and its submissions, a final report is sent to the 
Government for consideration (Australian Government, 2016b).  
 
The advantage of these public inquiries is that they are consultative processes, allowing for a wide 
variety of interested groups to contribute to the inquiry. The Government could be seen to take an 
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instrumentalist and proceduralist approach to decision-making; the government have founded this 
semi-independent commission as a means of discovering coherent policy alternatives. Government 
decisions have a greater amount of legitimacy when they can follow deliberative policy 
recommendations of such a public inquiry. However, the weakness of this approach is that this 
commission is not fully independent of political influence; commissions are appointed by the 
Government, meaning that the inquiry process may be populated with party hacks or individuals 
who are sympathetic to a specific policy agenda. This may result in a biased inquiry, as the 
commissioners may attach greater weight and authority to dominant discourses. This is not to say 
that partisan appointees are unable to engage in genuine inquiry or would necessarily create 
testimonial injustices. My contention is that these commission may produce stronger deliberation if 
they take a more expressive approach to consultation as well as using demarchic selection 
procedures. One of the limitations of the traditional commissions is that the commissioner is 
appointed by the government; my model allows for interested parties to directly participate as 
commissioners rather than only contributing to the inquiry. This creates a more equitable 
opportunity for citizens to participate, and this in turn may improve the quality of the inquiry.  
 
My proposal is thus: the Treasurer still sends out a reference for a public inquiry into a specific 
issue and nominates an individual to facilitate this commission. This person is required to put out 
the call for expressions of interest in the commission. Citizens may volunteer for participation in the 
committee or submit their own information and perspectives. There is a practical limit to how much 
people can participate; many would be unable to set aside time to be a part of a months-long inquiry 
process, and so would still be able to send written submissions. As part of the application process, 
citizens would have to outline their deliberative pragmatic interests; they must articulate how they 
are affected by the issue. Those who are unable to reasonably justify why they should participate 
(such as stating that they merely have strong feelings on the matter) would be ineligible to be 
selected. The commissioner, being chosen by the government as a judicious and experienced 
individual, could separate the various types of interests involved and then nominate a sampling of 
candidates to participate. There does not need to be a demographically representative set of 
commissioners or a minimum number of participants from each interest group. What is crucial is 
that those who have an interest in the inquiry have an opportunity to shape that inquiry. This 
process is aimed to allow for a much broader cross section of the community to directly 
participation in inquiry. The facilitator has the task of mediating this public forum, and must ensure 
that there is a civil and reasonable tone to the discussion. The purpose is not to debate policy itself 
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but to determine the various interests involved, and what the composition of the commission should 
be. 
 
The primary advantage of this process is that it may create a group of commissioners that have a 
variety of cultural and intellectual backgrounds. Recommendations made by a group with such 
diversity may be perceived as more substantively equitable and serving the public good, as they 
have little partisan affiliation. A commission that lacks this diversity may fall under suspicion; both 
the specific interest groups involved and the wider population may wonder if genuine inquiry has 
actually occurred.
7
 In these cases, the government may be accused of creating an inquiry to justify 
an unpopular policy they were going to implement regardless. If the commissioner was poorly 
chosen, then the other participants would likely not be meaningfully representative. My proposal 
adds in this additional demarchic selection process to increase the potential strength of inquiry; in 
the worst case these processes would simply be ineffective. However, the random sampling of 
participants provides citizens with more opportunities to engage in public discourse. Applying for 
participation would require that volunteers consider their interests and how they are affected, 
engaging in a thought process they may have otherwise overlooked. Ultimately, my proposal for 
demarchic commissions offers a small chance to an existing deliberative procedure. It may provide 
a more equitable access to the inquiry, as well as providing opportunities for citizens to engage in 
inquiry. 
 
Demarchic plebiscites 
 
In this section, I propose an alternate model for use in politics that I refer to as a demarchic 
plebiscite. I explore a model for plebiscites that serves the same purpose in determining public 
opinion, but I modify the way in which the process of forming public opinion is negotiated. More 
specifically, I aim to create procedures that enhance the collective learning processes so that 
participants develop a better collective understanding of the specific issue in question to increase 
the likelihood of better collective outcomes including a better educated citizenry capable of better 
collective decision-making. Additionally, this mechanism allows for the government to better 
understand the population’s considered views on a given issue. To do this, I will first discuss a 
                                                          
7 In “Persuasion and Distrust”, Randall Kennedy (1986) argues that there must be a transformation of the discourse so that all of the motives of 
participants are clearly established. Distrust in politicians’ motives can erode public confidence, particularly in matters involving diversity issues, 
such as race relations (Kennedy, 1986, p. 1343). 
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related direct democratic mechanism: the referendum. Referendums follow similar procedures to 
plebiscites, as both are nation-wide votes on an issue (Australian Government, 2015). Referendums 
serve another purpose though, as they are a procedural mechanism required to alter the constitution. 
They are not intended to serve a formally deliberative purpose, rather to gain the consent of the 
nation. Oftentimes, the way a referendum is framed substantially affects the way the issue is 
perceived. Next, I will discuss the current use of plebiscites, a non-binding direct democratic 
procedure. I argue that plebiscites have very limited value in a democracy due to their non-
deliberativeness and lack of force of law. This leads to my proposal of demarchic plebiscites; a 
procedure with the same aim as plebiscites (in discerning the nation’s opinions on an issue) but with 
a more deliberative democratic approach. This includes randomly selecting a cross-section of 
citizens to participate in a democratic forum, and then polling these participants after they have had 
the opportunity to develop more well-considered opinions. My purpose with this proposal is to 
replace existing plebiscite procedures while still leaving referendums as they are. Referendums are 
necessary in order to gain nation-wide consent in changing the constitution, whereas plebiscites can 
be utilised as more deliberative democratic mechanisms.  
 
One of the few direct democratic processes that can be used in a nation such as Australia is a 
referendum. The reasoning behind this process is relatively simple; as some issues are too 
pervasive, affecting all citizens in the same way, decisions on this issue can only be legitimised if 
all citizens are able to cast their vote on it. In “Referenda, Plebiscites and Sundry Parliamentary 
Impedimenta”, Greg Craven (2005) argues that the federal referendum process “represents a 
constitutional settlement deriving its legitimacy from a massive act of popular consent” (p. 81). In 
this way, referendums can also be seen as a deliberative democratic process as well, using a 
proceduralist, instrumental and pluralist approach to decision-making. While the referendum is a 
proceduralist process, not a substantive one, but they often aim to make a substantive change such 
as the 1967 referendum to recognise Aboriginals as citizens. However, substantive outcomes are 
difficult to accomplish, as they require a change to people’s beliefs and their actions; the substantive 
outcome of equality for Aboriginals would not have been possible without a commonly shared view 
that Indigenous people were citizens. Regardless, the process itself is a procedural approach to 
deliberative democracy. The referendum is a procedure that incorporates the full range of beliefs 
and interests within a nation (religious, cultural, ideological and moral perspectives) that cannot be 
included through representation alone. There is a weakness in the public deliberation for 
referendums however, in that despite being a mechanism that allows all citizens to have an equal 
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vote, there are no alternate forums for public deliberation. Political discourse is the only forum for 
discussion, meaning that the referendum is treated no differently to an electoral campaign. Citizens 
are not encouraged to take part in any discussion or debate, and arguably referendums are venues in 
which citizens should have well-considered opinions. There are no opportunities for this 
development.  
 
This is where I contend the weakness lies in referendums. These are instrumental in legitimising a 
decision on a massive scale, being legally binding, but without a deliberative means for arriving at 
decisions (Craven, 2005, p. 80). There may be many ways in which a specific issue can be 
addresses informed by the cultural, social, religious, economic and other aspects of that community. 
Taking only one approach to this when framing the question will alter people’s responses to it. This 
type of framing is especially likely if the issue has become heavily politicised and is partisan. In 
these circumstances, referendums are unlikely to pass (Lehman & Cavanagh, 2005, p. 174). An 
issue that requires the attention of an entire nation needs to be seen through many perspectives in 
order to be meaningfully explored. If the referendum is to meaningfully derive the consent of the 
majority of the population, citizens need to have opportunities to develop their opinions on the 
matter. Uninformed consent is of dubious value, and this problem may be magnified when asking 
millions of people to vote on an issue.  
 
An example of this problem can be seen in the 1999 Australia referendum, when the following 
question was put forward by parliament: 
 
A proposed law: To alter the constitution to establish the Commonwealth of Australia as 
a republic with the Queen and Governor-General replaced by a President appointed by a 
two-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth of Parliament. (Australian 
Electoral Commission, 2012) 
 
This question is not a simple one, and I do not intend to create an analysis of this specific choice 
and its consequences. Still, the question places a great deal of emphasis on the displacement of the 
monarchy. Framing the issue in this manner may have allowed the parliament to provoke a stronger 
pro-queen sentiment, improving the chances of the referendum’s defeat. The question could have 
been formulated in a different manner to create a different perspective on it. For example, the 
question could have replaced any mentions of the queen and instead refer more abstractly to foreign 
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monarchies. In this way, the referendum would have emphasised Australian independence and 
sovereignty, rather than the more negative connotation of abandoning the queen. For an issue of 
such complexity, neither question would have been wholly appropriate. Ensconced in this issue are 
problems of identity, values, sovereignty, trade treaties and so on. Arguably, each citizen must 
come to their own conclusion on the issue and prioritise their values. Another reason for the failure 
of the referendum was with the conception of the head of state; Australia would have a president 
but this person would be chosen by parliament and could be dismissed just as easily. Many 
republicans voted against the referendum due to this aspect of the law, despite fundamentally 
agreeing with the proposal. The nature of direct voting on an issue means that there cannot be more 
than a simple yes or no in response, but it can be clearly seen here that those who are in charge of 
framing the question can have enormous influence on the outcome. 
 
The plebiscite is a complementary direct democratic procedure to referendums (Australian 
Government, 2015). There primary difference between referendums and plebiscites is that a 
plebiscite has no force of law; it is merely a nation-wide vote for or against an issue. Those who put 
forward a plebiscite may gain a clearer understanding of the  general opinion of the population (at 
least in terms of immediate reaction) but no action must be taken as a result of this vote. There is 
questionable value to plebiscites as “they tend to promote a shallow, lackadaisical consideration of 
the issue to which they relate” (Craven, 2005, p. 84). Australia has only had three plebiscites in its 
history (Parliament of Australia, 2014, p. 379), two on the conscription of troops in World War 1, 
and the third on the national anthem in 1977. There is dubious value in plebiscites as they are now. 
However, it is a democratic mechanism that can be adapted to be more of a deliberative democratic 
procedure, similar to that of Fishkin’s deliberative opinion polls. Fishkin (1991) argues that opinion 
polls give an image of the public’s views as they currently stand (much like a plebiscite), though his 
focus is on making electoral democracies more deliberative. In his view, it is a challenge to balance 
the need for political equality with deliberativeness; direct democracy might grant all participants 
equal vote weight, but this would undermine deliberation. Deliberative opinion polls on the other 
hand “model what the public would think, if they had a more adequate chance to think about the 
questions at issue”(p. 81). As discussed in Chapter 5, deliberative opinion polling is a form of face-
to-face democracy, where citizens share and develop their views in an informal setting. The 
outcomes of the poll are still recorded, but these outcomes far more accurately represent the 
citizens’ preferences for political candidates. 
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A noteworthy and highly successful adaptation to these types of mass direct democracy can be seen 
in the British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly. A group of 160 citizens were chosen using a near 
random selection mechanism to examine the electoral system of British Columbia. Their task was to 
re-evaluate how elections were conducted, and then put forward a recommendation to the entire 
electorate as a referendum. This was a carefully crafted democratic experiment rather than being a 
fixture in Canadian democracy. It was designed to improve the overall quality of decision making 
by “empowering a citizen body to redesign political institutions so as to address democratic deficits 
(as compared to being consulted)” (Warren & Pearse, 2008, p. 7). Framers of the experiment 
recognised that politicians were not well positioned to self-critique, and that a random group of 
citizens would not have adequate legitimacy to conduct such an enormous change to the political 
institutions. A referendum was not seen as adequately deliberative, as this process was too closely 
connected with the very electoral systems in need of reform. Warren and Pearse argued that “the 
citizens have a right to chosen not only their electoral systems but the particular form of each type 
proposed” (p. 29). Thus the experiment conceived of a randomly selected group of citizens to 
deliberate on improving the democracy without the potential influence of vested political interests.  
 
The selection process for participation utilised both stratified random sampling (to be adequately 
inclusive of sex and geography) and simple random sampling (to account for ethnicity, religion, 
socioeconomic status and so on). Biases were deliberately introduced prior to the random selection 
to ensure participants were committed to the process. These biases included being on the electoral 
roll, responding in the affirmative to the invitation to participate, and having English language 
fluency. A stipend was provided to mitigate the challenges of low-income citizens participating. 
 
A major advantage of this experiment was its placement centrally in the democratic system; the 
Citizen’s Assembly was seen as highly legitimate due to being focused on constitutional processes 
as well as being highly representative through the use of random selection. Public consultation was 
a crucial component of the process. The wider electorate was always aware of the deliberations, as 
participants continually responded to the concerns of ordinary citizens. Through this consultative 
process, participants grew more component as the experiment went on. Interestingly, the more 
deliberations and consultations were conducted, the further they moved away from the raw form of 
public opinion. Participants came to understand that the expressed opinions of the public were non-
deliberative (p. 80), and eventually opted for a contrary alternative, rather than the most publically 
palatable option. 
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Ultimately, the experiment could be seen as highly successful as a supermajority of participants 
opted for the change to a new type of electoral system, with the vast majority of this group opting 
for a specific type of new system. The British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly served as a separate 
authority to existing political institutions, providing a significant improvement to the quality of 
deliberation while still being a legitimate decision-making body.  
 
Thus, I offer the following proposal: demarchic plebiscites. It is a costly and inefficient matter to 
conduct plebiscites, and the results are non-deliberative. Conversely, a demarchic plebiscite would 
operate in a fashion akin to that of a deliberative opinion poll rather than an exercise in mass voting. 
The demarchic plebiscite is a mechanism designed to determine what the public thinks on a specific 
issue. This is a non-electoral democratic procedure; similar to Fishkin’s polls, citizens would 
volunteer to participate in a public discussion. The purpose of these discussions is to create coherent 
image of citizens’ preferences; it would be necessary to hold hundreds of these forums throughout a 
country to get an adequate sample size. A demarchic plebiscite would create a snapshot of citizens’ 
considered opinions, as opposed to being a holistic accounting of all citizens’ non-deliberative 
views. A random selection occurs of all those who volunteer to create a type of equality of access to 
the plebiscite, and all citizens are eligible to participate. It would be important to know the 
demographics of the participants (socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, etc.) in order to 
determine whether the samples are representative. This membership would be rotational, giving 
more volunteers the opportunity to be selected for participation over time. My intention here is not 
to create a demographically representative snapshot of views. It is crucial that demographics of 
participants are known in order to determine the weaknesses and strengths of the procedure.  
 
These plebiscites would operate as communities of inquiry, led by a non-partisan facilitator. These 
facilitators could be chosen as the discretion of the Australian Electoral Commission (the non-
partisan body that administers federal elections) in order to avoid any type of impropriety or 
suspicion of bias. The Government could request for submissions by subject matter experts to create 
informational and educational materials from a variety of perspectives; this would create packages 
of knowledge that facilitators could present to each community of inquiry. After this, the group 
would discuss and deliberate on the issue, its potential consequences and outcomes, and express 
their view. They are not to find consensus; it is unnecessary for the group to reach an agreement. At 
the end, the participants are to express their view and articulate their reasons for this view. 
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Facilitators of the community are tasked with recording these opinions and submitting them. The 
results of hundreds of these forums are collated into one publicly accessible report, which details 
how the population voted and the most significant reasons for those votes.  
 
There are several advantages to this approach, as it provides an educative process for citizens to 
develop their understanding of an issue and then convey deliberative opinions, as well as being able 
to operate within existing political institutions. The demarchic plebiscite serves a deliberative 
democratic purpose while doing nothing to interfere with the legitimacy of referendums. 
Participants have an opportunity to develop cultural citizenship in using mechanisms described by 
Delanty (2003). A demarchic plebiscite is a process that requires learning involving connecting 
different concepts and the development of competencies through participation. The demarchic 
plebiscite also may provide an indication of when an issue should be put forward as a referendum. 
Some issues may be ready for public debate but not for a decision to be made. The 1999 Australian 
referendum indicated that there was a significant amount of support for republicanism (Australian 
Electoral Commission, 2011) but a slight majority preferred remaining a constitutional monarchy. 
There was a sense that it was better to maintain the Queen as the current head of state than to use an 
untested presidency (McAllister, 2001, p. 265). However, if the Queen was to no longer be the 
reigning monarch, the question of Australian republicanism may be worth revisiting in the form of a 
demarchic plebiscite. If the plebiscite still reflected a majority of pro-monarchist sentiments, the 
issue may not be worth taking to referendum yet.  
 
A demarchic plebiscite could be a mechanism to explore the public’s views on an issue of national 
significance. This would be an ideal method of testing public opinion again on a topic such as 
Australian republicanism. As I discussed earlier, this is an issue with many interests involved and 
facets, including national identity, economic implications, changes to political representation. 
Participation would be voluntary and citizens would be selected by lot to participate in deliberative 
forums. Hundreds of these forums would be held all across Australia in order to gain a 
representative cross-section of the nation; all citizens are eligible to participate, but must volunteer 
in order to demonstrate some level of interest in the republican question in order to be selected. 
These forums would be ongoing, with new participants being randomly selected to increase the 
sample size of the plebiscite. Much like official inquiries, there would likely be a time limit on the 
length of the procedure (such as six months); long enough to gain a reasonable sampling of the 
views of participants but not so long as to waste public funding. Republicanism may be an interest 
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that can affect all Australians, and this forum would provide a snapshot of the nation’s views 
overall. After a weekend of discussion and debate, the deliberative and considered opinions of the 
public are collated into one publicly accessible document. The demarchic plebiscite would have 
created a coherent snapshot of the citizens’ views. This would then provide a clear indication as to 
whether the issue was ready for elected representatives to pursue in a referendum; if there was a 
clear indication that most Australians were in favour of republicanism, elected representatives 
would likely suffer a loss of credibility if they ignored such a clear deliberative nation-wide 
opinion.  
 
There are limitations to my proposal however. The first is that despite my reconstructing plebiscites 
to make them more deliberative, they remain a democratic process with a weak authority. Without 
any force of law, any changes to existing policies or legislation completely rely on the actions of 
elected representatives. My response to this is that this process is taking an expressive approach to 
deliberative democracy; there is value in using a demarchic plebiscite as it can be an opportunity to 
develop citizens’ opinions and gain a clear understanding of their informed preferences. There are 
few mechanisms to educate citizens on issues as well as the very processes of being a citizen (such 
as how to deliberate) and using these forums can create thousands of well-considered opinions. 
Demarchic plebiscites would be used as a public forum for discussion, not as instrumental in 
making public decisions. 
 
The demarchic plebiscite may also be potentially unrepresentative, as it lacks the self-correcting 
mechanism inherent in Burgh’s (1998) model of cross-sectional demarchy. Under his model, a 
representative cross-section occurs over time, and is not necessarily so at any particular time 
depending on the composition of the demarchic body. My demarchic plebiscite would create a 
snapshot over the hundreds of forums, but these would still be limited to a certain period of time 
(such as a year to gain a reasonable sampling). This means that the snapshot of citizens’ views may 
not be representative of all the different interest groups. Burgh’s demarchic bodies rotate and are 
meant to be representative over many years, whereas for practical decision-making, a demarchic 
plebiscite would need to produce a reasonable sample of views in a year or less. Any longer than 
this and the government may be replaced by a different party, which may then simply cancel the 
plebiscite. There may be a large number of people who do not volunteer to participate as they do 
not fully understand how the issue affects them. Many citizens may wish to participate if they 
understood how an issue may affect them in the long or short term. This creates a catch-22; in order 
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to learn how to deliberate and develop a well-considered opinion, a person must volunteer to 
participate. However, a person is unlikely to volunteer to participate unless they already have a 
strong opinion on the matter. My primary response to this weakness is that a demarchic plebiscite 
provides a procedural approach to equality, allowing all who may wish to participate the same 
opportunity to be selected. As this issue (republicanism) concerns all Australians, a cross-sectional 
selection (using simple random sampling) may be more representative than a stratified sampling. A 
stratified sampling may preclude separate interest groups from participating as the framers of the 
plebiscite sample on certain demographics. A cross-sectional selection on the other hand allows all 
volunteers an equal opportunity to be selected, and this may be crucial in an issue where all citizens 
are eligible to participate. There is no practical way to determine who should be involved in 
deliberations except by engaging in inquiry with volunteers.  
 
My aim with this model of demarchy is to improve the deliberativeness of an existing democratic 
mechanism. A demarchic plebiscite is not a perfect procedure due to the potential non-
representativeness of all the interests involved in the issue; those who self-select to participate are 
likely to be significantly different demographically than those who don’t participate. Fishkin & 
Luskin (2005) argue that if the forum offers some type of incentive for participation, the sample 
will be representative of the population. Political equality is achieved despite the problem of self-
selecting volunteers. They state that “both demographically and attitudinally, the statistically 
significant differences are few and remarkably modest. The participants are a bit older, more 
educated, and more interested and knowledgeable about the topics than nonparticipants, but not by 
much” (p. 290). This incentive can be as simple as a stipend for participation, along with the 
plebiscite paying the cost of transportation and meals. Criminal juries operate in a similar manner, 
otherwise those who cannot afford to take time off work to sit on a legal jury would never be able to 
contribute in this manner. A demarchic plebiscite could therefore offer simple incentives such as 
monetary reimbursement for participants’ time and effort, overcoming the potential non-
representativeness of self-selecting volunteers. 
 
A Demarchic Legislative Council 
 
In this section, I offer a bold proposal which incorporates elements of the previous two plans: the 
reinstitution of the upper chamber in Queensland parliament. All other states in Australia are 
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bicameral legislatures, meaning that there are two chambers to each parliament. To do this, I will 
outline the historical and political context of this now absent political institution, then discuss why 
it would be beneficial to bring back this chamber as an advisory body. A new upper house in 
Queensland could foster deliberation and genuine inquiry while doing nothing to interfere with 
legitimacy of existing political structures. Members of the Legislative Council could create ad hoc 
small, specialised inquiry committees to analyse and advise on policy matters, and conduct ongoing 
deliberative opinion polling to ensure that parliament remains sensitive to the preferences of the 
broader population. 
 
In Australia, lower houses are known as Legislative Assemblies; membership of the Assemblies is 
conducted through popular election, with each seat being the sole representative of an entire 
electorate and serving terms of three to four years. The upper houses in Australia are known as 
Legislative Councils. Unlike lower houses, each Council is a multi-member constituency, with the 
entire state being considered one electorate. Councils serve as houses of review, generally having a 
smaller number of members that serve longer terms. In a bicameral legislature, a bill can only 
become law if it is passed by both lower and upper houses, requiring a simple majority in the 
Legislative Assembly and consent of the Legislative Council. Councils often form small 
committees to analyse the contents of bills in detail, as it is generally seen as ineffective to engage 
the full body in debate on any given issue. These committees are formed to deliberate on a bill, then 
report their findings to the larger council. After this, the committee is disbanded and new 
committees are formed to examine new bills. 
 
Queensland operates differently, as it abolished its upper house in 1921. The Queensland 
Legislative Council was seen as an undemocratic forum, with many members being chosen as 
representatives due to political patronage (Queensland Parliament, 2001, p. 2). Members of the 
Legislative Council were more akin to lords, being wealthy landowners rather than being 
representatives of interest groups or electorates. As a result, this upper house often came into 
conflict with the Legislative Assembly, vetoing many of the bills designed to further worker’s rights 
or socially progressive programs. The Council became autocratic and obstructionist, leading to the 
Legislative Assembly attempting and succeeding in abolishing the Council. The Premier appointed 
additional sympathetic members to the Council, then put forward a bill to abolish the Council. With 
the shift in the upper house majority, the Legislative Council voted itself to permanently disband. 
The reason for this change to the structure of the Queensland government is clear: the Legislative 
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Council was not competently serving its purpose as a house of review. It may have been possible 
for a non-representative body consisting of wealthy lords to conduct meaningful deliberation, but in 
this instance they served an obstructionist role. 
 
What is the value in reinstituting an upper house in Queensland then? The problems of electoral 
democracies have been well explored in previous chapters, and the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly is not immune to these criticisms. Voters primarily cast their ballots for either the Liberal 
National Party or the Labor Party, with a minority of votes going towards third parties or 
independent candidates (Queensland Electoral Commission, 2015). Political debates are adversarial, 
prosecutorial and lack deliberativeness in state politics. In “The declining reputation of politicians: 
is it deserved?” Colleen Lewis (2002) argues that public debates in Australia are vitriolic exercises 
in juvenile name calling and scorn. She contends that this lack of respectfulness is a major obstacle 
to meaningful deliberation, rather than some abstract difficulty in overcoming an ideological divide. 
In “an adversarial context difference with opponents is the norm. That is not at issue. What is is the 
level and tone at which those disagreements take place” (p. 140). The constant denigration of 
politicians both within parliament and to the media leads voters to believe the worst about their 
representatives (p. 141). It would be idealistic or plain naïve to assume that any kind of genuine 
inquiry or meaningful deliberation would occur in this context. Agreement and compromise seems 
impossible when a majority of elected representatives appear antagonistic, adversarial and 
disrespectful. Changing the tone of political discourse is not a feat that can be accomplished in any 
short period in time. It may take years or decades to reduce the amount of adversarial debate. 
However, I contend that this shift in discourse can begin in Queensland with the introduction of a 
non-partisan house of review. 
 
The task of gaining adequate political support to reinstitute the Legislative Council is a challenge, 
and for the sake of brevity I will assume that my proposal can be implemented without facing 
overwhelming political resistance. I propose that the Queensland Legislative Council membership 
would be selected using demarchic procedures; councillors would be chosen by lot on a rotational 
basis. All Queensland residents would be eligible to participate in the Council, with the only 
requirement being that they are selected from a pool of volunteers. As an initial experiment, the 
Council could utilise an unconditional random selection of participants. If the Legislative Council 
proved to be a disproportionate cross-section of the population over time then the type of selection 
procedure could be re-evaluated to include quotas to increase representation of marginalised groups. 
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Replacing elections with a system or rotational office by sortition for the upper house would 
decrease the impact of partisan politics, as members of the Legislative Assembly could not rely on 
the predictable membership of conventional fixed-terms of office-bearers who are elected at regular 
intervals. Rotation of office based on sortition would place constraints on power trading and 
political deal making, especially among members of political parties who could not guarantee en 
bloc voting, and, therefore, increase the likelihood of deliberation on a bill before it is presented to 
the upper house for review.  
 
My proposal bears many similarities to the changes argued by Anthony Barnett and Peter Carty 
(2015) in The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the House of Lords. They proposed that the 
upper chamber in the United Kingdom could be reformed to have a membership chosen primarily 
through lot. The House of Lords, with its mix of lifetime appointments and hereditary peers, is not a 
legitimate democratic procedure regardless of whether it serves a deliberative purpose or not. In 
Barnett and Carty’s view, replacing hereditary selection with elections would not be effective, as 
this would only serve to further muddy an already muddy electoral system. Random selection of 
candidates is a viable means of choosing upper house representatives, as this would create a 
different type of representativeness to that of the lower house (p. 25). Barnett and Carty argue that 
while the newly reformed upper house would have improved powers of scrutiny; it would serve an 
explicitly deliberative function rather than a legislative or policy-making role. There would also be 
no change to their level of authority, as the House of Lords does not have the power to veto bills; 
they can only delay for a period of up to a year.  
 
I contend that a demarchic version of this would offer substantial advantages over Barnett and 
Carty’s proposal due to being a democratic body of comparable authority. A new Queensland upper 
chamber would have more explicit and tangible powers of veto, as well as being able to pass bills 
on their own. In addition to the random rotational selection of Council members, I argue that the 
Council also use demarchic inquiries and deliberative opinion polling as mechanisms to enhance 
deliberation. In terms of demarchic commissions, these could be similar to what other Legislative 
Councils use when using appointed committees. These are either standing bodies (continuous 
committees for ongoing issues) or select bodies (highly specialised committees for one-off issues). 
However, unlike these committees, demarchic committee members would also be chosen through 
random selection; each seated on a standing committee dedicated to a specific portfolio of issues. 
The participants remain in their allocated standing committee until the end of their term, and a new 
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member rotated in to replace them. In the case of select committees, members are also randomly 
selected to participate in these bodies. These committees serve a deliberative purpose, engaging in 
inquiry on a given bill to analyse its effectiveness. Once this inquiry is completed, they present their 
findings and recommendations to parliament. In this way, the findings and conclusions of this upper 
body serve a deliberative purpose; they cannot be ignored as an obstruction in the same way the 
House of Lords may be. 
 
The Queensland Legislative Council could also have a specialised standing committee dedicated to 
conducting deliberative opinion polls. The purpose of this committee would be to commission 
polling on specific issues, analyse those opinions then present these findings to parliament. This 
would provide all Queensland parliamentarians access to up-to-date information about constituents 
opinions and preferences. This information could be a publicly accessible report; any 
parliamentarian who wished to justify a proposed bill using public opinion and cite the findings of 
the deliberative opinion polling committee. The efforts of this committee in discerning the public 
preference in both ongoing and emergent issues would provide an improvement to conditions for 
deliberation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that Australian political institutions could be altered to 
improve the quality of deliberation and inquiry. The purpose my proposals is to improve the quality 
of deliberation in Australian political institutions. These proposals, particularly my notion of re-
instituting the Queensland Legislative Council, are limited due to their lack of technical specificity. 
I have not laid out a coherent blueprint for how the Queensland Council would be implemented as, 
like Burnheim, I propose that this should be left to experimentation and gradual implementation. 
The question of how to “demarchise” existing political institutions, or to move towards a more 
complete model of demarchy, merits significantly more discussion than I have provided. For 
example, demarchic procedures may be able to improve the quality of candidate selection. There 
have been several notable case studies where sortition has been used to strong effect. The city of 
Canada Bay in New South Wales utilised a random selection of 36 local residents to answer a 
specific government question: “What services should we deliver in the city of Canada Bay, and how 
should we pay for them?” (newDemocracy Foundation, 2011, p. 4). This citizen’s panel provided a 
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series of recommendations to the city council, with this recommendation process becoming an 
ongoing component of the city’s governance (Thompson, 2012). We can see in this example that a 
quasi-demarchic model can be utilised to great effect, improving the quality of deliberation as well 
as providing learning opportunities for citizenship. Carson and Martin (2002) describe a similar 
success in using a functionally decentralised advisory body. In their article “Random selection of 
citizens for technological decision-making”, they describe how a state-wide policy jury was created 
in New South Wales in 2000 to deal with a technology and sustainability issue.  This jury 
statistically sampled the 142 volunteers for the jury and created a demographically-representative 
sampling of the population. The jury was non-partisan, with no media coverage and utilised two 
facilitators. These facilitators had the task of disseminating information, encouraging the 
development of consensus and minimising the domination of strong personalities. This specific 
example demonstrates the potential of demarchy to not only to be deliberative but to operate as a 
community of inquiry. It is possible for demarchic procedures to enhance the quality of 
deliberation, citizenship education, and representation in a given political context. The purpose of 
my adaptive demarchy is to illustrate this notion; various procedures can be used to great effect. 
The limitation of my proposals is that they have not been fully fleshed out. However, the more 
demarchic experiments are carried out, the more deliberation can be enhanced. 
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Concluding thoughts 
 
Burnheim’s (1985) proposal for demarchy in Is Democracy Possible? was an attempt to address the 
problems of existing democracies which he says are no more than “elective oligarchies with strong 
monarchical elements” (p. 1). He argued that all present forms of democracy not only permit but 
also encourage tyranny. The result, he says, “is that they strain their claims to be called democracy 
and their claims to superiority over monarchies and oligarchies” (p. 4). Burnheim saw little benefit 
to democracy if it was no better at protecting or furthering than the autonomy than other forms of 
government. The primary way democracies attempt to protect this autonomy is through elections, 
but voting conveys very little information about the preferences of the voter. In his view, a vote 
does not indicate the strength of a belief or preference as “it cannot express anything like a price I 
am willing to pay” (p. 62). This problem is exacerbated by the use of party packages; bundles of 
policies and individuals wrapped together. There is no way to know why a person votes for a 
political party. Partisan politics also brings non-deliberative elements, wherein politicians would be 
able to trade their votes on one issue for the votes of other politicians on a separate issue. To 
counter such practices, Burnheim argued that a person should have no voice in decision-making in 
issues where they have no legitimate material interest. To this end, he criticised the use of 
geographically-based constituencies as it allowed those without such interests to participate in 
decision-making.  Moreover, political parties are prone to alter the shape and authority of 
democratic institutions for non-democratic reasons, such as through the gerrymandering of 
electorates. Voting for politicians had become corrupted, non-deliberative exercises in petty 
tyranny.  
 
Burnheim’s proposal is ambitious, insofar as he offers a utopian illustration of a democratic polity. 
Essential to his proposal are functional decentralisation, statistical representation and rotational 
membership, deliberation, and higher-level bodies. Functional decentralisation, i.e., the use of 
specialised autonomous functional agencies in charge of a single issue, is a method of counteracting 
many of the non-deliberative factors that are inherent in a polity based on geographically located 
constituencies that have multiple functions. Because each committee deals with only one specific 
issue, this mitigates the problem of the inclusion of external factors that influence decision-making. 
Members of these decentralised functional bodies are chosen through sortition, a statistical 
sampling mechanism. This serves two significant purposes. The first is that it is “the most reliable 
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way of getting a group that is representative of a particular population” (p. 81), insofar as these 
single-issue bodies would be far more capable of protecting the autonomy of people affected by the 
issue. The second purpose is to improve the quality of deliberation: “such a system would still leave 
representatives a great deal of room for negotiation, and even for changing their opinions whenever 
they had defensible ground for doing so. It would approximate more closely than any other system 
to a fully participatory democracy” (p. 82). Unlike electoral politics, participants would be able to 
engage more deliberatively with the problem at hand as there is no incentive for careerism. The 
random selection of participants combined with the rotational offices means that participants could 
focus on the task at hand rather than on opinion polls. These participants could learn significantly 
more about the issues under discussion, making the process an educative experience. Burnheim 
contends that a higher-level body, which act as quasi-judiciary agencies, would oversee these 
specialised functional bodies, ensuring that a separate authority could administer procedural issues. 
The higher-level bodies “would not be empowered to initiate policy, much less to dictate to various 
functional bodies, but to provide a legal framework within which productive bodies operate” (p. 
87). 
 
His book was intended to convince readers of the viability of demarchy in the hope that some 
people might be convinced to try small scale experiments that would further convince others to 
incorporate changes that might one day lead to a fully-fledged demarchy. To some extent, such 
experiments have been tried, mainly focusing on decentralised decision-making and random 
selection in politics. For example, elements of demarchy can be seen in consensus-conferences, and 
democratic mechanisms that utilise a random selection of laypeople to deliberate on a specific issue. 
Carson and Martin (1999) highlight the success of the Danish Board of Technology’s use of a 
consensus-conference to produce public recommendations for the Danish parliament. Randomly 
selected individuals with no specialised knowledge were brought together to be informed by experts 
about specific technologies. Over the course of several days, this committee was able to set its own 
agenda and write its own report (p. 39). James Fishkin and Robert Luskin (2005) illustrate the 
practical application of demarchic procedures using deliberative opinion polling. They propose that 
a group of randomly selected participants could be brought together to conjointly develop their 
opinions on a specific issue. This would be a discursive exercise, facilitated by moderators, and 
participants would be encouraged to share their views and understanding. Deliberative opinion 
polls, such as the British based poll that was conducted on crime reduction, resulted in a significant 
change in participants’ preferences on criminal punishment (Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002, p. 
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485). This change was due to participants being more strongly informed on the root causes of 
crime; gaining up to date information on an issue demonstrably altered citizens’ preferences. 
 
Using Burnheim’s proposal for demarchy, the purpose of my thesis has been to offer some practical 
measures that could provide support or evidence to further persuade readers. To this end, it was 
inevitable that some aspects of his proposal would require clarification and others (aspects I 
consider to be not so persuasive) modification. I attempted to give various accounts of the major 
problems. My main concerns were with the methods of selecting participants, the political 
philosophy underlying Burnheim’s proposal, and the lack of specific mechanisms for educating 
citizens. For the first criticism, Burnheim argued that no one should participate in decision-making 
on an issue in which they had no legitimate material interest. I argued that the concept of legitimate 
material interests is of vital importance, but that there is no way of clearly delineating a material 
interest from a non-material interest. Calculating legitimate material interests relies too heavily on 
preconceived notions of what makes an interest legitimate. Secondly, Burnheim’s proposal is 
situated within a discourse which heavily emphasised protecting autonomy through participatory 
democracy. He was not aware of the changing direction of democratic theory, which came to place 
a greater emphasis on deliberative justifications for democracies, meaning that the legitimacy of 
demarchy ultimately still rested on the protection of people’s interests, or their opinion on what they 
perceived to be in their best interest, i.e., individual liberty. Thirdly, Burnheim meant for demarchy 
to be an educative exercise but his specialised functional bodies offered limited opportunities for 
citizens to develop their capacities for deliberation. However, meaningful deliberation, for 
Burnheim,  relies upon citizens having capacities and dispositions for discussion and inquiry; 
demarchy would not effectively function if this pre-condition has not been met somehow.  
 
I offered and alternative model called adaptive demarchy, which is meant to be a reconstruction; to 
re-situate demarchy within the new discourse on deliberative democracy. This new model alters the 
eligibility requirement so that it emphasises discursiveness; the process of determining a person’s 
eligibility to participate appeals to what I call deliberative pragmatic interests. The functional 
decentralisation of issues means that the only way to determine how people are affected is to engage 
in public deliberation, namely, to consider what the consequences of their interests and decisions 
are. In doing so, I provided an account of demarchy that makes deliberation central to its decision-
making. My model utilises demarchic procedures, such as random selection, rotation and functional 
decentralisation, but inquiry and deliberation play a far more important and integral role. I argued 
157 
 
 
 
that demarchy is a model of deliberative democracy, meaning that its decisions were only 
legitimised through deliberation. I also explicitly conceive of specialised functional bodies as 
institutional mechanisms for citizenship education. Each body can operate as a community of 
inquiry: a type of learning process that allows participants to conjointly develop their understanding 
of an issue. In other words, this provides an opportunity for participants to develop their social and 
intellectual capacities and dispositions for deliberation to informed and active citizenship. My 
demarchic proposal does not rely on only one set of demarchic procedures, as it is possible that 
some procedures are not appropriate for all socio-political contexts. My proposal is a model that 
consistently aims to re-evaluate itself, as a deliberative democracy includes a self-assessment of its 
own procedures to determine whether or not it is functioning effectively. It is an educative process, 
where both participants and the collective group learn how to deliberate more meaningfully over 
time.  
 
Burnheim’s later thoughts in The Demarchy Manifesto attempts to address the criticisms aimed at 
his first book. In particular, he recognises the importance of deliberation, and places a much greater 
emphasis on creating practical inquiry-based bodies. One of the most notable differences between 
The Demarchy Manifesto and Is Democracy Possible? is that he proposes his new demarchic bodies 
serve an advisory role; they provide a clearer path for existing political institutions to make justified 
decisions. He no longer seeks to wholly replace existing political structures, and instead seeks to 
solve contemporary and future policy problems. He articulates specific demarchic procedures that 
are intended to bring about strong conditions for deliberation. Examples of this include local 
communities becoming venues for direct participation, auditing committees to increase 
accountability in governance, and global demarchic juries conducting inquiry into single issues. Of 
particular note is a re-emphasis on the demarchic aspect of vigorous public debate as deliberative 
and educative. He says: 
 
The point of full public discussion is not just to enlighten those charged with drawing it 
to a conclusion. It ought also to educate the other participants and the public more 
generally. If we value an open society we must recognise that opening up our range of 
opportunities depends not only on resolving conflicts between people’s existing 
preferences, but in exploring new possibilities that open up when we are prepared to 
reconsider our preferences. A regime that gives us an active role in the process must 
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balance the protection of our existing interests against the development of new interests. 
(p. 36) 
 
This new emphasis is also evident in this passage: 
 
What applies to self-understanding of social groups also applies to individuals and the 
ways in which they can benefit from public discussion. Many considerations that they 
had not previously seen as affecting them are seen as more relevant once the situation is 
better understood. They are also likely to understand that in many matters they have 
conflicting interests arising from different roles, and that their ability to solve their 
personal problems often depends on how the society resolves those differences. The 
existence of a vigorous public discussion of a problem one share with others enables 
one to appeal to that discussion in personal relationships. One is not asking for special 
consideration or favours, but appealing to considerations that are widely accepted as 
valid. (p. 37) 
 
I have argued that Burnheim’s proposal does not always reflect what seems to be his intentions. 
Hence, I have placed greater theoretical emphasis on the need to develop deliberative dispositions 
and how demarchic procedures and structures can assist this, and I have discussed various ways in 
which I think this this educative aspect could be put into practice. To reiterate, demarchy can create 
conditions for strong deliberations as well as providing learning processes for the development of 
cultural citizenship. This type of citizenship is necessary for enhancing the deliberativeness of the 
decision-making process, as it emphasises democratic dispositions for toleration and inquiry  
 
On the topic of deliberation as having an educative component, I would like to conclude with some 
brief comments on the role of education as vital to the acceptance and implementation of demarchy. 
I mentioned Delanty’s idea of citizenship as a learning process; as collective cultural learning 
process. I have explained how demarchy can assist in developing ways to make these learning 
processes more salient to participants so that they are aware of the impact of inquiry However, it is 
important that we not neglect the role of formal education in bringing about an inquiring society 
that would be more open to alternatives like demarchy, but also on the raising the quality of 
deliberativeness. The question is: What educational practice would fit best the kind of deliberative 
demarchy I propose? Should such an education itself be demarchic? 
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I will say a few words on these matters. According to Walker (1992), who is an advocate of 
Burnheim’s demarchy, a compulsory education is justifiable in a society that values diversity and 
difference. The society would need to create the empirical conditions for well-educated participants, 
and the education system would play a vital role in this:  
 
The curriculum will be designed to promote open minded, experimental thinking, and 
should contain a variety of points of view and ways of doing things, not only 
complementing but often competing with each other. What, beyond this, is in the 
common interest, is a matter to be empirically and pragmatically determined as 
circumstances and new problems and challenges emerge. (p. 328)  
 
Burgh (1996) argues that demarchic decision-making is a process, rather than a single act. 
Participants develop not only their understanding of issues but their capacities for deliberation, and 
their views may change as these develop. In “Translating democracy into practice: a case for 
demarchy”, Burgh contends demarchy cannot achieve its substantive aims unless the society 
commits to an ideal of philosophy for children and communities of inquiry. He does not make a 
case for substantive goals, but argues that these types of changes to a society’s curriculum would be 
necessary to bring about the meaningful participation that Burnheim envisages. For Burgh, a 
demarchy that utilises an unconditional random selection can operate as a community of inquiry, 
bringing about the open-mindedness and willingness to experiment that are essential to meaningful 
participation: 
 
A system such as Burnheim’s demarchy, provided that statistical representation is 
replaced by total random selection, meets this demand. Demarchy will encourage 
continual deliberation, reflection and evaluation, and as it is tested, tried out and 
implemented into more areas of decision-making, it will be revised and fine-tuned. In 
terms of significance to philosophy for children, demarchy embraces the qualities which 
are characteristic of a community of inquiry, that is, a commitment to freedom, open 
debate, pluralism, and self-government. (p. 19) 
 
It seems that the model of the community of inquiry as pedagogy has all the hallmarks of an 
educational practice that would fit demarchy. In particular, the emphasis on rigorous inquiry as 
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integral to communal learning. Burgh (2009) contends that if democracy is a way of life that is 
discursive, then it is essential that educational arrangements be made to prepare citizens for this. 
Democracy is inherently a social practice, and demarchy provides a mechanism to develop the 
dispositions and capacities for inquiry and deliberation. 
 
In sum, if we are serious about democracy then we need to treat it as more than a competition of 
elites or a means of validating our pre-existing beliefs. It is a way of life, a mode of interaction. It is 
a procedure by which we do more than articulate our differences; we also discover the source of 
these differences and search for new alternatives. In this way, democracy itself is a mechanism for 
our self-development, and by engaging in democratic procedures we can find strong justifications 
for potential courses of action and become more willing to experiment with new possibilities. 
Deliberative democracy is becoming increasingly important in our world, as the politics and 
economics of a nation are able to influence the outcomes for a global community. We must have 
clear reasons for our democratic choices, and the only way to accomplish this is through genuine 
inquiry and deliberation. In this globally interdependent context, non-deliberativeness leads us to a 
dangerous place: a volatile world where toxic partisan discourse allows us to elect rabid populists 
instead of committed and conscientious public servants.  
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